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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with examining the right of return and compensation, under 
international law, of Jordanian nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin exclusively 
and Jordan’s right as their state of nationality to bring claims on their behalf to and 
against Israel. It does not concern itself with other categories of Palestinian refugees who 
are not Jordanian nationals although the two rights of return and compensation arguably 
apply to all Palestinian refugees.
The thesis also aims at examining Jordan’s right as a host country, under international 
law, to bring compensation claims to and against Israel for creating the Palestinian 
refugee problem. It examines the legal bases for such a right, under international law in 
the context of State Responsibility for wrongful acts along with relevant provisions of the 
1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty.
The thesis attempts to critically assess, analyze and examine major claims that Jordan can 
bring to and against Israel against principles of international law both on behalf of its 
nationals of Palestinian refugee origin and in relation to the right of return and 
compensation and claims of its own as a host state to and against Israel. It also critically 
assesses and examines the procedures and mechanisms available for the pursuit of such 
claims that are available to Jordan in the context of the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 
along with non Peace Treaty based procedures and mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
The number of Palestinian refugees, both that were rendered refugees as a result of the 
1948 Arab-Israeli War, the prelude to it and its aftermath and those who were rendered 
refugees as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and its aftermath (Commonly referred to 
a ‘Displaced Persons’) and the descendants of each of those two categories, is estimated 
to be today in the range of 6,890,000.1
One third of this total number of Palestinian refugees live in the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan (Jordan). The overwhelming majority of those are full fledged Jordanian Nationals 
today.2
Jordan had been the most hospitable country for Palestinians who became refugees both 
during and after the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. It is the only country that has 
granted Palestinian refugees full Nationality and extended to them the full privileges 
attached to nationality. Palestinian Refugees and their descendents constitute today 
almost 50% of the total population of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Other Arab 
countries did not confer nationality upon Palestinian refugees and their descendents and 
have granted them travel documents and formal residency status only.
1 See, Takkenburg, L. The Status o f  Palestinian Refugees in International Law , Clarendon Press 1998, pp. 
20- 21 .
2 Ibid.,
7
The context in which Jordan has opted to confer upon Palestinian refugees nationality 
arose in the wake of Jordan’s incorporation of the West Bank in 1950. In that year 
Jordan, formally incorporated the West Bank as part of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan. Jordan had contended then, when its decision to incorporate the West bank was 
challenged by many including the Arab League, that it was heeding the call to unity 
which was announced by a gathering of West Bank Notables in a conference that they 
Held in Jehrico to unite the West Bank with the East bank of Jordan under the reign of 
Kind Abdullah I of Jordan. A lot has been said regarding the lawfulness and legality or 
illegality of this unity and Jordan’s status in the West Bank between 1950 and 1967 when 
the latter was occupied by Israel in the wake of the 1967 War. Jordan’s status in the West 
Bank is not however the focus of this study. It will suffice to say in this context that after 
Jordan’s formal incorporation of the West Bank in 1950, Jordan enacted a new 
nationality law in 1954 in which it conferred the Jordanian nationality upon all 
Palestinian refugees and their descendants who were ‘habitually resident in Jordan 
between 1949 and 1954.3
Jordan has been shouldering the burden of Palestinian refugees for many decades now 
and it is estimated that Jordan has spent over the years almost 40 Billion US dollars to 
provide for and care for Palestinian Refugees.4
3 See, Jordanian Nationality Law, law number (6) (1954), in the Official Gazette o f  Jordan, issue Number 
1171 (16 February 1954), p. 105.
4 See, Cost o f  Influx o f  Palestinian Refugees Into Jordan, a detailed study conducted by the Refugees’ 
Study Unit at the Peace Process Coordination Bureau at the Jordanian Foreign Ministry dated 21 December 
2002.
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In 1988 Jordan announced its legal and administrative disengagement with the West 
Bank to allow for the Palestine Liberation Organization to assume its position as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian People. This was, especially the case in light 
of what seemed to be the prelude to the inception of a political process aimed at bringing 
the Arab-Israeli War to an end peacefully and through negotiations.
Nevertheless, Jordan had never abdicated what it has perceived as its exclusive right5 to 
defend and present claims on behalf of it nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin 
to return to their homes and receive compensation. When the Arab League adopted its 
Resolution in the Arab League Summit in Rabat in 1974 recognizing the PLO as the sole 
legitimate representative o f the Palestinian People, Jordan accepted that resolution and 
decision but made a reservation to the effect that the resolution in question does not 
prejudice Jordan’s exclusive rights in relation to all national thereof.6
The 1988 decision of legal and administrative disengagement with the West Bank 
preserved the citizenship status of all Palestinian refugees who were granted nationality 
in 1954 with the exception of those who were still residents of the West Bank at the time 
of the Disengagement. 7
5 Interview with Dr. Hani Mulki Head o f Jordan’s Negotiations Delegation with Israel and later Jordan’s 
Foreign Minister, Amman, 6 February 2006 [ hereinafter referred to as Interview with Mulki].
6 For the text o f  the Resolution o f the Arab League Rabat Summit Meeting and the text o f Jordan’s 
reservation in the authentic Arabic text see, MAJMUAT ALWATHAIK ALURDUNYA ( the Official 
Compilation o f Jordanian Documents), (1975), p. 243-245 [ hereinafter referred to as “ MAJMUAT 
ALWATHAIK”]
7 See MAJMUAT ALWATHAIK, ibid, (1988), P. 56-58.
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Jordan has been consistent in its position that it possesses the exclusive right to bring 
claims relating to its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin to and against Israel. The 
Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of 1994 contains provisions that address the issue of 
Palestinian refugees, resolving their problem and providing for mechanisms and 
procedures to address such matters.
Jordan viewed the issue of solving the problem of Palestinian refugees as one of its four 
central objectives for negotiating a peace treaty with Israel, the other three issues being 
water rights in shared trans-boundary water resources and the issues of borders and 
Jerusalem.8
Furthermore, Jordan firmly stands by the position that it has a right to seek compensation 
as a host country for costs that it has incurred as a result of shouldering the burden of 
Palestinian refugees for decades in Jordan.9
This thesis aims at appraising the right of return and right to compensation of Jordanian 
nationals of Palestinian refugee origin and Jordan’s right, under international law, to 
bring claims to and against Israel in relation to those two rights on behalf of such 
nationals, in addition to its right as a host country to bring compensation claims to and 
against Israel for generating refugees that fled to Jordan and settled therein in light of the 
signing of the Treaty of Peace between Jordan and Israel in 1994.
8 Interview with Mulki, op.cit.
9 Ibid.,
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The analysis in the thesis pertaining to the right of Palestinian refugees to return and their 
right to compensation, naturally applies to all Palestinian refugees, irrespective of 
whether they are Jordanian nationals or not. As a matter of fact, it applies equally, in 
terms of the treatment of international law of the issue of the right of return and right to 
compensation also to Jews who were expelled from Arab Countries in the wake of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.
This thesis however, does not attempt to assess or examine the right of return of all 
Palestinian refugees and their right to compensation under international law. It aspires to 
appraise the right of return and compensation, under international law, of the limited 
group of Palestinian refugees who are nationals of Jordan.
Members of this group of Palestinian refugees are in effect and in reality nationals of a 
State, i.e, Jordan. Their, right of return and right to compensation, as will be 
demonstrated, is firmly established under international law. They have the advantage of 
being nationals of a country since 1954. Accordingly, and unlike other Palestinian 
refugees in other countries today, they have the nationality of a country that can extend 
diplomatic protection to them in a manner that meets the substantive and procedural 
requirements of the ‘nationality of claims’ rule. Furthermore, they are nationals of a 
country which has signed a Treaty of Peace with Israel which includes provisions that 
address the issue of Palestinian refugees, thus giving Jordan another clear locus standi in 
relation to bringing claims on their behalf to and against Israel.
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The thesis attempts to also examine the bases of Jordan’s right, under international law to 
bring claims on behalf of its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin and its right as a host 
country to seek compensation from Israel relating to the costs that it has incurred as a 
result of hosting Palestinian refugees.
As indicated previously, the issue of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, their right to return 
and right for compensation had been one of the major objectives that have led Jordan to 
enter into a Peace Treaty with Israel. When the Peace Treaty was signed in 1994, almost 
everyone expected that the Arab-Israeli conflict would have been resolved peacefully and 
comprehensively in a few years to follow. This was also Jordan’s expectation back then.
Today after the lapse of 12 years from the signing of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict remains unresolved, the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are dormant 
since the year 2000 and the Articles of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty relating to refugees 
remain in the realm of treaty provisions that have not been implemented or executed. 
This is partially ascribed to the fact that some of the central provisions of the Jordan- 
Israel Peace Treaty indicate that some of the aspects of the issues of refugees are to be 
settled in negotiations that are to be held in conjunction with and at the same time as final 
status negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel. Such final Status negotiations 
have not seriously materialized thus far.
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The Peace Process has been stagnant for the past 5 years and the Israeli government has 
opted, over the past few years, towards implementing unilateral non negotiated 
withdrawals from Gaza and parts of the West Bank under the pretext that there is no 
Palestinian Partner committed to Peace that it can negotiate with currently and thus, 
according to this Israeli position, there would not be any ‘final status’ negotiations 
between the Palestinians and Israel in which Jordan can negotiate matters pertaining to 
Palestinian refugees with Israel at and in conjunction with.
Unlike many other Arab countries, Jordan has never had a Jewish community living in it 
that was expelled or forced to leave in the wake of the creation of the State of Israel and 
at the aftermath of its creation. This reality should operate in favor of Jordan, since Israel 
would not be able, in relation to Jordan, to demand, as it would likely do in relation to 
other Arab Countries the return of and compensation to their Jewish communities who 
fled such countries during the years of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan never had a 
Jewish community at all and accordingly, it may well be advisable for Jordan not to 
bundle its claims on behalf of its Palestinian refugee population in relation to the right of 
return and compensation with claims of other Arab Countries related to Palestinian 
refugees.
Jordan is already at formal Peace with Israel and in light of the fact that a solution to the 
issue of Refugees had been a central objective for Jordan in the context of the Peace 
Treaty with Israel and as a result of the fact that the a solution in the form of exercising 
the right of return and/or receiving compensation by the refugees has not taken place yet,
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neither has Jordan formally requested compensation from Israel for hosting Palestinian 
refugees generated by the latter, largely as a result of the long hiatus that has befallen the 
Middle East Peace Process, this thesis aims at appraising the rights in question and is 
structured in a manner that may be viewed as a ‘roadmap’ or ‘blueprint’ for presentation 
of claims by Jordan to and against Israel in relation to the right of return and 
compensation of its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin and Jordanian state 
compensation claims to and against Israel in relation to hosting Palestinian refugees who 
were generated and created by Israel once the Peace Process is resumed or in the context 
of a Jordanian decision to pursue this issue with and in relation to Israel regardless of the 
status of the Peace Negotiations.
Accordingly, Chapter 1 of this thesis will provide a historical and factual background that 
is indispensable for demonstrating that the generation of Palestinian refugees was the 
product of deliberate Israeli policy endorsed at the highest level of decision making in 
Israel both in 1948 and 1967. Furthermore, it will shed light and give appreciation to 
Jordan’s relationship with the Question of Palestine and the issue of Palestinian refugees 
and provide a necessary contextual underpinning for the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter 2 of the thesis will examine the right of Palestinian Refugees to return and their 
right to compensation under international law. It will survey the right of return within the 
United Nations system, the law of Nationality, human rights law and humanitarian law. It 
will also explore the right to compensation, in international law in detail. It will then 
proceed to identify and examine the legal bases available to Jordan to present claims to
14
and against Israel on behalf of its nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin relating 
to the right of return and compensation and the legal bases for its right to present claims 
for compensation as a host state to and against Israel. Those bases, that underline both 
Jordan’s right to bring claims on behalf of its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin and 
its right to compensation as a host state, are the doctrine of State Responsibility and the 
relevant provisions of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of 1994. The chapter will explore 
the requirements of ‘nationality of claims rule’ and exhaustion of local remedies. It will 
also highlight the erga omnes character of certain aspects of such claims.
Chapter 3 attempts to highlight and assess the major potential claims that Jordan my 
present to and against Israel in detail. It will examine each and every head of possible 
major claim and assess its strengths and weaknesses in light of relevant principles of 
international law. This chapter will provide an in depth analysis of violations that Israel 
has committed in relation to both Palestinian Refugees of the period of 1947-1949 and 
Palestinian refugees of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The heads of claims are divided into 
two time frames; one relating to possible heads of claims relating to the 1947-1949 
refugees and the other related to the 1967 refugees (commonly referred to as Displaced 
persons in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and literature related thereto). This is 
particularly the case owing to the fact that certain developments of international law rules 
had evolved and developed between the two Palestinian refugee generating events in the 
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. New rules would inevitably thus, apply to the 1967 
refugees that do no necessarily apply to the refugees of 1947-1949. the Chapter will 
examine thoroughly Israeli legislation pertaining to property and demonstrate that the
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combined effect of this legislation constitutes expropriation of individual property of 
Palestinian refugees. It will also illustrate Israel’s continued obstruction of the right of 
Return of Palestinian refugees and point to existing continued breaches committed by 
Israel of Article 11.1 of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty which has a direct bearing on 
providing Jordanian Nationals of Palestinian refugee origin with remedies by Israel in 
relation to its discriminatory national legislation. The Chapter also addresses the issue of 
claims relating to injury suffered by Jordan as a host state and attempts to outline and 
briefly assess the remedies that Jordan may seek.
Finally, Chapter 4 examines in detail the relevant provisions in the Jordan-Israel Peace 
Treaty addressing the issue of refugees and financial claims in general, in addition to the 
dispute settlement provision contained in the Treaty. The chapter assesses procedures 
and mechanisms offered by such Article that could serve Jordan in bringing claims to and 
against Israel. It provides a critique of those articles, their strengths and weaknesses and 
the impact of the Treaty on Jordan’s standing and right to present claims to and against 
Israel on behalf of its national who are of Palestinian refugee origin. The chapter also 
examines non Peace Treaty mechanisms and procedures that are available to Jordan such 
as recourse to the International court of Justice and other peaceful settlement of disputes 
procedures in addition to possible participation in Israeli-Palestinian Mechanisms. Such 
mechanisms would not have been procedurally or even theoretically conceivable had 
Jordan and Israel not concluded the Peace Treaty perhaps with the exception of seeking 
an advisory opinion from the ICJ through competent United Nations Organs.
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As stated previously, the aspiration of this thesis has been to serve at some point in the 
future as a ‘roadmap’ or ‘blueprint’ of practical utility to Jordan when or should it decide 
to present claims to and against Israel on behalf of its nationals of Palestinian refugee 
origin. Hence, the structure of the thesis has been profoundly influenced by this 
aspiration of rendering the thesis a potential instrument that has a functional utility in the 
future for Jordan.
Had this not been the aspiration of the thesis and had the thesis been one that is intended 
to remain in the realm of academic studies, it may well have been structured in a way that 
would have been different from its current structure. By way of illustration, it may have 
been structured in a manner that would have placed the issue of General Principles of 
State Responsibility and the right of return and right to compensation under one single 
chapter, addressing the issue of Jordan’s standing to bring a claim under another, assess 
major heads of claims under a third and assess the effects of the Peace Treaty under a 
forth. However, and after grappling with this issue for a considerable time, the conclusion 
was that such an approach would severely compromise the integrity of what the 
aspiration is for this thesis to be, namely as indicated above, a ‘roadmap’ or ‘blueprint’ 
that can and may be used by Jordan in the future if and when it chooses to present claims 
to and against Israel on behalf of its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin in relation to 
their right of return and right to compensation and claims as a host state for hosting and 
providing for Palestinian refugees for many decades.
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While the issue of Palestinian refugees, in general terms, and their right to return and 
right to compensation has been the subject of intense scholarly legal analysis and critique, 
very little legal literature, analysis and writings-if any- has been produced that relates to 
Jordan’s unique circumstance and that of its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin in 
spite of the fact that Jordan is by far the country that hosts the overwhelming majority of 
Palestinian refugee population in the Diaspora. This thesis, it is hoped, would constitute a 
meaningful contribution to international legal literature in a manner that would provide 
this specific and complicated subject matter with some scholarly justice.
The thesis relies on a wealth of United Nations documents. It also relies on outstanding 
legal research and books on a range of topics on international law such as State 
Responsibility, Human rights law, Humanitarian Law and the law of nationality. It also 
draws heavily on Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) cases and advisory 
opinions, International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases and advisory opinions, European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) cases, Iran-US claims Tribunal cases, Israeli court cases 
and other case law of courts and arbitral awards. It also draws on many documents of the 
Foreign Ministry of Jordan and Its archives. It also benefited from an interview with His 
Excellency Dr. Hani Mulki who was the Head of Jordan’s negotiating team with Israel 
during Peace talks leading to the conclusion of the Peace Treaty.
This thesis has benefited from the insights offered as a result of the official capacity of its 
author as the Legal Advisor of the Jordanian Foreign Ministry and as the Director of the 
Peace Negotiations Coordination Bureau. Access was readily available to many valuable
18
documents that are otherwise not accessible to academic researchers. The author’s 
official capacity as an official in Jordan’s Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, placed 
limitations-dictated by legal and administrative prohibitions of disclosing privileged 
official information-on the thesis and in many instances did not allow citation of 
extremely useful material.
It is appropriate to state that this thesis does not in any manner, fashion or way represent 
the official position or view of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The views expressed 
therein are solely those of the author who is fully and exclusively responsible for the 
content of the thesis.
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Chapter (1)
The Expulsion and Displacement of Palestinians
The aim of this chapter is to provide a context for the subject matter of this thesis. It will 
give an appreciation to the circumstances surrounding the displacement of Palestinian 
refugees. The chapter will probe and highlight literature that clearly indicates that 
expulsion of Palestinian Arabs constituted deliberate policy adopted at the highest level 
of decision making within the annals of the Israeli Political establishment that was carried 
out with intent and careful planning and that was conducted by entities that constitute 
agents of the state or that have evolved to become the new state within the meaning given 
in the context of the International Law Commission’s final Articles on State 
responsibility in the case of the events of 1947-1949 and clearly acts of the official Israeli 
army in the context of the 1967 war and its aftermath and that such acts were sanctioned 
by and are attributable to the State of Israel.
While the Legal analysis of these issues is carried out in the ensuing chapters, and in 
particular in Chapter 3, this chapter is the chapter that attempts to uncover the facts and 
the evidence that expulsions were part and parcel of deliberate policy adopted at this 
highest political level, that it was conducted and sanctioned by the state of Israel and was 
fully condoned by it and is attributable to it factually.
The chapter, through the highlighted literature, will illustrate that the exodus of 
Palestinian Arabs was triggered by forcible measures undertaken by Israeli entities,
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including massacres, destruction of villages and instilling fear of persecution in the minds 
of Palestinian Arabs.
The chapter will also shed light on the numbers of Palestinian refugees. It will also 
briefly explain the status of Palestinian Refugees in Jordan and certain necessary facets of 
Jordan’s relationship with the Palestine Problem.
All these issue are very important in the context of rendering this thesis resemble a 
possible ‘roadmap’ or ‘blueprint’ for presentation of claims by Jordan to and against 
Israel on behalf of its nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin.
a. Political and historical background
Apart from the period of Ottoman rule (1517-1917), Palestine was an Arab populated 
region until 1948. In the last days of the First World War, when the majority of the 
population was Arab, the Ottoman Empire lost the territory of Palestine to British troops.
fViDuring the latter part of the 19 century, the Ottoman Empire had permitted a small 
number of Jewish immigrants into the country. By 1918 their numbers had risen to 
56,000, out of a total population of 680,OOO10
Britain had conflicting aims or goals in the period 1915-1918, and thereafter during the 
mandate period. In 1915-1916, the British authorities assured Sherif Hussein, the Emir of 
Mecca, that it would ‘support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the
10 British census figures —  the Israeli government puts the number o f Jews living in Palestine in 1914 at 
83,000; see Minority Rights Group Report (MRG): The Palestinians. Report No.24, London. 1984 
(hereinafter, Minority Rights Group, 1984).
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limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.’ Yet shortly thereafter, the British Foreign 
Secretary, Mr. Balfour, stated that Britain favored the establishment in Palestine of a 
‘homeland’ for the Jewish people, which would not ‘prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities’.11 Balfour’s words were incorporated into the 
League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, which was signed in London on 24 July 1922 
and entered into force on 29 September 1922.12 Arab protest against increased Jewish 
immigration (and the Balfour Declaration) erupted in the 1920s. In 1936, the British 
Government’s Peel Commission recommended the partitioning of Palestine into Arab and 
Jewish States. This recommendation was accepted by the Zionists as a basis for 
negotiations with the British Government13, but rejected by Palestinian leaders.14 Avi 
Shlaim has explained why the then Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, David 
Ben Gurion, accepted the Peel Commission Plan:
“Although Ben Gurion accepted partition, he did not view the 
borders of the Peel Commission plan as permanent. He saw no 
contradiction between accepting a Jewish state in part of Palestine 
and hoping to expand the borders of this state to the whole land of 
Israel.”15
In a letter to his son Amos on 5 October 1937, Ben Gurion wrote: ‘I am certain we will 
be able to settle in all other parts of the country, whether through agreement and mutual 
understanding with our neighbors or in another way. Erect a Jewish state at once, even if
11 See United Nations, The Origins and Evolution o f  the Palestine Problem: 1917-1988, New York. 1990, 
(hereinafter UN, Origins), 8, for the full text o f the Balfour Declaration. See also Cassese, A. Self 
Determination o f  Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal. Cambridge University Press, 1995. pp. 232-3, and sources 
there cited.
12 Mandate for Palestine, Text: UN, Origin, Ibid., p.48.
13 See Shlaim, A. The Iron Wall, W.W. Norton &Company. 2000. p. 19.
14 See Minority Rights Group, 1984, op.cit, p.3 and note 12.
15 See Shlaim, A. The Iron Wall, op.cit, p. 21.
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it is not in the whole land. The rest will come in the course of time.’16
In 1939, the British Government published a ‘White Paper’ proposing a maximum of 
17,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine over a five-year period, with future numbers to 
be decided in co-operation with the Arabs.17 After the issue of the White Paper and as a 
result of increased immigration pressure, hostilities erupted again. During the first part of 
the Second World War, a truce was initially agreed between the Zionists and the British 
security forces, but because of the increased volume of Jewish migration into Palestine, 
conflict continued between Palestinian Arabs and Jews. Soon, however, two Zionist 
guerrilla groups, Irgun Zevai L e ’umi and Lohamei Herut Yisrael18, began systematically 
attacking British security forces and Palestinian civilians in retaliation for, amongst other 
things, the 1939 ‘White Paper’. As the Second World War progressed and moved to its 
conclusion, immigration pressure increased once more, particularly as a result of the 
Holocaust and political developments in Europe.
With the end of the war, Britain continued as the responsible mandatory power for 
Palestine. However, faced with an apparently irresoluble conflict, in 1947 Britain 
requested that a special session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
prepare a study on the question of Palestine, to be deliberated at its next session.19
16 See Ben-Gurion, D. Letters to Paula, New York. University of Pittsburg Press.
17 For the “White Paper”, see UN, Origins, op.cit p. 53.
18 The Irgun Zevai L e’umi was an armed Jewish underground organization that was founded in 1931 by a 
group o f  Haganah (The ‘official’ military forces o f the emergent state o f  Israel) who had quit the latter in 
protest o f  its defensive mandate. Subsequently, in 1937 the group split again and half its members returned 
to the Haganah. The Lohamei Herut Yisrael emerged from yet another split o f  the Irgun Zevai Le 'umi that 
occurred at outset o f the outbreak o f the Second World War.
19 See, the United Nations and the Question o f  Palestine, p.5, UN Department o f Public Policy. New York 
1994.
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Formed in April of that year, the United Nations Special Commission for Palestine 
(UNSCOP) completed its work on 31 August 1947. Co-operation with the Commission 
was uneven, with the Jewish organisations generally assisting and the Palestinian leaders 
refusing to participate on the basis that the natural rights of the Palestinian Arabs were 
self-evident and should be recognized, not investigated.
The Commission’s report contained a majority recommendation for partition with 
economic union, and for Jerusalem to be placed under the administrative authority of the 
United Nations. The Partition Plan recommended that fifty-four per cent of the land area 
of the former Palestine be allocated to the proposed Jewish State and the rest to the 
proposed Arab State, despite the fact that the Jewish population was less than one third of 
the whole population and that Arab lands accounted for over 80% of the land area of
*7 1Israel. The Jewish Agency accepted the Plan, but the Arabs did not and protested that it 
violated the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which granted people the right to
99decide their own destiny.
On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 181(H)23 which, with 
some slight changes, endorsed the Commission’s majority recommendation for the 
adoption and implementation of the ‘Plan of Partition with Economic Union. With the 
resulting impasse, violence broke out in several parts of Palestine, accompanied by rising
20See, Report o f the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine, 31 August 1947. United Nations 
General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), 2nd Session, Supplement 11, UN doc. A/353, vols. i-iv.
21 See Minority Rights Group, op.cit, p. 6.
22 See Takkenberg, L. The Status o f  Palestinian Refugees in International Law , Clarendon Press. Oxford. 
1998, [hereinafter, Takkenberg, Palestinian Refugees]
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death tolls. Such was the intractable nature of the conflict that when the British withdrew 
in May 1948, the first Arab-Israeli war began.
When a formal armistice was finally declared just over a year later, the emergent Israeli 
State had control over most of the territory of the former Mandate Palestine with the 
exception of the areas known as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which were 
respectively under the control of Jordan and Egypt. The new State of Israel was 
established on the entirety of the then Jewish state envisioned in the United Nations 
Partition Resolution, most of the Arab State envisioned and a significant part of the 
International zone envisioned in the resolution including West Jerusalem. As a direct 
result of the war, there were 6,000 reported Jewish deaths, but no accurate figure of Arab 
deaths.24 An estimated 750,000 Palestinians fled and/or were forced to leave their homes 
or were expelled and were living in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.
The emergence of the State of Israel:
The political goal of the establishment of a State to be called Israel was continuously 
supported not only in the rhetoric of the Zionist movement, but also in military 
preparations on the ground, which significantly pre-date the founding of the State of 
Israel. The most well-known military organization is the Haganah, which was founded in 
1920 and operated until 1948. Originally a loose network of ‘defense’ groups, it 
expanded its membership in the late 1920s, initiated military and officers’ training,
24 See Minority Rights Group, op.cit, p. 4.
25 Ibid.,
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established arms depots, imported weapons from Europe, and laid the basis for the 
underground production of arms. In the period 1936-39, the Haganah evolved from 
militia to a military body, and was active during the disturbances of this period, 
supporting illegal immigration and anti-British demonstrations.
In 1938, the Jewish Agency Executive decided to appoint a nationwide leader for the 
Haganah, and in September 1939 it was decided to appoint a professional Military 
General Staff. From 1941 onwards, the Haganah emphasized its national and Zionist 
character. It identified its basic principles to include responsibility to the World Zionist 
Organization, and its functions to include defending the Jewish community, defending 
the Zionist enterprise in the ‘Land of Israel’, and resisting ‘enemy action’ from outside. 
In this period, it stated that it served the entire yishuv, (that is, the Jewish community in 
Palestine, especially the Zionists), and saw itself as ‘absolved’ from the laws of the non- 
Jewish government (i.e. the British Mandatory authorities).
During the Second World War, however, the Haganah co-operated with the British war 
effort, and supplied volunteers for the British army. Simultaneously, it strengthened its 
own base, setting up the Palmach - or ‘strike force’, an abbreviation of Pelugof 
HaMachatz - in 1941. One of the founders of the Palmach was Yigal Allon, later 
Minister of Labour (1961-1968), and appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Education and Culture after the 1969 General Election. The so-called ‘Allon Plan’ was an 
unofficial plan for a solution to Israel’s border problems after the 1967 War. It proposed 
new border lines to combine maximum security with a minimum of Arab population.
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Yitzhak Rabin was another member of the Palmach, and took part in armed action 
against the British Mandatory authorities from 1944 onwards. He was appointed Deputy 
Commander in 1947 and commanded the ‘Harel Brigade’ in the 1948-49 war. Ariel 
Sharon was also a member of the Haganah, which he joined at the age of fourteen in 
1942. He commanded an infantry company in the Alexandroni Brigade during 1948. The 
brigade participated in the occupation, depopulation and destruction of, among others, the 
Palestinian coastal village of Tantura on 22-23 May 1948, during which large numbers of 
civilians were reported to have been killed.
At the end of the Second World War, the Haganah again involved itself in the anti- 
British struggle, in association with terrorist groups such as Irgun Zevai Le'umi and 
Lohamei Herut Yisrael.
The Irgun Zevai Le ’umi was an armed Jewish underground organization founded in 1931 
by a group of Haganah commanders who had quit in protest at the Haganah's defensive 
mandate. In April 1937, the group itself split, with half of its members returning to the 
Haganah. The new Irgun Zevai L e ’umi, known by its abbreviation, Etzel, was 
ideologically linked to the ‘Revisionist Zionist Movement’ and accepted the authority of 
its leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky. It also received support from factions of the right-wing 
General Zionists.
The Irgun rejected the ‘restraint’ policy of the Haganah, and adopted a policy of 
intimidation and terror against the Arab population and, after the British White Paper in
26 See, footnote 9, supra.
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1939, also against the Mandatory authorities. A truce was called at the outbreak of the 
Second World War, leading to another split and the emergence of the Lohamei Herut 
Yisrael. From 1943, Irgun was led by Menachem Begin (later to be Prime Minister of 
Israel from 1977-1984), and in February 1944 it began armed attacks against the British 
administration, including government offices and police stations. It joined the Jewish 
Resistance Movement and when this disintegrated in August 1946, Irgun continued its 
terrorist activities against the British. The Irgun, the Lehi and the Palmach were 
responsible, in various degrees, for the massacre at Deir Yassin?1
Lohamei Herut Yisrael, or Lehi, its acronym, was an underground organization which 
operated from 1940 to 1948. Also known as the ‘Stem Gang’, from its leader, Abraham 
‘Yair’ Stern, it broke away from the Irgun in 1940. The reasons for the split were the 
group’s insistence that the armed struggle against the British should be continued, 
notwithstanding the war with Nazi Germany, its opposition to service with the British 
army, and its readiness to collaborate with anyone who supported the fight against the 
British Government. Its objectives included, among others, a Hebrew kingdom from the 
Euphrates to the Nile.
After Stem was killed in February 1942, the new leaders of the group (Natan Yellin-Mor, 
Yitshak Shamir and Yisrael Eldad) reorganized the movement. Because of its relatively 
limited strength, Lehi engaged in full-scale terrorism, including the assassination in Cairo 
on 6 November 1944 of Lord Moyne, the British Minister for Middle East Affairs. Lehi
27 See Isseroff, A. Coming to Terms with Deir Yassin. www.ariga.com/peacewatch/dv. See also Milstein, U. 
The War o f  Independence. Vol. IV: Out o f  Crisis Came Decision. Zamora-Bitan, Tel-Aviv 1991, pp. 255- 
276.
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was briefly a part of the Jewish Resistance Movement (from November 1945 to mid- 
1946). When this broke up following the Irgun bombing of the King David Hotel, Lehi 
continued its terrorist campaign, particularly in Jerusalem in 1947, where it sought to 
prevent implementation of the partition plan and the internationalization of the city.
On 14 May 1948 the independent State of Israel was proclaimed by a Provisional State 
Council. It was recognized immediately by the USA and shortly thereafter by the Soviet 
Union, but only gradually by other States, with Arab States in particular withholding 
recognition for many years (and some still refusing recognition to this day). Israel was 
admitted to membership of the United Nations on 11 May 1949, and a permanent 
Government was established following elections held in that year.
On 26 May 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel transformed the Haganah into the 
regular armed forces, known as Zeva Haganah Le-Yisrael -the Israel Defense Force. 
Irgun offered to disband and to integrate its members into the Israeli Defense Force, and 
this was achieved in September 1948. Lehi mostly disbanded and its members also 
enlisted in the IDF. It continued to be active in Jerusalem, however, and its members are 
considered responsible for the murder of Count Folke Bemadotte, the United Nations 
Mediator, in Jerusalem on 17 September 1948. Although the leaders of Lehi were 
sentenced to long jail terms by an Israeli military court, they were released in a general 
amnesty.
It is not seriously disputed that the military and other armed elements engaged in the
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fighting and expulsion of the Palestinian population were subsequently incorporated into 
the official organs of the State of Israel,28 or that the actions of those units were 
subsequently adopted by the State of Israel, in the sense understood by the International 
Court of Justice in the US Hostages in Tehran Case in 1979 29
b.Causes of the Expulsions of Palestinians
(i) The 1947-1949 Conflict
The reasons behind the expulsions have been disputed. Israel’s official position has been 
that the Arabs fled voluntarily, not as a result of compulsion, coercion or threat on the 
part of the Israelis, but because of the combination of requests by Arab leaders for the 
population to seek safety and the collapse of Arab institutions with the departure of the
*1A
Arab elite. Count Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator for Palestine, reported 
differently in September, 1948. He stated that ‘the exodus of Palestinian Arabs resulted 
from panic created by fighting in their communities, by rumors concerning real or alleged 
acts of terrorism, or expulsion’.
28 Official Israeli Government publications explicitly recognize the continuity between armed elements 
which engaged in activity before the founding o f the State of Israel and the organs o f  the State. Before the 
establishment o f the State o f Israel, a number o f armed Jewish defense organizations operated. In addition 
to the Haganah and Palmach, which answered to the elected leadership o f the Jewish national institutions. 
Other armed defense groups, namely the lehi and the Irgun operated independently. It was only natural that 
when the independence of the State o f  Israel was declared the new, legal Government would decide to 
establish a single, unified armed force loyal to the Government o f the State o f Israel: The Israel Defense 
Forces, http://www.idf.il/english/historv/historv.stm.
29 See, Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 
34-36. The Court, after taking note o f  various statements and acts by the Iranian authorities, stated as 
follows: “The approval given.., by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs o f the Iranian State, and the 
decision to perpetuate them translated continuing occupation o f the Embassy and detention o f the hostages 
into acts o f that State. The militants, authors and jailers o f the hostages, had now become agents o f  the 
Iranian State for whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible.” (Paragraph 74)
30 See, The Refugee Issue: A Background Paper. State o f Israel, Government Press Office, October 1994, 
p.3.
See, Progress Report o f  the UN Mediator for Palestine, GAOR, 3rd session, Supp.ll, UN doc. A/648, 
p. 14. [hereinafter, UN Mediator Report].
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The most detailed account of the expulsion of the Palestinians is provided by Israeli 
historian Benny Morris in his 1987 study, The Birth o f the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 
1947-1949, which was based on the then recent declassification and opening of most 
Israeli state and private political papers from 1947. The Arab flight from the 
countryside began with a trickle from a handful of villages in 1947, and became a steady 
though still small-scale emigration over the period December 1947- March 1948 with the 
departure of many of the country’s elite, especially from Haifa and Jaffa.33 This wave is 
estimated in the several tens of thousands. Between April and August 1948, the rural 
emigration turned into a massive displacement. According to Morris:
“Jewish pressure on the Arab villages of the Coastal Plain, and the 
Haganah conquest of parts of Arab Jerusalem and the Jewish 
Corridor, Tiberias, Haifa, the Hula Valley in Galilee Panhandle, 
Jaffa and its environs, Beisan and Safad sent some 200,000-
300,000 urban and rural Palestinian Arabs fleeing to the safety of 
the surrounding Arab States (Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and 
Transjordan) and the Arab population centres of Gaza, Nablus, 
Ramallah and Hebron.”34
In general, the displacements were a direct response to attacks and retaliatory strikes by 
the Zionist settlers’ defense force; (the Haganah) and to fears of such attacks.35
Reference should be made, in particular, to the Haganah’s Plan D, the objective of which 
was to secure all areas allocated to Israel under the UN partition resolution, as well as
32 See, Morris, B. The Birth o f  the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, Cambridge University Press, 
1987 [hereinafter referred to as Morris, Birth].
33 See, Minority Rights Group, op.cit, p. 4.
34 See, Morris, Birth, op.cit, p. 254.
35 Ibid.,.
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Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors leading to them. Avi Shlaim notes:
“Although the wording of Plan D was vague, its objective was to 
clear the interior of the country of hostile and potentially hostile 
Arab elements, and in this sense provided a warrant for expelling 
civilians. By implementing Plan D in April and May (1948) the 
Haganah thus directly contributed to the Birth of the Palestinian 
refugee problem.”
The above indicates clearly that there wets a policy of expulsion. Benny Morris writes:
“Plan D was not a political blueprint for the expulsion of 
Palestine’s Arabs: it was a military plan with military and 
territorial objectives. However, by ordering the capture of Arab 
cities and the destruction of villages, it both permitted and justified 
the forcible expulsion of Arab civilians.”37
In January 1948, the Zionist forces began an organized expulsion of Arab communities,38 
and the potential boost which this displacement represented to the goal of ‘Eretz Israel... 
without Arabs’ was not lost on Israel’s leaders. On 31 March 1948, Weitz, the director of 
the JNF’s Lands Department, noted that ‘[tjhere is a tendency among our neighbours... to
-IQ
leave their villages’. In fact, however, and contrary to Israeli claims that Arab Leaders 
urged the population to flee for their own safety, Benny Morris reports many instances of 
Palestinian leaders and Arab States urging the population to remain in their towns and 
villages.40 This ‘tendency’ to leave, or rather, the pressure to leave, was promoted and
36 See, Shlaim, The Iron Wall, op.cit, p. 31.
37 See, Morris, Birth, op.cit, pp. 62-63.
38 Ibid., p. 54 (quoting HHA. 66.10, protocol o f the meeting o f the Mapam Political Committee, statement 
by Galili. 5 Feb. 1948. Mapam (United Workers’ Party), a socialist-zionist party, was the second largest 
political party in the early years o f  the State. Mapam joined the labor alignment from 1969-1984, ran 
independently in 1988, and returned to Labor in 1992.
39 Ibid.,
40 Ibid.,
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expanded in part by Weitz himself, who was responsible for the land acquisition and, in 
great measure, for the establishment of new settlements. The conditions of war and 
anarchy of early 1948 enabled the yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, to take 
physical possession of these tracts of land.41
Benny Morris further observes that clear traces of an expulsion policy on both national 
and local levels’ existed from the beginning of April 1948 42 Sometime between 8-10 
April, orders went out from the Haganah General Staff to the Haganah units involved to 
clear away and, if  necessary, expel most of the remaining Arab rural communities.
According to historian and researcher Ariel Yitzhaqi, Haganah and Palmach troops 
carried out dozens of operations against Palestinians by raiding their villages and blowing 
up as many houses as possible. ‘In the course of these operations, many old people, 
women and children were killed wherever there was resistance.’43
Yitzhaki cites some ten major massacres committed by Jewish forces in 1948-49, and 
many more smaller ones. ‘Major massacres’ are described as involving an assault by 
Zionist troops resulting in more than fifty victims. Among those cited by Yitzhaki and 
others are: the Deir Yassin massacre, 9 April 1948, in which over 250 unarmed villagers 
were murdered;44 the expulsions from Lydda and Ramie on 12-13 July 1948, in which
41 Ibid.,
42 Ibid., p. 64.
43 See, Yitzhaqi, A. The Journal o f  Palestine Studies, Vol. 1, n.4, Summer 1972, pl44, citing Yediot 
Aharanot; Hadawi, S. Palestine Rights and Losses in 1948: A Comprehensive Study, London: Saqi Books, 
1988
44 Ibid.,
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over 60,000 Palestinians were expelled from the two towns in an operation approved by 
Ben-Gurion and carried Out by senior army officers, including Yigal Allon, Yitzhak 
Rabin, and Moshe Dayan;45 and the massacre at Al-Dawayma, an unarmed village 
captured on 29 October 1948, in which 80-100 villagers were killed after the capture.
In an analysis of these events, Hagana’s intelligence branch explained that ‘British 
withdrawal freed our hands’ to resolve the Arab question. In Jerusalem on 15 May 1948, 
Haganah loudspeaker vans urged the Arab population to flee. ‘Take pity on your wives 
and children and get out of this bloodbath’, they proclaimed. ‘Surrender to us with your 
arms. No harm will come to you. If you stay, you invite disaster’. ‘The Jericho road leads 
to Jordan.’ ‘The evacuation of Arab civilians had become a weir aim,’ observed Haganah 
officer Uri Avnery, who would later become a member of Israel's parliament46
The Palestinians were ‘ejected and forced to flee into Arab territory’.47 ‘wherever the 
Israeli troops advanced into Arab country, the Arab population was bulldozed out in front 
of them. It typically sufficed, recalled Avnery, ‘to fire a few shots in the direction of Arab
•  4Rvillages to see the inhabitants, who had not fought for generations, take flight’.
Massacres of Arab populations continued even after the 1947-1949 expulsions. Other
45 Both towns were intended to be in the Arab State called for in the UN partition plan, and were defended 
by small contingents o f the Arab Legion. These were withdrawn on 9-10 July, as being too small to stand 
against the large Jewish force, which attacked on 12 July. Substantial civilian casualties resulted in the 
resulting expulsion, which had the express approval o f  Ben-Gurion. The Rabin Memoirs, University o f  
California Press, 1996, pp. 383-4.
46 See, Quigley, J. The Palestinian Question in International Law: A Historical Perspective, 10 Arab 
Studies Quarterly, pp. 44, 82, (1988).
47 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
48 Ibid., quoting Avnery, U. Les refugies arabes-obstacle a la paix, Le Monde, 9 May 1964, p. 2.
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similar incidents after the end of the 1948 war include the expulsion of the Negev 
Bedouin in the period 1949-1959; the Azazme Tribe massacre in March 1955; and the 
massacre at Kafr Qassim, an Israeli Arab village in the little triangle bordering the West 
Bank on 29 October 1956.
(ii) The 1967 W ar and its aftermath
The mid-1960s saw the rise of independent Palestinian guerrilla groups (known in Arabic 
as the fedayeen), the most notable of which was Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement. 
Various governments in the region encouraged guerrilla raids into Israel, particularly 
from Lebanon or Jordan. The Israeli reprisals to these militarily futile raids were 
predictably harsh. Responding to a fedayeen raid, on 13 November 1966, Israel launched 
a major attack on the Jordanian West Bank border village of Samu, rounding up villagers 
and destroying their houses. A Jordanian armored column which sought to repel the 
attack was defeated by superior firepower. By the spring of 1967, the situation had 
become extremely tense.
On 13 May 1967, President Nasser of Egypt at that time received a Soviet intelligence 
report which claimed that Israel was massing troops on Syria’s border. According to Avi 
Shlaim, Nasser responded with ‘three successive steps’ which made war virtually 
inevitable:
“he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border; he expelled 
the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai; and, on 22 May. 
he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping...”49
49 Schlaim, A. The Middle East: The Origins o f  Arab-Israeli Wars, in Woods, N. Explaining International 
Relations since 1945, Oxford, 1996, pp. 219, 227.
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Both Egypt and Jordan were parties to the multilateral 1964 Arab Defense Pact but, 
sensing that war was now likely, King Hussein suggested an Egyptian-Jordanian Mutual 
Defense Treaty. President Nasser immediately accepted the idea, and the treaty was 
signed on 30 May. The treaty stipulated that Jordan’s forces were to be placed under the 
command of Egyptian General Abdul Moneim Riad.
On 5 June 1967, Israel launched a surprise attack, virtually eliminating the Egyptian air 
force in a single blow. In response to the Israeli attack, to the Israeli build-up and 
incursions across its border, and in accordance with its obligations under the Pact with 
Egypt, Jordanian forces launched an offensive into Israel, but were soon driven back as 
the Israeli forces counterattacked into the West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem. Israel 
now had complete control of the skies, and after a spirited defense of Arab East 
Jerusalem, the outnumbered and outgunned Jordanian army was forced to retreat to 
preserve the East Bank heartland against further Israeli expansion. When the final UN 
cease-fire was imposed on 11 June 1967, Israel stood in possession of a wide swath of 
Arab land, including the Egyptian Sinai, Syria’s Golan Heights, and, most significantly, 
what remained of Arab Palestine -the Jordanian West Bank, including Arab East 
Jerusalem, and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip.
At no time was Israel’s existence threatened and, leaving aside the rhetoric on both the 
Israeli and the Arab sides, there is no convincing evidence that any of the Arab States in 
the region had any intention of attacking Israel. Israel’s invasion and occupation of the 
West Bank correspondingly lacked any legal basis in international law.
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O f the States participating in the conflict, Jordan paid by far the heaviest price. As a 
result of the war, more than 300,000 Palestinian Arabs were displaced and fled to Jordan, 
or were forced to leave or were expelled, many of them uprooted for the second time in 
less than two decades. Jordan’s economy was also devastated. About 70% of Jordan's 
agricultural land was located in the West Bank, which produced 60 to 65% of its fruit and 
vegetables. Half of Jordan’s industrial establishments were located in the West Bank, 
while the loss of Jerusalem and other religious sites devastated the tourism industry. 
Altogether, the areas now occupied by Israel had accounted for some 38% of Jordan's 
gross national product.
After the cease-fire was secured, the Security Council adopted resolution 237 (1967), 
calling upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the 
areas where military operations had taken place, and to facilitate the return of the 
displaced persons. The Governments concerned were asked to respect scrupulously the 
humanitarian principles governing the protection of civilian persons in time of war 
contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. At its fifth emergency special 
session in 1967, convened after the fighting began, the General Assembly called upon 
Governments and international organizations to extend emergency humanitarian 
assistance to those affected by the war. The Assembly asked Israel to rescind all 
measures already taken and to desist from taking further action which would alter the 
status of Jerusalem.50
50 See UNGA Resolution 2252 (ES-V), 4 July 1967, confirmed by Resolution 2341 B(XXII), 19 December 
1967.
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Later that year, on 22 November, the Security Council unanimously adopted, after much 
negotiation, resolution 242 (1967), laying down principles for a peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East The resolution stipulates that the establishment of a just and lasting peace 
should include the application of two principles: ‘withdrawal of Israel armed forces from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict’, and ‘termination of all claims or states of 
belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within 
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force’. The resolution 
affirms the need for ‘achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem’.
Egypt and Jordan accepted resolution 242 (1967) and considered Israeli withdrawal from 
all territories occupied in the 1967 war as a precondition to negotiations. Israel, which 
also accepted the resolution, stated that the questions of withdrawal and refugees could be 
settled only through direct negotiations with the Arab States and the conclusion of a 
comprehensive peace treaty.51
Since 1967, the Security Council has continued to express its concern about the situation 
on the ground, declared null and void the measures taken by the Israeli government to 
change the status of Jerusalem, called for the cessation of Israeli settlement activity, 
which it determined to have no legal validity, reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth
51 A potentially problematic difference results from apparent variations in the French and English texts o f  
SC resolution 242. with one implying withdrawal from “all territories” and the other leaving open the 
possibility o f it meaning only “some territories”.
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Geneva Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 
1967, including Jerusalem, and called for the return of Palestinians.52
c. Numbers of Palestinians who sought refuge and who were forced to leave
(i) Displacement: Some global figures
For a variety of reasons, including the absence of any census after 1931, considerable 
migration from rural areas to the towns, and significant population growth in the 1930s 
and 1940s, the numbers of Palestinian Arabs who became refugees or were displaced in 
1947-1949 range between 726,000 and 900,000.53 On the Arab side, they are numbered 
between 900,000 and one million, while Israel generally cites 520,000. The United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East54 (UNRWA), 
which includes statistics from its predecessor, the United Nations Relief for Palestine 
Refugees, cites 960,000, while the United Nations Economic Survey Mission puts the 
figure at 726,OOO.55
UNRWA figures of Palestinian refugees and where they settled are useful but not wholly 
accurate or comprehensive as a demographic record. For example, these figures reflect 
those who registered but who may no longer be in one or other of the territories in which 
UNRWA operates. Also, they do not reflect the numbers of those who fled or were
52 See, Masalha, N. Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics o f  Expansion, London, Pluto Press, 
2000, on Israel’s expansionist policies, particularly from June 1967 onwards.
53 See, Takkenberg, Palestinian Refugee, op.cit, p. 19.
54 See, UNGA Resolution, No. 302 (IV), adopted on 8 December 1948 establishing The United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
55 Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Facts and Figures about the Palestinians, Information Paper 
N o.l. Washington. D.C.,1992, 13 (Table 3). The PLO Negotiations Affairs Department cites 804,766 
Palestinians dispossessed in 1948, and numbers the present ‘refugee’ population at 5,248,185: 
http//:www.nad-pio.org/permrmanent/re fug5.html..
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forced to leave or were expelled in 1948, but who did not register. They may, 
nevertheless, constitute a provisional guide to the numbers and distribution of both 
UNRWA registered and non-refugee Palestinians.
(ii) Displacement in 1947-1949
The UN Mediator, Count Folke Bemadotte, reported in 1948 that ‘almost the whole of 
the Arab population fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish occupation’.56 The 
majority of refugees settled in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, within the territory of 
the former mandate Palestine.
The directions of flight of the waves of refugees were various, and are reflected in their 
reported rates of reception into the Arab host communities. According to Benny Morris,
“The population of the northern part of Palestine (Haifa, Acre, 
Safad and Galilee) fled northward into Syria and Lebanon, while 
the refugees from Jaffa and the Gaza and Beersheba districts of the 
south crowded into the Gaza Strip. The Arab population of the 
coastal area of Palestine, including some from Haifa and Jaffa and 
most Arab inhabitants of Ramleh and Jerusalem districts, fled to 
the hilly country on the west bank of the river Jordan. [An 
additional] 150,000-200,000 Palestinians [fled as a result of 
offensives] in October and December 1948 to January 1949, most 
of them to the Gaza area. About 150,000 of the Arab population of 
pre-1948 Palestine remained behind. They became Israeli citizens,
• 57an Arab minority in a Jewish state.”
56See, UN MediatorReport, op.cit, p. 14.
57 Morris, as quoted in Takkenberg, L. Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p 265. See also Morris, B. The Initial 
Absorption o f  the Palestinian Refugees in the Arab Host countries, 1948-1949, in Bramwell, AC. (ed.) 
Refugees in the Age o f  Total War, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988; Morris, B. Israel’ s Border Wars, 1949- 
1956; Morris, B. Arab Infiltration Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993; Morris, B. 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians, Oxford Clarendon Press, 
1994.
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(iii) Displacement after June 1967
The distribution of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons was further upset by the 
1967 War, when large numbers of refugees and other displaced persons were forced to 
leave or were expelled, and fled to Jordan and elsewhere, including Lebanon, Syria, 
Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Some 115,000 people in Syria were 
displaced when Israeli forces occupied the Golan Heights and the Quneitra area. Among 
this group were approximately 16,000 Palestinian refugees who were uprooted for the 
second time. Many of these moved towards Damascus and some to Dera 'a, further south. 
About 162,500 refugees from the West Bank and some 15,000 refugees from the Gaza 
Strip were forced to leave or were expelled and fled to the Jordanian Eastern Bank, where 
they were joined by another 240,000 non-refugee former residents of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip fleeing for the first time. The latter are referred to as displaced persons.
The displacement of the Palestinian population continued even after the cessation of 
hostilities; already in June 1967, the Israeli authorities evicted the population and 
destroyed the quarter of al-Magharbe in the Old City of Jerusalem, while the ‘transfer’ of 
some 100,000 from the West Bank was implemented by Chaim Hertzog, the first military
CO
Governor of the West Bank after the 1967 war.
d. Israeli Policy and practice post-flight and/or expulsion. 
d(l). Preventing Return of the Refugees
The flight and/or the expulsion of the Arab inhabitants from Palestine was seen as a great
58 See, Masalha, N. Israel’s  Moral Responsibility Towards the Palestinian Refugees’, http://www.nad- 
plo.org/permanent/refug7a.html.
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triumph for Zionism, the Jewish Agency and other Jewish organizations, and within their 
overall political aims.
(i) The evidence of historical intent
It is not seriously disputed that the policy of conquest and/or possession of Palestinian 
lands has long historical roots, and that it did not begin with the events of 1947-1949.59
Writing in 1885, Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, though publicly 
promoting a future Jewish country in which Arabs and Jews would live as equals, 
indicated privately his endorsement of expropriation and removal.60
The same views were maintained through the twentieth century. Thus, Moshe Sharett, 
Ben-Gurion’s chief deputy, Israel’s first Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, wrote 
from Istanbul to friends in Tel Aviv on 12 February 1914 that, despite newspaper stories 
that Arabs and Jews might live together in peace in Palestine,
“we must not be deluded by such illusive hopes... for if we cease to 
look upon our land, the Land of Israel, as ours alone and we allow 
a partner into our estate, all content and meaning will be lost to our
59 See, for example, letters from Ben Yehuda, 1882, cited in Be’eri, E. The Beginnings o f  the Israeli-Arab 
Conflicts, Sifriat Po’alim, Haifa University Press, 1985, pp. 38-9.
604 We must expropriate gently the private property on the estates assigned to us. We shall try to spirit the 
penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while 
denying it any employment in our own country’: diary entry 12 June 1895; see Patai, R. ed., The Complete 
Diaries o f Theodor Herzel,, vol.l, Harry Zohn, trans.. New York: Herzl Press and Yoseloff, T, 1960, pp.88- 
89. See also the views o f  another founder o f political Zionism, Zangwill, I. cited in various places, 
including Flapan, S. Zionism and the Palestinians, p.56; Gomv, Zionism and the Arabs 1882-1948, p. 217; 
Alsberg, P. The Arab Question in the Policy o f  the Zionist Executive before the First World War, (Hebrew), 
Shivat Tzion, Jerusalem. (1955-56), pp.206-2077; Masalha, N. Expulsion o f  the Palestinians: The Concept 
o f  ‘Transfer ’ in Zionist Political Thought. 1882-1948, Washington, D.C., Institute for Palestinian Studies, 
1992.
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enterprise.”61
‘Transfer’, ‘force’, and ‘expulsion’, appear repeatedly in the writing of Zionist politicians 
and activists. In the words of Vladimir Jabotinsky, founder of the Revisionist Zionist 
party and ideologue both of Irgun, and of the Likud Party, ‘The Islamic soul must be
/ ' • j
broomed out of Eretz Yisrael’. Menahem Ussishkin, chairman of the Jewish National 
Fund and member of the Jewish Agency Executive, put it thus in 1930: ‘We must 
continuously raise the demand that our land be returned to our possession... If there are 
other inhabitants there, they must be transferred to some other place. We must take over 
the land. We have a greater and nobler ideal than preserving several hundred thousands 
of Arab fellahin’.63
David Ben-Gurion, leader of the Zionist movement and head of the MAPI party during 
the 1930s, favored various forms o f ‘transfer’ at various times. In June 1938, he wrote:
“The Hebrew State will discuss with the neighbouring Arab States 
the matter of voluntarily transferring Arab tenant farmers, workers 
and fellahin from the Jewish State to neighbouring states. For that 
purpose the Jewish State, or a special company... will purchase 
lands in neighboring States for the resettlement of all those 
workers and fellahin.”64
Three years later, in 1941, he wrote:
6,Quoted in Haaretz, Friday supplement, 1 December 1995.
62 Cited in Shavit, Y. The Attitude o f  Zionist Revisionism Towards the Arabs, in Zionism and the Arab 
Question, Hebrew, p .74.
63 Daor Hayom, Jerusalem, 28 April 1930.
64 See, Protocol o f the Jewish Agency Executive, Meeting, 7 June 1938, Jerusalem, confidential, no. 51, 
Central Zionist Archives, vol. 28, Jerusalem.
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“We have to examine, first, if this transfer is practical and 
secondly, if it is necessary. It is impossible to imagine general 
evacuation without compulsion, and brutal compulsion... The 
possibility of a large-scale transfer of a population by force was 
demonstrated when the Greeks and the Turks were transferred 
[after the First World War]. In the present war [Second World 
War] the idea of transferring a population is gaining more 
sympathy as a practical and the most secure means of solving the 
dangerous and painful problem of national minorities. The war has 
already brought the resettlement of many people in eastern and 
southern Europe, and in the plans for post-war settlements the idea 
of a large-scale population transfer in central, eastern, and southern 
Europe increasingly occupies a respectable place.”65
Yosef Weitz, who was to become head of the Israeli government’s official Transfer 
Committee in 1948 and Director of the Jewish National Fund’s Settlement Department 
noted the following in his diary in 1940:
“Amongst ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both 
peoples in this country. No “development” will bring us closer to 
our aim to be an independent people in this small country. After 
the Arabs are transferred, the country will be wide open for us; 
with the Arabs staying the country will remain narrow and 
restricted... There is no room for compromise on this point.., land 
purchasing... will not bring about the State... The only way is to 
transfer the Arabs from here to neighbouring countries, all of them, 
except perhaps Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Old Jerusalem. Not a 
single village or a single tribe must be left. And the transfer must 
be done through their absorption in Iraq and Syria and even in 
Transjordan. For that goal, money will be found —  even a lot of 
money. And only then will the country be able to absorb millions 
of Jews... There is no other solution.”6
It is also clear that what might have been described as political or idealistic rhetoric was
65 See, Ben Gourion, D. Lines o f  Zionist Policy, 15 October 1941.
66 See, Weitz Diary, A247/7, entry for 20 December 1940. pp. 1090-1091, Central Zionist Archives, 
Jerusalem; see also entries for 20 February 1948,17 July, Ibid., p. 1204.
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in fact translated into military policy on the ground:
“[W]e [the Haganah] adopt the system of aggressive defense; 
during the assault we must respond with a decisive blow: the 
destruction of the [Arab] place or the expulsion of the residents 
along with the seizure of the place”.67
(ii) The intention to expel: From words to actions-1948 Onwards
It is clear from the evidence that expulsions of Palestinian populations were intentionally 
undertaken, and that they were not dictated by military necessity, but by policy decisions 
taken at the highest levels of the Israeli government in waiting and the Israeli State after 
14 May 1948. In a Memorandum dated 10 May 1948, Aharon Cohen wrote:
“There is reason to believe that what is being done.., is being done 
out of certain political objectives and not only out of military 
necessities... In fact, the “transfer” of the Arabs from the 
boundaries of the Jewish State is being implemented... the 
evacuation/clearing out of Arab villages is not always done out of 
military necessity. The complete destruction of villages is not 
always done because there are “no sufficient forces to maintain 
garrison”.68
These political/military objectives appear repeatedly in the statements of those 
responsible for the development and implementation of Zionist and later Israel policy. In 
the words of David Ben-Gurion again, in April 1948:
67 Ben Gurion’s advice on 19 December 1947, on the eve o f the 1948 War, cited in Flapan, S. The Birth o f  
Israel: Myth and Reality, New York: Pantheon Books, London, Croom Helm, 1987, p. 90.
68 Cohen, A. Memorandum, Our Arab Policy During the War, 10 May 1948, in Giva’at Haviva, Hashomer 
Hatza’ir Archives, 10.10.95 (4).
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“We will not be able to win the war if we do not, during the war, 
populate under and lower, eastern and western Galilee, the Negev 
and Jerusalem area.. .1 believe that war will also bring in its wake a 
great change in the distribution of the Arab population.”69
Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel from 1948 onwards, was similarly insistent, 
stating in August 1948:
“As for the future, we are equally determined.., to explore all 
possibilities of getting rid, once and for all, of the huge Arab 
minority, which originally threaten us. What can be achieved in 
this period of storm and stress will be quite unattainable once 
conditions get stabilised. A group of people from among our senior 
officers [i.e., the Transfer Committee] has already started working 
on the study of resettlement possibilities in other lands.”70
As the Palestinian population was forcibly removed, special measures were considered
necessary in order to preserve this new status quo. During March and April 1948, Josef
Weitz oversaw the implementation of a policy which mainly focused on measures to
*71ensure that there could and would be no return.
The first unofficial Transfer Committee-composed of Weitz, Ezra Danin and Elias 
Sasson,72 later to become the head of the Middle East Affairs Department of the Foreign 
Ministry-came into being at the end of May, following Danin's agreement to come in on 
the scheme in mid-May and the Foreign Minister’s (Moshe Sharett) unofficial sanction of
69 David Ben Gurion to the Zionist Actions Committee, 6 April 1948, Ben Gourion, Behilahem Yisrael [As 
Israel Fought], Tel Aviv: Mapai Press, 1952, pp. 86-87.
70 Moshe Sharett to Chaim Weizmann, President f  the Provisional Council o f the State o f Israel, 18 August 
1948, cited in Morris, B irth , op.cit, pp. 149-150.
71 See, Morris, Birth, op.cit, p. 245.
72 Ibid., p 30
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the Committee’s existence and goals on 28 May 1948.73 Danin suggested that as a matter 
of policy, they should destroy Arab houses, ‘settle Jews in all the areas evacuated’, and 
expropriate Arab property.74
On 5 June 1948, Weitz presented Ben-Gurion with a three page memorandum, signed by 
himself, Danin and Sasson, and entitled, ‘Retroactive Transfer, A Scheme for the 
Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel’. The memorandum stated that the 
war had brought about ‘the uprooting of masses [of Arabs] from their towns and villages 
and their flight out of the area of Israel... This process may continue as the war continues 
and [the Israeli army] advances’. The war and the expulsions had so deepened Arab 
enmity ‘as perhaps to make possible the existence of hundreds of thousands of 
inhabitants who bear that hatred’. Israel therefore must be inhabited largely by Jews so 
that there will be in it very few non-Jews, and that ‘the uprooting of the Arabs should be 
seen as a solution to the Arab question in the State of Israel and, in line with this, it must 
from now on be directed according to a calculated plan geared towards the goal of 
‘retroactive transfer’.
To consolidate and amplify the transfer, the Committee proposed that action be taken to 
prevent the Arabs from returning to their places of origin, and to extend help to the Arabs 
to be absorbed in other places. To prevent Arab return, the Committee further proposed 
the destruction of villages as much as possible during military operations; prevention of 
any cultivation of land, including reaping and harvesting of crops, picking olives and so
73 Weitz Diary, op.cit, entry for 28 May 1948, p 2403.
74 Ibid.,
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on, also during times of cease-fire, the settlement of Jews in a number of towns and 
villages so that no ‘vacuum’ was created; legislation to prohibit return, and propaganda to
n r
discourage return.
The Committee proposed that it oversee the destruction of Arab villages and the 
renovation of other sites for Jewish settlement, negotiate the purchase of Arab land, 
prepare legislation for expropriation, and negotiate the resettlement of the Arabs in Arab 
countries. According to Weitz, Ben-Gurion ‘agreed to the whole line’76 Ben-Gurion also 
approved the Committee’s start of organized destruction of the Arab villages, about 
which Weitz informed him. Using his Jewish National Fund (JNF) apparatus and network 
of landpurchasing agents and intelligence operatives, Weitz immediately set in motion 
the levelling of Arab villages. His agents toured the countryside to determine which 
villages should be destroyed and which should be preserved as suitable for Jewish
77settlement.
Morris recounts that on 18 August 1948, Ben-Gurion called a meeting to review Israeli 
policy on the issue of return, which was attended by the country’s senior political leaders 
and senior political and Arab affairs officials. According to one official who was present, 
‘The view of the participants was unanimous, and the will to do everything possible to 
prevent the return of the refugees was shared by all’. Renewed orders went out to all IDF
75 Ibid., p. 36.
76 However, Ben-Gurion thought that the Yishuv should first take care o f the destruction o f the Arab 
villages, establish Jewish settlements and prevent Arab cultivation and only later worry about plans for the 
organized resettlement o f the refugees in Arab countries.
77 Morris, Birth, op.cit, p. 137.
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units to ‘prevent the return of refugees’.78
The political decision to bar return was repeatedly reaffirmed at various levels of 
government over the following months, as successive communities of exiles asked to be
70allowed back. In January 1949, the Israeli Cabinet voted to ‘encourage introducing olim 
(new Jewish immigrants) into all abandoned villages in the Galilee’.80
Archival evidence confirms the impact of policy at ground level. In April 1949, for 
example, in regard to villages which had come under Israeli rule as a result of the 
Armistice Agreement with Jordan (3 April 1949) and which were specifically protected
by Article VI, paragraph 6, Ben-Gurion called a meeting to discuss whether the Arab
•  01 inhabitants should be allowed to remain. Later the same month, Foreign Minister
Sharett indicated at a meeting of the MAPAI members of the Knesset that, ‘the intention
•  « 87is to get rid of them. The interests of security demand that we get rid of them.’
The right to return has been consistently rejected by Israeli representatives in the Knesset 
(Moshe Sharett, 15 June 1949), the UN General Assembly (Abba Eban, 17 November 
1958; Tekoah, 13 December 1972), and the UN Special Political Committee (Comaj, 9 
December1968).
78 Ibid., pp.148-149.
79 Ibid., p. 154.
80 See, David Ben-Gourion, The War Diary, 1948-1949, op.cit, entry for 9 January 1949, p. 926.
81 Political Consultations, 4 December 1949, State Archives, Foreign Ministry, 2447/3.
82 MAPAI party Members o f Knesset meeting, Labor Party Archive, section 2, 11/1/1. MAPAI (Mifleget 
Poalei Eretz Israel -land o f Israel Workers Party) was established in 1930 as a Zionist-socialist party and 
served as the dominant political party in the pre-State and early post-State years.
49
The official Israeli position on the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem explained 
previously, thus fails to accord with the historical record set out by Benny Morris and 
other Israeli scholars, such as Avi Shlaim and Ilan Pappe, who recognize Israel’s 
responsibility for the flight of the Palestinians.83 This issue of responsibility remains 
central to the resolution of individual and inter-State claims.
d(2). Changing the demographic and physical character of Palestine
During 1948 and the first half of 1949, a number of processes definitively changed the 
physical and demographic character of Palestine. Taken collectively, they steadily 
rendered the practical possibility of an Arab return more and more remote. These 
processes were the gradual destruction of the abandoned Arab villages, the cultivation 
and destruction of Arab fields, the share-out of 'abandoned' Arab lands to Jewish 
settlements, and the settlement of Jewish immigrants in empty Arab housing in the 
countryside and in urban neighbourhoods. Together, these events ensured that there 
would be nowhere and nothing to which the refugees could return.84
(i) Destruction of villages
As explained, the General Assembly’s Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 gave 
the Jews some 54 per cent of Palestine land. Then a minority, largely urban population 
owning no more than 6-7 per cent of the land, it made tactical sense for the Zionists to
83 See, among others, Flapan, S. The Birth o f  Israel: Myths and Reality, London, Croom Helm, 1987: 
Segev, T. The First Israelis. New York, The Free Press, 1986; Pappe, I. The Making o f  the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict 1947-1951, London: I. B. Tauris, 1992.
84 See, Morris, Birth, op.cit,, p. 155.
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accept partition, just as much as it did for the Palestinian majority to reject it. They 
resisted from the next day, and so began Israel’s ‘war of independence’ and the 
Palestinian nakba (catastrophe). The Zionists were comparatively ready, well-organized 
and equipped for the resistance and the war that was to come; the Palestinian community, 
however, was not. It lacked cohesion, was subject to clan rivalries, various external 
pressures, and lack of military training and expertise.
While the Palestinians resisted partition, Zionist defense and retaliation operations began 
to merge into an offensive strategy by early 1948. After December 1947, the dynamiting 
of Arab houses and parts of villages became a major component of most Haganah 
retaliatory strikes.85 About 350 Arab villages and towns were depopulated in the course 
of the 1948-49 war and during its immediate aftermath. By mid-1949, the majority of 
these sites were either completely or partly in ruins and uninhabitable. The destruction in 
the 350 villages was due to vandalism and looting, and to deliberate demolition, with 
explosives, bulldozers and, occasionally, hand tools, by Haganah and IDF units or 
neighbouring Jewish settlements in the months after their conquest.
The destruction of villages became a major political enterprise.86 During the second half 
of 1948, and through 1949 and the early 1950s, the destruction of forcefully abandoned
• 87Arab sites, usually already half-destroyed, continued.
(ii) Takeover and allocation of Palestinian lands
85 Ibid., pp.155-156.
86 Ibid., p. 160.
87 Ibid.,
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The Jewish takeover of Arab property in Palestine began with the ad hoc, more or less 
spontaneous, reaping of crops in forcefully abandoned Arab lands by Jewish settlements 
in the Spring of 1948. This was encouraged by the entry into Palestine of Oriental Jews 
and Jewish immigrants. The summer crop ripened first in the Negev, which is where 
Jewish reaping of Arab fields began. As the summer crops ripened and as the Arab 
evacuation gained momentum, Jewish harvesting of Arab fields spread to other parts of 
the country.
During late April and early May, as requests from settlements and regional councils to 
harvest abandoned fields poured into the Committee for Abandoned (Arab) Property, 
headed by Gad Machnes, the Committee’s Yitzak Gvirtz began to organize the 
cultivation. The committee for Abandoned Property-which soon became the Arab 
Property Department and then the Villages Department in the Office of the Custodian for 
Abandoned Property-regarded the forcibly abandoned crop as Israeli state property and 
sold the right to reap it to Jewish farmers and settlements. By 10 October 1948, the 
Ministry of Agriculture had formally leased or approved the leasing for cultivation of
320,000 dunums (a dunum is approximately a quarter acre) of ‘abandoned’ land, and 
Ministry Secretary Avarham Hanuki expected that another 80,000 dunums would soon be 
approved for Jewish cultivation. The ministry anticipated leasing a further one million
oo
dunums during the second half of 1949.
88 Ibid., p. 179.
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(iii) Establishment of new settlements
There were 279 Jewish settlements in Palestine on 29 November 1947. Between the start 
of Arab-Jewish hostilities and the beginning of March 1949, 53 new Jewish settlements 
were established, followed by 80 more at the end of August 1949. Almost all these 
settlements were established on Arab-owned lands and dozens were established on 
territory earmarked in the 1947 United Nations Partition Resolution for the Palestine 
Arab State. As Foreign Minister Sharett noted in a statement to the Knesset on 15 June 
1949, ‘a flood of immigration had set in and a large part of the geographical and
80 .. ,jeconomic vacuum created by the exodus was filled.5 The settlements, mostly kibbutzim, 
expanded and deepened the Jewish hold on parts of Palestine.90
The accommodation of new immigrants in abandoned Arab housing began in the towns 
in 1948, starting almost immediately with the forced flight of Arab families from mixed 
Jewish-Arab districts in the mixed cities. An early trace of the policy can be found in 
Ben-Gurion's instructions to the newly-appointed Haganah commander in Jerusalem, 
David Shaltiel, at the end of January 1948. Some Arab districts in western Jerusalem had 
already been abandoned, and Ben-Gurion ordered Shaltiel 'to settle Jews in every house 
in abandoned, half-Arab neighbourhoods...5
The Transfer Committee first proposed that the government adopt the settlement of new 
immigrants in abandoned Arab houses as part of a coherent and multi-faceted program to
89 He added, ‘[W]e shall help in the resettlement o f these displaced persons. We shall not follow the 
example o f other nations in every respect. We shall pay compensation for abandoned lands...’ 
http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp7MDAH01 atO.
90 See, Morris, Birth, op.cit,, p. 179.
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bar return of the refugees.91 In April 1949, Yosef Tal reported that of 190,000 immigrants 
who had arrived since the establishment of the State, 110,000 had been settled in 
abandoned Arab houses 92
(iv) Palestinian/Israeli Citizenship
The Palestinian refugees were not only barred from returning to their homes, but were 
also effectively and retroactively deprived of their citizenship. Under Ottoman rule, the 
inhabitants of Palestine were considered Turkish nationals. Under the British mandate, 
and pursuant to League of Nations policy, the inhabitants of such territories were not 
considered nationals of the administering powers, although they benefited from the 
exercise of diplomatic protection. Accordingly, Palestinian citizens were treated in 
Great Britain as British Protected Persons, although not as British Subjects.94 Mandate 
citizenship was regulated by the Palestinian Citizenship Order 1925-4195 and included 
acquisition by birth.96 Palestinian citizens were eligible for a British passport issued by 
the government of Palestine. The passport referred to the national status of its holder as 
‘Palestinian citizen under Article One or Three of the Palestinian Citizenship Order,
91 Ibid., p. 190.
92 Ibid., p. 195.
93 See League Council Resolution o f 22 April 1923, Official Journal, 604, quoted in Weis, P. Nationality 
and Statelessness in International Law, (2nd edn., 1979), p.20.
94 See, Weis, Nationality and Statelessness, ibid., p. 18-20, 22; R v. Ketter [ 1940] 1 KB 787, where it was 
held that the appellant, a native o f Palestine bom when that territory was under Turkish sovereignty, but 
holding a passport marked ‘British Passport-Palestine’, had not become a British subject by virtue o f art. 30 
of the Treaty o f  Lausanne o f 24 July 1923 (UKTS, N o.16/1923), or under the terms o f  the Mandate 
agreement o f  24 July 1922, since Palestine was not transferred to and. consequently, was not annexed by 
Great Britain by either Treaty or Mandate. See also, Goodwin-Gill, G. “A Note on Nationality Issues 
affecting Palestinians ”, in The Refugee in International Law, (2nd edn., 1996), p. 241-6.
95 S.R. & O 1925. No. 25.
96 Art. 3, Palestinian Citizenship Order.
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1925-41.’97
Palestinian citizenship as a construct of British legislation terminated with the mandate, 
and with the proclamation of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948. Under international law, 
citizenship and other laws can continue to apply, even after a territory has been annexed 
or abandoned; this is generally a matter for the ‘new’ sovereign, or is settled by 
agreement between the States. However, only one (Israeli) court has come to such a 
conclusion in the Palestinian context, and that was soon overtaken by municipal 
legislation.98
Thus, the Palestinians’ nationality status fell within a legal lacuna. Although Israel had 
no nationality legislation until 1952, Israeli courts held that on the termination of the 
mandate, former citizens of Palestine lost their citizenship without acquiring any other.99 
For purposes of Israeli municipal law, the issue was resolved by a Supreme Court 
decision100 and by the Nationality Law.101 The 1952 Law confirmed repeal of the 
Palestinian Citizenship Orders 1925-41 retroactively to the day of the establishment of 
the State of Israel.102 It declared itself the exclusive law on citizenship, which was
97 See, Takkenberg, Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 180, citing a copy o f  a passport on file.
98 See, A.B. v. M.B, 17 ILR 110 (1950), (holding that ‘So long as no law has been enacted providing 
otherwise, my view is that every individual who, on the date o f the establishment o f the State o f  Israel, was 
resident in the territory which today constitutes the State o f Israel, is also a national o f Israel.’)
99 See Oseri v. Oseri (1953) 8 PM 76; 17 ILR (1950); Estate ofShifris (1950-51) 3 PM 222.
100 See, Hussein v. Governor o f  Acre Prison,{1952) 6 PD 897, 901; 17 ILR 111 (1950). holding that 
Palestinian citizenship ceased to exist, in the territory o f Israel and in other parts o f the former mandated 
territory o f Palestine, after the establishment o f the State of Israel and the annexation o f  the other parts to 
neighbouring States. See also Nakara v. Minister o f  Interior (1953) 7 PD 955:20 ILR 49 (1953).
101 Nationality Law, 5712/1952, p.93, Official Gazette 22 (1952).
102 Section 18 (A)
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available by way of return, residence, birth and naturalization.103 Former Palestinian 
citizens of Arab origin were eligible for Israeli nationality provided that they met the 
conditions of section 3:
(a)A person who immediately before the establishment of the 
State, was a Palestinian citizen and who does not become an Israeli 
national under section 2, shall become an Israeli national with 
effect from the day of the establishment of the State if:
(1) he was registered on the 4th Adar, 5712 (1 March 1952) as an 
inhabitant under the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance, 5709- 
1949;and
(2) he is an inhabitant of Israel on the day of the coming into force 
of this Law; and
(3) he was in Israel, or in an area which became Israeli territory 
after the establishment of the State to the day of the coming into 
force of this Law, or entered Israel legally during that period.
(b) A person bom after the establishment of the State who is an
inhabitant of Israel on the day of the coming into force of this Law,
and whose father or mother becomes an Israeli national under
subsection (a), shall become an Israeli national with effect from the 
day of his birth.
These strict requirements meant that the vast majority of those who, as a result of the
1948 war, left the territory of what became Israel, were effectively denied Israeli
citizenship.
(v) Palestinian/Jordanian citizenship
At the same time that the majority of Palestinian refugees were denied Israeli citizenship, 
citizenship in their respective countries of refuge, for the most part, was also not
103 Section 1.
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available, except in Jordan. It is estimated that of some 6,375,800 Palestinians, only 
approximately 2,640,000 have been granted citizenship elsewhere in the world.104 This 
lack of citizenship occurred for a variety of reasons. First, Palestinian refugees were 
admitted to neighbouring countries on what was expected to be a temporary basis, and 
thus citizenship appeared unnecessary.105 Additionally, there was and continues to be a 
political consensus in the Arab world that the acceptable solution to the Palestinian 
refugee problem is repatriation and self-determination. As a consequence, many refugees 
decided against either becoming Israeli citizens, even if eligible under the limited criteria, 
or to take up citizenship, if permitted, in their host countries. Each of these solutions was 
viewed as tantamount to acquiescence in the legitimacy of the State of Israel and denial 
of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.
Jordan has been by far the most hospitable country of refuge for Palestinian refugees, 
and at first granted full citizenship to all Palestinian refugees and their descendants who 
were ‘habitually resident’ in the Kingdom between 1949 and 1954106. It did not matter 
whether they lived on the East or West Bank, because at that time Jordan incorporated the 
East and West Banks, and Palestinians moved freely between the two. Many families had 
businesses and homes on both sides of the river. However, once Israel occupied the West 
Bank, movements were restricted. In 1983, the Jordanian government created a dual 
system for the administration of residence rights: yellow cards, which represented full
104 Most o f the information on citizenship is taken from a recent study by Arzt, D. Refugees to Citizens, 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1997.
105 Benny Morris states: ‘In any case, no one regarded the exodus as permanent; surely the refugees would 
within weeks return to their homes.’ See Morris, Birth, op.cit, p. 66.
106 See, Jordanian Nationality Law, law number (6) (1954), in the Official Gazette o f  Jordan, issue Number 
1171 (16 February 1954), p. 105.
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residency and full Jordanian citizenship rights for persons who had left the West Bank for 
the East Bank before 1 June of that year; and green cards, providing a renewable two- 
year Jordanian ‘passport’ with no right of residence in Jordan for those who left the West 
Bank after 1 June 1983. Green card holders can visit Jordan for up to one month at a 
time. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Israel issue similar documents to Palestinians. Jordan 
permits Palestinian bearers of green cards to apply for five year passports, but these do 
not constitute entitlement to formal citizenship in Jordan.
The main category of Palestinians in Jordan who are not Jordanian citizens are those 
displaced from the Gaza Strip in 1967 (approximately 70,000 persons). They require 
official permission to work, and are restricted to employment in the private sector. They 
are permitted to apply for and use Egyptian travel documents to travel abroad and require
1 A*1
return visas to ensure they are permitted re-entry into Jordan.
Until 1988, most West Bank residents automatically held Jordanian citizenship. After
* •  •  108 Jordan announced its ‘Decision of Administrative and Legal Disengagement’ for the
West Bank in July 1988, it began to regard the Palestinians residing there before 31 July
1988 as non-Jordanians. Effectively, Palestinians residing in the West Bank lost their
Jordanian citizenship. Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin, who have been allowed by
Israel to ‘return’ to the autonomous areas of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank,
have also lost their Jordanian citizenship.
107 See, Morris, Birth, op.cit, p. 43-44.
108See, “MAJMUAT ALWATHAIK ALURDUNYA” (the Official Compilation o f Jordanian Documents), 
(1988), pp. 56-58 , [hereinafter “MAJMUATALWATHAIK"]
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(vi) Palestinian travel documents
Though the Jordanian authority continued to issue West Bank residents with travel 
documents, they were valid only for two years. Since other Arab States viewed the two- 
year travel document solely as a refugee document, many refused to grant entry visas to 
their holders. In October 1995, the Jordanian Department of Civil Affairs and Passports 
announced that under new regulations, West Bank residents who had a passport before 
July 1988 could replace their two-year documents with a regular five-year passport, even 
if  they had lost their right to residence in the West Bank. The new passport does not 
confer renewed Jordanian citizenship on West Bank residents.
In addition, until the Palestinian Authority began issuing its own travel documents in 
November 1995, West Bank residents who traveled abroad had to acquire permits from 
the Israeli civil administration. If they overstayed the date of return, they lost their right 
of return. Further, the legal status of spouses of non-Palestinians and of family members 
who do not reside in the West Bank remains a complex, generally unresolved issue.109 Of
1,200,000 Palestinians in the West Bank, only about 7,500 have full Jordanian 
citizenship.110
e. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Palestine
In April 1950, the King of Jordan signed a resolution, passed to him for signature by the 
National Assembly of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (representing both East and
109 See Arzt, Refugees to Citizens, op.cit, p. 40.
110 Ibid., p. 60.
59
West Banks), which supported the unity of the two Banks as one nation State called the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Several Arab States, members of the Arab League, 
refused to recognize Jordan’s right to sovereignty over part of Palestine and Jerusalem. 
On 16 May 1950, the Political Committee of the Arab League decided unanimously that 
the unity of the Arab part of Palestine was in violation of its previous resolutions on the 
subject.111
A crisis amongst Arab States was averted, however, when the Government of Jordan 
formally announced that unity with the Palestinian territory was ‘without prejudice to the
119final settlement’ of the Palestinian problem.
On 16 February 1954, Jordan enacted the “Jordanian Nationality Law”113 Article 3(2) of 
this law stipulates that ‘every non-Jewish person who had held the Palestinian Nationality 
prior to 15 may 1948 and is habitually residing in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
during the period extending from 20 December 1949 to 16 February 1954 is a Jordanian 
National’." 4
The effect of this Article had been to render all the inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Palestinian refugees who had been residing therein between 20 December 1949 and 16 
February 1954 as Jordanian nationals.
111 Mazzawi, M. Palestine and the Law, ‘Palestine and Jordan : Merger and Separation’, Garnet Publishing,
1997, p. 264.
1,2 See, “MAJMUATALWATHAIK" , op.cit, (1951), p. 414.
113 See, “Jordanian Nationality Law", op.cit, p. 105.
114 Ibid., Article. 3.
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The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in Jerusalem in 1964, 
following a decision of the League of Arab States. The Palestine National Council 
(PNC), made up of 422 leading Palestinian representatives, adopted the Palestinian 
National Charter and formally created the PLO, headed by a Palestinian lawyer, Ahmed 
Shuquairy.
The PNC is the supreme body in the PLO, and appoints the Executive Committee which 
handles regular business between sessions. Several changes were introduced after the 
1967 war, in order to reduce the PLO’s dependency on the Arab States, and to rationalize 
relations with many parallel organizations. Two such organizations, the Fatah and the 
PFLP joined the PLO and as of 1968 had one half of the seats in the PNC. Following the 
resignation of Ahmed Shuquairy, Yasir Arafat, the leader of Fatah, was appointed 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and, in 1971, became the General 
Commander of the Palestine Forces.
The PLO was recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people by all Arab 
States at the 1974 Summit in Rabat, Morocco. The PLO was given observer status at the 
United Nations the same year, and in 1976 became a full member of the League of Arab 
States in its own right.
It must be stressed in this context that, when the Arab Summit recognized the PLO as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian People, Jordan made a clear reservation 
regarding this resolution of the Summit to the effect that this is ‘without prejudice to the
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full and exclusive right of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in relation to all nationals 
thereof’115
On 15 November 1988, the Nineteenth Session of the PNC adopted the Declaration of 
Independence of Palestine, as well a political communique. The Declaration accepted 
General Assembly resolution 181(11) of 1947 and the communique accepted Security 
Council resolution 242 of 1967.
In 1991, the PNC approved the Palestinian participation in the Madrid Peace Conference 
based on the principle of land for peace, and Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. 
The Central Council met in Tunisia in October 1993 to consider the Declaration of 
Principles, which was accepted by a large majority. The Council also authorized the 
Executive Committee to form the Council of the Palestinian National Authority for the 
transitional period, and chose Yasir Arafat as President of the Council of the National 
Authority.
In 1993, the PNC held its session in Gaza City in Palestine for the first time since 1966. 
The session voted, by majority, to ‘abrogate the provisions of the PLO Charter that are 
contrary to the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel of 9 and 
10 September 1993.’ On 9 September 1993, in letters to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and 
Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst, PLO Chairman Arafat had committed the PLO to 
cease all violence and terrorism. On 13 September 1993, the Declaration of Principles on
115 See for the text o f the Resolution o f the Arab League Rabat Summit Meeting and the text o f Jordan’s 
reservation in the authentic Arabic text, “MAJMUATALWATHAIK",(1975), op.cit, p. 243-245.
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Interim Self-Government Arrangements between Israel and the Palestinians was signed in 
Washington, D.C.
Following the adoption of the 1993 Declaration of Principles. Israel agreed to recognize 
the PLO ‘as the representative of the Palestinian people’, and Mr Arafat recognized the 
right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security, and undertook that the PLO 
constitution provision to the contrary would be deleted.
At the request of the PLO and in the interests of ‘enhanc[ing] the Palestinian national 
orientation and highlighting] the Palestinian identity’, King Hussain of Jordan 
announced in July 1988 ‘the dismantling of the legal and administrative links between the 
two Banks of Jordan’.116 This statement opened the door for Palestinians and coincided 
with United States recognition of the PLO as the ‘sole representative’ of the Palestinian 
people, but may yet be without prejudice to some at least of the rights of Palestinians.
It has also been argued that dismantling the legal and administrative links between the 
Banks of the Jordan was unconstitutional, precisely because it meant surrendering part of 
the sovereign territory of Jordan. It is by no means clear that the ‘dismantling’ has 
effectively meant that those Palestinian refugees given citizenship as a result of the unity 
of the two Banks, lost their nationality, or that Jordan has been deprived of its normal 
right to exercise protection on behalf of its nationals. This may in part have been the 
intention of the PLO, but the consequential effects of this decision are yet to be 
determined.
116 See, “ MAJMUAT ALWATHAIK" , op.cit, (1988), p. 56-58.
The announcement of Jordan’s ‘Administrative and Legal Disengagement’ was followed 
on 22 August 1988 by a Decree signed by Yasir Arafat, in his capacity as Chairman of 
the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in which the PLO 
assumed responsibility for the Palestinians of the West Bank. Arafat’s decree clearly 
defines the nature and extent of the responsibility being taken on by the PLO:
“The Chairman of the Executive Committee:
By virtue of the powers vested in him, and in response to the 
superior demands of national interest, and in conformity with the 
decision of the Executive Committee dated 21/8/1988 equivalent to 
9 Murharram 1409 (Hijra Era), and following the decision of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to terminate the legal and 
administrative relationship with the West Bank and the measures 
taken by it, decrees as follows:
One: All laws, regulations and decrees in operation in the occupied 
Palestinian territories up to 31/7/1988 shall remain in operation 
until amended or repealed by the appropriate Palestinian legislative 
authorities.
Two:Officials functioning in public departments, utilities and 
organizations in the occupied Palestinian territories, and who have 
been covered by recent Jordanian decisions and processes, shall 
remain in office and exercise their functions.
Three:The Palestine Liberation Organization shall assume full 
responsibility towards the officials and the workers in regard to 
whom this Decree applies, in accordance with the rights accruing 
to them, and on the basis of the regulations and rules pertaining to 
their appointments.”117
The legal effects of Jordan’s 1988’ administrative and legal disengagement from the
117 Ibid., p. 270. Original in Arabic entitled, ‘Palestinian Historic Decree’, Selected Documents on the 
Palestine Problem  (in Arabic) for the First Conference o f Palestinian Economic Activists held in Tunis 12- 
14 April 1990
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West Bank remain unclear, especially from an international law perspective. There are a 
number of arguments available which support the view that Jordan, technically and in 
strict law, still retains sovereignty over the West Bank, in addition to the fact that Jordan 
has made no formal, constitutional relinquishment of sovereignty, these arguments 
include the following:
(a) there have been no protests at the extension or application of Jordanian treaties to the 
West Bank;
(b)Israel’s incursion into the West Bank in (alleged) self-defence, even if initially 
justified because of a Jordanian attack, is not justified as a continuing feature once the 
original attacks have ceased;
(c) Jordan was admitted to the United Nations as a State which included the West Bank, 
and Israel -already a Member - did not object;
(d)any argument that the West Bank is, after the 1988 Jordanian Declaration (or even 
earlier), terra nullius would be relying on a concept which is now outmoded;
(e)UN resolutions have condemned Israel for its activities in the West Bank, thus 
recognizing that it is not Israeli territory;
(f)Israel has accepted its West Bank status as a belligerent occupant, and thus that it does 
not have sovereignty over the West Bank.
Despite what appeared to some the first step towards self-determination for the
Palestinians, the Decree made little impact on the situation of those Palestinian refugees
living in camps in the West Bank who, for extended periods, had been under the de facto
118control of the Palestinians during the time of Jordanian rule.
As things stand today, and taking into consideration the measures taken after Jordan’s
118 See Takkenberg, Palestinian Refugees, op.cit p. 133.
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1988 administrative and legal disengagement from the West Bank,119 all the residents of 
the West Bank are no longer Jordanian Nationals. The legality or illegality of this 
measure is extraneous to the scope of this study.
Palestinian refugees who were displaced in the Period 1947-1949 (including their 
descendants), who are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA) and who are full Jordanian Nationals total in number 1, 609,566 people.120 Of
1 2 1 * * •  • those 1,345,640 reside outside the 10 official Palestinian refugee camps in the
Kingdom and 266926122 still reside in the 10 camps.123
Additionally, 169040124 Palestinian refugees who had been ‘original residents’ of the 
West Bank (including their descendants) and were displaced as a result of the 1967 
War, are full Jordanian nationals and live in Jordan today.
There are also 209242126 Jordanians of Palestinian origin (including descendants) who
119 See, “MAJMUATALWATHAIK", op.cit, (1988), p. 56-58.
120 Ibid., (2001), p. 588.
121 Ibid.,
122 Ibid.,
123 The ten camps are Wihdat, Talbyla, Hussein, Baqa in Amman, Irbid, Hussun, Souf and Jerash in Irbid, 
Zerqa and Marka in Zerqa.
124 See, “MAJMUATALWATHAIK" , op.cit, (1988), p. 56-58
125 Those are commonly referred to in the literature and legal instruments in the context o f the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and Peace making efforts as “Displaced Persons" to distinguish them from Palestinian refugees 
who were displaced as a result o f the 1947-1949 situation from areas that became part o f  the State o f  Israel 
as a result o f the 1948 first Arab-Israeli War, who are referred to commonly as "1948 Refugees”. The term 
"Displaced Persons" in this literature and those legal instruments does not include Palestinians who were 
displaced in 1947-1949 and took the West Bank as their residence thereafter until the outbreak o f the 1967 
war and were displaced again as a result to the Diaspora. Thos are still part and parcel o f the "1948 
Refugees ".
126 See, “MAJMUATALWATHAIK” , op.cit, (1988), p. 56-58
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were not registered with UNRWA127 and who had been displaced in the 1947-1949 
period. Those are also full Jordanian nationals.
Additionally, there are 153496128 Palestinians from Gaza residing and holding Jordanian 
travel passports in Jordan and 72000129 Palestinians from Gaza residing in Jordan without 
holding even Jordanian travel passports.
All the categories mentioned above with the exception of the last category (Palestinians 
from Gaza), are full Jordanian Nationals. They enjoy all the privileges of nationality and 
perform all the obligations associated with it.130
It should be noted in this context that Arab Countries including Jordan are not Parties to
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951(1951 Convention).131
This is despite that fact that Article 1(D) of the Convention States that:
“ This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present 
receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than
127 UNRWA only registers "1948 Refugees". Palestinians displaced from the West Bank as a result o f the 
1967 war are not within the scope o f  UNRWA activities and registration. The objective for registration had 
been for purposes o f  providing services, relief and works for “1948 Refugees". UNRWA currently define 
Palestine Refugees in the context o f  its jurisdiction and competence as follows: ‘[Palestine refugee] shall 
mean any person whose normal place o f residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 may 
1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result o f the 1948 conflict.”, cited in 
Takkenberg, Lex., "Palestinian Refugees", op.cit, p. 77. Tekkenberg makes it clear, in pp. 81-83 that 
UNRWA has never expanded its working definition of a Palestine refugee and that the abovementioned 
definition is one that confines refugees status, in the context o f UNRWA’s mandate and jurisdiction to 
those Palestinian who fled ‘ as a result o f the 1948 conflict.’, "1948 Refugees" And that as the West Bank 
Was part o f Jordan, those who fled that territory were considered ‘internally displaced’ and registered as 
such by the Jordanian Government.
128 See, “MAJMUATALWATHAIK" , op.cit, (1988), p. 56-58
129 Ibid.,
130 These nationals benefit from all privileges associated with nationality such as free education, subsidies, 
employment rights and all the political rights.
131 See. For the text o f the 1951 Convention, 189 UNTS and Brownlie, I Basic Documents on Human 
Rights, Third Edition, 1992, p.64, [Hereinafter Borwnlie, Basic Documents].
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the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or 
assistance.”132
The main reason why Jordan did not sign the 1951 Convention is ascribed to the fact that 
the convention contains ‘cessation clauses’ in its Article 1(C) that spell out conditions 
under which a person ceases to be a refugee. Of particular concern to Jordan, who has 
granted a large number of Palestinian refugees nationality, is the ‘cessation clause’ 
contained in Article 1(C), paragraph 3 which provides that the 1951 Convention shall 
cease to apply to any person if “He has acquired a new nationality.”133 Jordan maintains 
the view that signing the 1951 Convention would inevitably dilute the rights of its 
Palestinian refugee community and eradicate their status as refugees.134
The subject matter of this study is exclusive to the above mentioned Palestinian refugees 
with the exception of the last category (those from Gaza). Palestinian refugees who are 
currently Jordanian nationals constitute almost a third of the Palestinian refugee 
community living in the Diaspora. Jordan is the only country which granted them full 
nationality. The other two thirds of Palestinian refugees who are not Jordanian nationals 
now and who live in many Arab and foreign countries, while broadly sharing the same 
rights in relation to return, repatriation and compensation, are not the focus of this study.
132 Ibid., Article. 1(D).
133 Ibid., Article. 1 (C).
134 See, Position Paper Regarding the 1951 Convention, Archive o f the Jordanian Ministry o f Justice, 23 
April 1977, No. MOJCL88,
68
Chapter (2)
The Rights of Return and Compensation 
For Palestinian Refugees of Jordanian Nationality and Jordan’s Right 
to Bring Claims On Their Behalf And Its Right As a 
Host State to Compensation
This chapter will address the issue of the Right of Return/Right to compensation of 
Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin who were either displaced during the 1947-1949 
Arab-Israeli hostilities or during the 1967 war. It will, inevitably examine the legal bases 
for the right of return/compensation for Palestinian refugees in general, since the bases 
for the right of return and compensation are the same for all Palestinian refugees whether 
they are Jordanian nationals or not. It will then proceed to analyze Jordan’s right to bring 
possible claims to and against Israel on behalf of its Palestinian refugee community who 
are today Jordanian nationals. It will then assess Jordan’s right to seek compensation, 
from Israel, as a refugee host country.
The chapter will outline the bases allowing Jordan, under international law, to present 
claims to and against Israel on behalf of its nationals who are of Palestinian refugee 
origin in relation to their right of return and right to compensation. It will also outline and 
examine the bases of Jordan’s right to seek compensation as a host country for providing 
for and shouldering the burden of a massive number of Palestinian refugees for many 
decades.
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While this chapter will outline these bases and assess them with reference to United 
Nations resolutions addressing these issue, the law of nationality, human rights law, 
humanitarian law, State responsibility and the Jordan-Israel Treaty of Peace, all being the 
genesis allowing for the exercise of this right by Jordan should it decide to do so, the 
ensuing chapters 3 and 4 will then examine and assess consecutively firstly in chapter 3, 
the major heads of claims that Jordan may present to and against Israel and analyze them 
in the context of principles of international law and secondly chapter 4 will outline, 
examine and analyze the mechanisms and procedures that are available to Jordan to 
initiate such claims both in the context of mechanisms and procedures available in the 
context of the Jordan-Israel Treaty of Peace and its related specific provisions and other 
mechanisms outside the scope of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace.
This chapter is the one that will probe and highlight the foundational bases, in 
international law, available to Jordan that would enable it to present the relevant claims in 
general. The ensuing two chapters are the ones that consecutively sketch out and assess 
specific heads of claims and their legal strengths and shortcomings and the mechanisms 
and procedures available to pursue them. Such an approach is influenced by the utilitarian 
approach of this thesis in serving, at some point in time as a ‘guide’ or ‘roadmap’ or 
‘blueprint’ that could influence or possibly guide Jordan’s approach towards the issue of 
presenting claims to and against Israel.
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(a) The Rights of Return and Compensation for Palestinian refugees.
Under international law, individuals have a right of return.135 The right of return
guarantees all individuals a fundamental right to return to their homes of origin whenever
they have become displaced from them due to circumstances beyond their control. It is
argued that the right of return is an inherent human right which all individuals possess
even if, in actual practice, governments may deliberately obstruct the free exercise of that 
1right. However, since the right of return is one accorded by international law,
135 See, UN doc, ST/SG/SER. F/2, The Right o f  Return o f  the Palestinian People, (1 November 1978). P 1. 
The document refers to the person’s right to return to his home in his native country as as one that “ 
traditionally has been included among an individuals fundamental rights”. The document also in p. 3 sites 
the Magna Carta o f  1215 A.D. as one o f the first recoded legal codifications o f the natural right to return 
with the guarantee therein o f the freedom “ ....to go out o f our Kingdom and to return, safely and securely, 
by land or by water...”. See also Article 13 o f the Universal Declaration of Human Rights o f 1948 which 
states that “1. Everyone has a right to freedom o f movement and residence without within the borders o f  
each state. 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own and to return to his Country.”, 
cited in Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit, p. 23. Also, Article 12 o f the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights o f 1966 (ICCPR) states that “ 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country including 
his own. 4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived o f the right to enter his own country.” Cited in Brownlie, 
Basic Documents , ibid., pp 129-130. The International Court o f Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion given 
in 1971 on the issue o f Namibia, took the view that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
codification o f the Fundamental right o f  equality, from which all other human rights flow, gives it the force 
o f  customary international law. The ICJ’s vice President stated that “although the affirmations o f the 
Declaration are not binding qua international convention within the meaning o f Article 38, Paragraph 1(a), 
o f the Statute o f  the Court, they can bind states on the basis o f custom through a general practice accepted 
as law, in the words o f  Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), o f the Statute. One right which must certainly be 
considered a preexisting binding customary norm which the Universal Declaration codified, is the right to 
equality, which by common consent has ever since the remotest times been deemed inherent in human 
nature. “ It is not by mere chance that in Article 1 o f the Universal Declaration o f the Rights of Man there 
stands, so worded, this primordial principle or axiom: ‘All human beings are bom free and equal in dignity 
and rights’”. “ From this first principle flow most rights and freedoms, the ground was thus prepared for the 
legislative and constitutional process which began with the first declarations or bills o f rights in America 
and Europe, continued with the constitutions o f the nineteenth century, and culminated in positive 
international law in San Francisco, Bogota, and Addis Ababa charters, and in the Universal Declaration o f  
Human Rights which has been confirmed by numerous resolutions of the United Nations..”, Legal 
Consequences fo r  States o f  the Continued Presence o f  South Africa in Namibia, ICJ Reports (1971), pp 77- 
78. Additionally, a study by the International Commission o f Jurists with the title Loss o f  Nationality and 
Exile published in the Review o f the International Commission o f Jurists, No. 12 ( June 1974), supports the 
view that both the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and The ICCPR form sources o f international 
law.
136 See, Boling, G. The 1948 Palestinian Refugees and the Individual Right o f  Return: An International 
Law Analysis. BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and refugee Rights. BADIL Brief No.8 
(January 2001), p. 5. [hereinafter, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees]
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deliberate government obstruction of it ‘would violate international law and can never be
137legal.’ Accordingly, the right of return exists independently of any government’s 
policy choice to allow the free exercise of it or not.138
The right of return normally would be a personal, an individual right. Only when large 
groups might have been displaced from their homes would it assume a collective 
dimension. But it is rare that the right of return should be invoked on a national scale, that 
there should be a situation where the greater part of an entire nation should be uprooted 
from its land, be exiled and then denied the right to return. In our times a notable 
exception in this dimension is that of the Palestinian people, forced to flee their ancestral 
land by reason of military and political action and then to find the right of return denied 
to them.139
In the case of the Palestinian People, the individual or personal right of return assumes 
a special significance for without its restoration, the exercise of the collective or national 
right of self-determination, itself guaranteed by a variety of international instruments and
137 Ibid.,
138 Ibid.,
139 See, UN doc, ST/SG/SER. F/2, The Right o f  Return o f  the Palestinian People (1 November 1978), 
op.cit, p 2.
While many useful analyses have been written about the individually held right o f  return o f the 
Palestinian refugees, several contributions stand out in particular for their invaluable insights into the legal 
bases in international law o f this right. For the most important among these, see, e.g., Quigley, J. Displaced 
Palestinians and the Right o f  Return, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter 1998), p 
171; Quigley, J. Mass Displacement and the individual Right o f  Return, British Yearbook o f International 
Law, Vol. 68 (1997), p 65; Quigley, J. Family Reunion and the Right to Return to Occupied Territory, 6 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal (1993), p 223; Mallison, W.T and Mallison, S. The Right o f  Return, 
9 Journal o f Palestine Studies (1980), p 125; Mallison, W.T and Mallison, S. An International Law 
Analysis o f  the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question", UN doc. 
ST/SG/SER.F4 (1979); Mallison, W.T and Mallison, S. The Palestine Problem in International Law and 
World Order, (1986), pp 174-188; Lawland, K. The Right o f  Return o f  Palestinians in International Law, 
International Journal o f Refugee Law, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 1996), p 532.
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arguably having the statues of ju s cogens141, would be compromised. Unable to exercise 
the fundamental right of self-determination during the period of the mandate, although 
recognized by the Covenant of the League of Nations as a provisionally independent 
nation,142 the Palestinian People have struggled to regain this right since 1947, when the 
United Nations became involved in the Palestine issue and recommended the partition of 
Palestine into two states, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish.143 While Israel 
declared independence on 14 May 1948144, on the basis of the United Nations Partition 
resolution145, the Palestinian Arab State envisioned in the resolution did not come into 
existence. Instead, ‘the first great exodus of Palestinians fleeing from their homeland took
141 See the ruling o f the International Court o f Justice (ICJ) in the East Timor Case, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp 
90, 102. The ICJ noted in the case that Portugal’s assertion the right o f peoples to self -determination, as it 
evolved from the United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is ‘irreproachable’ and ‘one o f the 
essential principles o f  contemporary international law’.
142 The League o f Nations, at the behest o f the victorious Allied and Associated Powers, initiated a new 
system in regard to some o f the territorial possessions o f which Germany and Turkey had been divested as 
a result o f their defeat in World War I. This system was called the mandate system and was formulated in 
Article 22 o f the League of Nations’ Covenant which was adopted on 28 June 1919. this provided that:
“ 1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence o f the late war have ceased to be under the 
sovereignty o f the States which formally governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions o f the modem world, there should be applied the 
principle that the well- being and development o f such peoples form a sacred trust o f  civilization and that 
securities for the performance o f this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
2. The best method o f giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage o f such peoples should be 
entrusted to advanced nations who by reason o f their resources, their experience or their geographical 
position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should 
be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf o f the League...
4. Certain communities formally belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage o f  development 
where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering o f  
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such a time as they are able to stand alone. The 
wishes o f these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection o f the Mandatory...”, cited 
in, The Mandate for Palestine was entrusted to Britain and was confirmed by the Council o f  the League o f  
Nations on 24 July 1922. For The Mandate system in General and in details see, Wright, Q. Mandates 
Under the League o f  Nations, The University of Chicago Press (June 1930).
143 See General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), U.N. GAOR, 128th Plenary Meeting at UN DOC. A/519 
(1948). Cited in Bassioni, C.(ed), Documents on the Arab —Israeli Conflict, Volume 1, Transnational 
Publishers, New York (2005), pp 300-316. {hereinafter, Bassiouni, Documents]
144 Declaration o f the Establishment o f the State o f Israel, available at website: http://mfa.gov.il , cited in 
Bassiouni, Documents, ibid., p 335.
145 General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), U.N. GAOR, 128th Plenary Meeting at UN DOC. A/519 (1948). 
Cited in Bassiouni, Documents, ibid.,
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place in 1948, and the second great wave followed in the 1967 Middle East War’.146 
From then on the majority of the Palestinian People have been in exile, unable to return 
to their homes, despite the fact that the right of those ‘wishing to return to their homes 
and live at peace with their neighbors have been endorsed repeatedly by the General 
Assembly since 1948’.147
The legal bases for the Right of Return of Palestinian Refugees are found in the United 
Nations Resolutions, law of Nationality, Human Rights Law, Humanitarian law, Support 
by State Practice in other refugee situations and customary international law. Each of 
these bases will be examined in detail
On the other hand refugees have a right to receive, from the country generating refugees, 
and the latter is under a duty to provide ‘...compensation, whether pursuant to the 
principle of tort, unjust enrichment, abuse of rights or unconstitutionality’148. Similarly, 
the United Nations system and state practice reinforce and confirm the right of refugees 
to receive compensation from countries generating refugees and the duty of such 
countries to provide it.149 This right clearly applies to Palestinian refugees too.
146 See, UN doc, ST/SG/SER. F/2 The Right o f  Return o f  the Palestinian People, (1 November 1978), 
op.cit, p 2.
147 Ibid., quoting the language used in the United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), UN doc. 
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter referred to as “G.A. Res. 194”]. Successive General Assembly Resolutions used 
the same language or referred to “G.A. Res. 194”. See for example G.A. Res. 3236 o f  1974, U.N. GAOR, 
29th Session., Supp. No. 31 para. 2, UN doc. A /9631 which mentions both the right o f  return and the right 
to self-determination; G.A. Res. 54/69 (1999) which states that paragraph 11 o f the G.A. res. 194 has not 
yet been effected; G.A. Res. 55/55 (2000) which stresses the need for “resolving the problem o f the 
Palestinian Refugees in conformity with.,, Resolution 194(111)”.
148 See, Lee, L. The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries o f  Asylum, 80 AJIL 1986, p. 538. 
Hereinafter, Lee, The Right to Compensation]
149 See, in general, ibid.,
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(i) The Recognition of the Right of Return and compensation of Palestinian 
Refugees by the United Nations.
In December 1948, the United Nations’ General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 
194(III)150 which, inter alia, established a mechanism known as the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission (UNCCP) to facilitate implementation of durable solutions for 
refugees in Palestine. Resolution 194 was closely based upon prior recommendations 
made by the U.N-appointed Mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bemadotte.151 
‘Resolution 194 unambiguously declared -in reliance upon then existing principles of 
customary international law -  that Israel was obliged immediately to ‘allow all 
Palestinian refugees displaced during the 1948 conflict to exercise their right of 
return’152.
Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 sets forth the framework for a durable solution to the
predicament of the Palestinian refugees. Paragraph 11(1) of Resolution 194 by its express
terms identifies the distinct rights that all Palestinian refugees are entitled to exercise
1 ^under international law - return, restitution, and compensation. Paragraph 11(1) further 
affirms that those refugees choosing not to exercise their priority rights of return and 
restitution are nevertheless also entitled to receive full compensation for their losses. 
After extended debate, the General Assembly selected the following language to
150 See, United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), UN doc. A/810 (1948).
151 See, for the U.N. Mediator’s recommendations, "Progress Report o f  the United Nations Mediator on 
Palestine", U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp. No. 11, UN doc. A/648 (1948).
152 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 10.
153 Ibid.,
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enumerate these three separate, but interrelated ‘fundamental rights’154 of the 1948 
Palestinian refugees, stating that the General Assembly:
“Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and 
live at peace with their neighhours should he permitted to do so at 
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid 
for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or 
damage to property which, under principles of international law or 
in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible.”155
As stated previously, the adoption of resolution 194 by the GA was the culmination of a 
process that traces back its origins to a progress report that was prepared by Count Folk 
Bemadotte the United Nations Mediator on Palestine on 16 September 1948, one day 
before he was assassinated by Jewish armed elements.
The report which was submitted to the GA, took full account of the significant change of 
circumstances since the adoption on 29 November 1947 of UNGA resolution 181 (II), 
which had proposed the creation of two States, one Arab and one Jewish, in economic 
association and with the international status of Jerusalem assured. The most substantial 
development, which the Mediator recognized, was the establishment of the State of Israel 
in 1948.156
154 Ibid.,
155 See, United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), para. 11(1), UN doc. A/810 (1948), op.cit.
156 The most significant development in The Palestine scene since last November is the fact that the Jewish 
State is a living, solidly entrenched and vigorous reality. That it enjoys de ju re  or de facto  recognition from 
an increasing number o f States, two o f which art permanent members o f the Security Council, is an 
incidental but resting fact. The Provisional Government o f Israel is today exercising, without restrictions on 
its authority or power, all the attributes o f full sovereignty. The Jewish State was not bom in peace as was 
hoped for in the resolution o f 29 November, but rather, like many other States in history, in violence and 
bloodshed. The establishment o f this State constitutes the only implementation which has been given to the 
resolution, and even this was accomplished by a procedure quite contrary to that envisaged for the purpose
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In setting out his recommendations to the General Assembly, the Mediator included the 
following among the ‘seven basic premises’ which formed the foundation for his 
conclusions:
“Right o f  reparation
(e) The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the 
present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should 
be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate 
compensation for the property of those who may choose not to 
return.
International responsibility
(g) International responsibility should be expressed where 
desirable and necessary in the form of international guarantees, as 
a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to 
boundaries and human rights.”157
The Mediator also came to a number of specific conclusions which 
he considered would provide ‘a reasonable, equitable and workable
in the resolution. In establishing their State within a semi-circle of gunfire, the Jews have given a 
convincing demonstration o f their skill and tenacity, Progress Report o f  the United Nations Mediator on 
Palestine Submitted to the Secretary-General fo r Transmission to the Members o f  the United Nations. UN  
doc. A/648, Section II, para. 5
l57See, Progress Report o f  the United Nations Mediator on Palestine Submitted to the Secretary-General 
fo r  Transmission to the Members o f  the United Nations, UN doc. A/648, Section VIII, Conclusions, para.
3. p, 17. The seven basic premises in full were: Return to peace: (a) Peace must return to Palestine and 
every feasible measure should be taken to ensure that hostilities will not be resumed and that harmonious 
relations between Arab and Jew will ultimately be restored. The Jewish State: (b) A Jewish State called 
Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so. 
Boundary determination: (c) The boundaries o f this new State must finally be fixed either by formal 
agreement between the parties concerned or failing that, by the United Nations, Continuous frontiers: (d) 
Adherence to the principle o f geographical homogeneity and integration, which should be the major 
objective o f the boundary arrangements, should apply equally to Arab and Jewish territories, whose frontier 
should not, therefore, be rigidly controlled by the territorial arrangements envisaged in the resolution o f 29 
November. Right o f reparation: (e) The right o f innocent people , uprooted from their homes by the present 
terror and ravages o f  war, to return to their homes should be affirmed and made effective with assurance o f  
adequate compensation for the property o f those who may choose not to return. Jerusalem: (f) The City o f  
Jerusalem, because o f  its religious and international significance and the complexity o f interests involved, 
should be accorded special and separate treatment. International responsibility: (g) International 
responsibility should be expressed where desirable and necessary in the form o f  international guarantees, as 
a means o f allaying existing fears, and particularly with regards to boundaries and human rights.
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basis for settlement.’ These included:
“(i) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in 
Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be 
affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement 
and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate 
compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, 
should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission...”.158
In a section dealing with the problem of Arab refugees in so far as that problem entered 
into his functions as mediator, Count Bemadotte recalled that his proposal to permit such 
refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-occupied parts was rejected by the Provisional 
Government of Israel on security grounds. The Mediator added:
“5. ...not withstanding the views expressed by the Provisional 
Government of Israel, it was my firm view that the right of the 
refugees to return to their homes at the earliest practicable date 
should be affirmed.
6. It is not vet known what the policy of the Provisional 
Government of Israel with regard to the return of Arab refugees 
will be when the final terms of settlement are reached. It is, 
however, undeniable that no settlement can be just and complete if 
recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to 
return to the home from which he has been dislodged by the 
hazards and strategy of the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews 
in Palestine. The majority of these refugees have come from 
territory which, under the Assembly resolution of 29 November, 
was to be included in the Jewish State. The exodus of Palestinian 
Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their communities, 
by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or 
expulsion. It would be an offence against the principles of 
elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were 
denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants 
flow into Palestine, and, indeed, at least offer the threat of 
permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted 
in the land for centuries.
158 Ibid., para. 4(i)
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7. There have been numerous reports from reliable sources of 
large-scale looting, pillaging and plundering, and of instances of 
destruction of villages without apparent military necessity. The 
liability of the Provisional Government of Israel to restore private 
property to its Arab owners and to indemnify those owners for 
property wantonly destroyed is clear, irrespective of any 
indemnities which the Provisional Government may claim from the 
Arab States,
8. It must not be supposed, however, that the establishment of the 
right of refugees to return to their former homes provides a 
solution of the problem. The vast majority of the refugees may no 
longer have homes to return to and their resettlement in the State of 
Israel presents an economic and social problem of special 
complexity. Whether the refugees are resettled in the State of Israel 
or in one or other of the Arab States, a major question to be faced 
is that of placing them in an environment in which they can find 
employment and the means of livelihood. But in any case their 
unconditional right to make a free choice should be fully 
respected.”159
Following consideration of the Mediator’s Report in the First Committee and then in 
plenary, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 194 (III)160 on 11 December 1948. A 
number of amendments were made during the debate. None, however, was intended to or 
did in any way qualify the basic premises setout in the Mediator’s Report. Rather, the 
intent of the amendments was to raise the level of agreement in the General Assembly, by 
removing elements of the language which might appear politically controversial.
It was also clear that the General Assembly intended a role for the Conciliation 
Commission in the matter of compensation.161
159 Ibid., Section VIII, Section V, Refugees, paras. 5-8.
160 See, United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), UN doc. A/810 (1948), op.cit
161 See the proposed amendment submitted by the United States, UN doc. A/C. 1/379, 23 November. 1948, 
paras, C,D to the UK’s draft resolution, UN doc. A/C. 1/394, 18 November 1948, Palestine Progress Report 
of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, United Kingdom: Draft Resolution.
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Paragraph 11 of the United Kingdom’s draft resolution proposed that the General 
Assembly,
“[Endorse] the principle stated in Part I, Section V, Paragraph? of 
the Mediator’s Report and [Resolve] that the Arab refugees should 
be permitted to return to their homes at the earliest possible date 
and that adequate compensation should be paid for the property of 
those choosing not to return and for property which has been lost 
as a result of pillage, confiscation or of destruction; and [Instruct] 
the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, 
resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab 
refugees and the payment of compensation.”
The United Kingdom draft resolution, which drew clearly on the Mediator’s conclusions 
described above, was revised twice during discussions in the First Committee, in the light
of the debate. The second revision eliminated the paragraph endorsing aspects of the
1 /»') •Mediator’s report, and avoided specific reference to the various causes of loss and 
damage; it included the following version of paragraph 11, under which the General 
Assembly,
“Endorses the conclusions stated in Part I, Section VIII, paragraph 
4(1) of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on 
Palestine, and
“Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and 
live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at 
the earliest possible date, and that compensation should be paid for 
the property of those choosing not to return, and for loss or damage 
to property which under principles of international law or in equity 
should be made good by the governments or authorities 
responsible; and
162 See, UN doc. A/776, Report o f the First Committee, 7 December 1948, para. 15
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“Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the 
repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of 
the refugees and the payment of compensation and to maintain 
close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for 
Palestine Refugees..”.163
During discussions in the First Committee, the United States endorsed the general 
principles of the seven basic premises stated in the Mediator’s report.164 It proposed the 
following amendment, which would have the General Assembly,
“[Resolve] that the Arab refugees wishing to return to their homes 
and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so 
at the earliest possible date and that adequate compensation should 
be paid for the property of those choosing not to return; and 
[Instruct] the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the 
repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation 
of the Arab refugees and the payment of compensation...”165
However, this proposal was withdrawn, the United States representative accepting that 
the final United Kingdom text achieved the desired balance and was adequate to achieve 
the desired objective. 166The US thus implicitly accepted the correctness of the United 
Kingdom formula for compensation as extending beyond compensation for the property 
of those choosing not to return.
A Guatemalan amendment, containing a similar limitation to paragraph 11 of the second
163 See, UN doc. A/C.l/394/Rev.2, 30 November. 1948.
164 See, UN doc. A/776, Report of the First Committee, 7 December 1948, op.cit, para. 8.
165 See, UN docs. A/C.l/397, 23 November 1948; A/C. 1/397/Rev. 1, 25 November 1948; see also UN doc 
A/C.l/398/Rev.2, 1 December 1948 {Guatemala: Revised Amendment to the Second Revised Draft 
Resolution o f  the United Kingdom)
166 See, UN doc. A/776, Report of the First Committee, 7 December 1948, op.cit, para. 15.
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revised draft resolution, was rejected by 37 votes to 7 with 5 abstentions.167 Paragraph 11, 
with the substitution of the words ‘earliest practicable date’ for ‘earliest possible date’, 
and the following words added at the end ‘and through him with the appropriate organs 
and agencies of the United Nations’, was adopted by 29 votes to 6, with 13 abstentions. 
The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 25 votes to 21, with 9 abstentions.
In the version which the First Committee recommended for adoption by the General 
Assembly, paragraph 11 thus read as follows:
“Endorses the conclusions stated in Part I, Section VIII, paragraph 
4(i) of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator on 
Palestine;
“Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and 
live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at 
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid 
for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or 
damage to property which under principles of international law or 
in equity should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible;
“Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the 
repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of 
the refugees and the payment of compensation and to maintain 
close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for 
Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs 
and agencies of the United Nations...”168
The Report of the First Committee was considered by the General Assembly in plenary
on 11 December 1948, with amendments to the draft resolution proposed by Australia,
167The Guatemalan proposal used language similar to the US amendment, and would have limited the 
payment of ‘adequate compensation’ for the ‘property o f those choosing not to return’ (UN doc 
A/C.l/398/Rev.2, 1 December 1948.
168 See, UN doc. A/776, Report of the First Committee, 7 December 1948, op.cit, para. 29.
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Brazil Canada, China, Colombia, France and New Zealand.169 The Australian 
representative noted that the debates in the Committee had been ‘prolonged and
170 •heated’ . The adoption of the draft by a very narrow margin had led to informal 
discussions with a view to finding common ground, the object being to ‘modify the 
resolution without destroying its essential purpose, so as to specify more clearly what its
171intention was and to delete from it any polemical references.’
The Canadian representative noted that the amendments proposed for paragraph 11
removed instructions which appeared elsewhere; the first part of the paragraph was
redundant ‘for the objective it stated was adequately elaborated in the course of the
1
paragraph which followed’ .
The United Kingdom reiterated its view that the conclusions reached by the Mediator, 
‘formed a reasonable, just and workable solution for the Palestine problem, and had in no
173way been shaken as a result of the debate in the First Committee’ .
The New Zealand representative likewise concurred, and stated that ‘by passing the draft 
resolution and the amendments the Assembly would not be annulling or weakening the 
resolution of 29 November 1947. Neither would it be setting aside the Mediators report. 
But it would be making an attempt to obtain conciliation.174
169 See, UN doc. a/789, 9 December 1948.
170 U.N. GAOR, 184* plenary meeting, 11 December 1948, pp. 936-940.
171 Ibid.,
172 Ibid., pp. 942-943
173 Ibid., p. 948.
174 See, U.N.GAOR, 185* plenary meeting, 11 December 1948, p. 978.
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The proposal to amend paragraph 11 by deleting the reference to the conclusions of the 
Mediator was adopted by 44 votes, with 8 abstentions; the draft resolution, as amended, 
was adopted by 35 votes to 15, with 8 abstentions.
The drafting history of UNGA resolution 194 (III), and of paragraph 11 in particular, 
leads to a number of conclusions. Firsty, the right of return is considered of paramount 
importance; it was strongly endorsed by the Mediator, and is stated clearly and 
unequivocally in this paragraph. Secondly, the right to compensation has two aspects: (1) 
it is due in respect of the property of those who choose not to return; and (2) it is payable 
also, and irrespective of return, for loss or damage to property. Thirdly, the loss or 
damage is to be ‘made good’ by the Governments or authorities responsible, in 
accordance with principles of international law or in equity. Fourthly, the Conciliation 
Commission among its other responsibilities, is to facilitate the payment of 
compensation.
The ‘ordinary meaning’ of paragraph 11 is clear, and is confirmed by the travaux 
preparatoires. Resolution 194 (III) is not a treaty, but is an international instrument 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly; as such, the rules of treaty 
interpretation can be applied by analogy. Thus, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties175 confirms the rule of customary international law that a treaty “shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
175 See, The Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, (23 May 1969), UNTS, vol. 1155, p.331.
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of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”176 The rules permit 
recourse to “supplementary means of interpretation” including the travanx praparatoires 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31, “(a) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable”.177
The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), in a 1949 
Working Paper on “Compensation to Refugees for Loss of or Damage to Property to be 
made good under Principles of International Law or in Equity”, explains the fact that 
paragraph 1 Ideals with two distinct matters:
“(1) the right of refugees to return to their homes and (2) the 
payment of compensation to them. It will also be seen that the 
question of payment of compensation presents itself under two 
different aspects: (a) payment of compensation to refugees not 
choosing to return to their homes and (b) payment of compensation 
to refugees for loss of or deimage to property which under 
principles international law or in equity should be made good by 
the Governments or authorities responsible.”178
There is nothing in the history of resolution 194 (III) to suggest that paragraph 11 was to 
be read otherwise than in accordance with its ordinary meaning; or that anything but the 
normal rules of international law governing compensation for injury and loss were to 
apply. The context, to which reference can and should be made, shows (1) that
176 Ibid., Article 31(1).
177 Ibid., Article 32
178 See, Compensation to Refugees fo r  Loss o f  or Damage to Property to be Made Good Under Principles 
o f  International Law or in Equity, UN doc. W /30,31 October 1949, para. 2.
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international law and the concept of responsibility were clearly in the minds of the 
drafters; (2) that the reference to causes (pillage, confiscation, destruction)179 in the 
Mediator’s Report and in the first draft resolution shows recognition of an existing legal 
context; and (3) that the mention of ‘equity’ was intended to ensure that compensation 
should not be denied on technical legal grounds.180
Clearly, the first right enumerated in Resolution 194 is the right of return. Paragraph 
11(1) of Resolution 194 states the right of return unambiguously, in the phrasing “the 
refugees wishing to return to their homes.., should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date.”181 It should be noted here that Resolution 194 was drafted to apply to 
all persons displaced during the 1948 related conflict and therefore covers both the 1948 
Palestinian refugees (the externally displaced) and the 1948 internally displaced 
Palestinians. Both groups of displaced Palestinians therefore have the unqualified right to 
return to their homes of origin and their lands, despite Israel’s continued obstruction of 
this right vis-a-vis both groups of 1948 displaced Palestinians. This point was clarified by
1 Q9a Working Paper prepared by the U.N. Secretariat in Geneva in May of 1950.
The emphasis in Resolution 194 on repatriation - i.e. implementation of the right of return
179 Despite the fact that these references were dropped in the final text o f  paragraph 11 in order to promote 
agreement on the essential purpose o f the resolution.
180 See. Goodwin-Gill, Guy, Palestinian Refugees: An International Framework for Compensation, 
unpublished study (2003), p. 19, available at the Jordanian Foreign Ministry Archives, Document Number 
Z2811. [hereinafter, Goodwin-Gill, International Framework]
181 Ibid.,
182 See, UN doc A/AC.25/W.45, "Analysis o f  Paragraph 11 o f  General Assembly Resolution o f  11 
December1948", Working Paper Prepared by the U.N. Secretariat (15 May 1950). Section 1, titled “Who 
are the Refugees?” states in paragraph 3 that:
“According to the above interpretation the term “refugees” applies to all persons, Arabs, Jews and others 
who have been displaced from their homes in Palestine. This would include Arabs in Israel who have been 
shifted from their normal places o f residence”.
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- as the preferred solution for Palestinian refugees reflects ‘several customary norms of 
international law which existed in 1948’183. That this is so is reflected in the language of 
the U.N. Mediator’s recommendation for a solution to the plight of the refugees - 
subsequently incorporated into Resolution 194 - which acknowledged the fact that no
1 Sinew rights were being created: “The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes 
in Jewish controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the
•  • I • •United Nations....” Commenting on the original draft of paragraph 11 (proposed by 
Great Britain), the representative of United States similarly acknowledged that the 
General Assembly was creating no new rights, stating instead that the operative 
paragraph concerning the rights of the 1948 refugees “endorsed a generally recognized 
principle and provided a means for implementing that principle..”186
By contrast, it is important to note that Paragraph 11(1), which delineates the rights of the 
refugees, does not include resettlement. Resettlement is only included in Paragraph 11(2), 
which instructs the UNCCP to facilitate implementation of the rights affirmed in 
Paragraph 11(1) according to the choice of each individual refugee. Thus Resolution 194 
placed the emphasis on repatriation. This emphasis was consistent with the mandates of 
several international agencies established prior to 1948 to facilitate solutions for other
1R7groups of refugees.
183 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 11.
184 See, Takkenberg, Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 243 noting that “Count Bemadotte was apparently o f  
the opinion that the right o f refugees to return already formed part o f existing international law’.
185 See, Progress Report o f  the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp. No. 11, 
UN doc. A/648 (1948), op.cit, part I (“The Mediation Effort”), sect VIII (“Conclusions”), No. 4 (“Specific 
Conclusions”), subsection (i), containing the quoted language.
186 See, Compensation to Refugees fo r  Loss o f  or Damage to Property to be Made G ood Under Principles 
o f  International Law or in Equity, UN doc. W/30, 31 October 1949, op.cit, paragraph 8.
187 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 11.
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The U.N. Mediator whose thinking the General Assembly so closely tracked in drafting 
Resolution 194, clearly regarded the right of return as the most appropriate remedy to 
correct what he clearly viewed as the ‘mass expulsion’188 of the 1948 Palestinian 
refugees.
“It is, however, undeniable that no settlement can be just and 
complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab 
refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged by 
the hazards and strategy of the armed conflict....The exodus of 
Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their 
communities, by rumors concerning real or alleged acts of 
terrorism, or expulsion... There have been numerous reports from 
reliable sources of large-scale looting, pillaging and plundering 
and of instances of destruction of villages without apparent 
military necessity.. It would be an offence against the principles of 
elemental justice, if these innocent victims of the conflict were
1 £ Qdenied the right to return to their homes..”
The second right enumerated in Resolution 194, which is closely connected to the first, is 
the right of restitution, or the right to regain possession of private property belonging to 
the returning 1948 Palestinian refugees. This right is stated in the language of Resolution 
194 indicating the specific “destination” or “location” where the General Assembly 
declared the refugees had the right to exercise their right of return, which was clearly 
stated as being the right “to return to their homes”190. That the General Assembly 
intended to incorporate the right of restitution within the right of return in Resolution 194 
is clearly spelled out in a Working Paper prepared by the U.N. Secretariat dated March
188 Ibid.,
189 See, Progress Report o f  the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp. No. 11, 
UN doc. A/648 (1948), op.cit, part I(“The Mediation effort”), sect. V (“Refugees”), subsections 6 and 7, 
containing the quoted language.
190 See, United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), para. 11(1), U N  doc. A/810 (1948), op.cit.
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1950.191 The General Assembly reiterated the right to restitution in the Palestinian 
context in a 1974 resolution referring to the “inalienable rights of the Palestinians to 
return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and 
uprooted.”192
The third right enumerated in Resolution 194- the right of compensation - entitles two 
groups of Palestinian refugees to monetary compensation for certain categories of their 
private property. The first group of refugees comprises those who might choose to 
exercise their right of return. Returning refugees in this group are entitled to receive 
compensation for all private property which had been damaged or destroyed, because this 
is property which these refugees would otherwise be entitled to regain repossession of 
under the second enumerated right - the right of restitution - if the property had not been 
damaged or destroyed. The second group of refugees comprise those who might 
voluntarily choose not to exercise their priority of return and restitution. This group of 
non-returning refugees is also entitled to receive compensation for all of their property, 
irrespective of whether it had been damaged or destroyed, because they had been 
wrongfully displaced from it in violation of international law. Again, that this is the 
correct interpretation of the General Assembly’s language in Resolution 194 is clearly
191 See, Precedents fo r  Restitution o f  Property or Payment o f  Compensation to Refugees, Working Paper 
prepared by the U.N. Secretariat, Geneva, March 1950, UN doc. A/AC.25/W.81/Rev. 2 (Annex I) (1950). 
Paragraph 1 o f the Working Paper clearly outlines the inclusion o f the right o f restitution in the right o f  
return, it states that:
“ l.The underlying principle o f paragraph 11, sub-paragraph 1. o f  the resolution o f  the General Assembly 
o f 11 December 1948, is that the Palestine refugees shall be permitted either to return to their homes and be 
reinstated in the possession o f the property which they previously held or that they shall be paid adequate 
compensation for their property. The purpose o f the present paper is to furnish some background for this 
principle and to recall similar historical situations where claims o f restitution o f property or payment o f  
compensation were put forward”.
192 See, UNGA. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess, Supp. No. 31, para. 2, UN doc. A/9631 (1974).
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spelled out in a Working prepared by the U.N. Secretariat dated October 1949.193
In this context, it is relevant and helpful for understanding the scope, extent and subject 
matter of compensation referred to in UNGA Resolution 194, to note that the UNCCP 
suggested that the substitution of the expression, ‘loss of or damage to property which 
under principles of international law or in equity should be made good’, brought the 
wording closer to that generally used in Mixed Claim Conventions194, and suggested that 
the General Assembly consequently did not wish to limit refugee claims for 
compensation to instances of war damage; a ‘somewhat wider application’ was called for, 
with each case being considered on its merits.195
This view is supported elsewhere in the work of the UNCCP196, which stressed the need 
to distinguish between three categories of claims: (a) compensation claims for property of 
refugees not choosing to return; (b) compensation claims for loss of or damage to 
property, which, under principles of international law or in equity should be made good;
193 See, Compensation to Refugees fo r  Loss o f  or Damage to Property to be Made Good Under Principles 
o f  International Law or in Equity, Working Paper Prepared by the U.N. Secretariat, Geneva, October 1949, 
UN doc. A/AC25/W.81/Rev. 2 (Annex II) (1949), op.cit, paragraphs 12 and 13.
194 Ibid., footnote 63 at p. 19 where Goodwin-Gill sites, for example Article 1 o f the United States-Mexican 
General Claims Convention, which provided that the Commission were to decide ‘in accordance with the 
principles o f international law, justice and equity’.
195 See, Compensation to Refugees fo r  Loss o f  or Damage to Property to be Made Good Under Principles 
o f  International Law or in Equity, UN doc. W/30, 31 October 1949, op.cit, para. 13.
196 See, the series o f working papers prepared by the United Nations Secretariat and the UN Conciliation 
Commission for Palestine in the years immediately following the adoption o f resolution 194 (III). These 
include: The Refugee Problem in Concrete Terms, UN doc. W/3, 17 March 1949; Initial Steps on the 
Question o f  Compensation, UN doc. W/24, 7 September 1949; Note on Certain Conservatory Measures, 
UN doc. W/25, 8 September 1949; Compensation to Refugees fo r  Loss o f  or Damage to Property to be 
Made Good Under Principles o f  International Law or in Equity, UN doc. W/30, 31 October 1949; the 
Question o f  Compensation fo r  Palestine Refugees, UN doc. W/3 3, 25 January 1950; Returning Refugees 
and The Question o f  Compensation, UN doc. W/36, 7 February 1950; Historical Precedents fo r  Restitution 
o f  Property or Payment o f  Compensation to Refugees, UN doc. W/41, 18 March 1950; Note on 
Compensation fo r  the Property o f  Refugees who Decide Not to Return, UN doc. W/43, 22 April 1950.
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and (c) compensation claims for ordinary war damages.197 In its view, only the first two 
categories were dealt with by resolution 194 (III):
“The compensation claims for loss of or damage to property 
which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be 
made good by the Governments or authorities responsible, is an 
intermediate group of claims between the compensation claims 
under A and C. The claims in question do arise out of the military 
events In Palestine but only in an incidental way and they cannot 
be considered as claims for ordinary war-damages. From the 
legislative history of paragraph 11 of the resolution of the General 
Assembly it will appear that the cases which the Assembly 
particularly had in mind were those of looting, pillaging and 
plundering of private property and destruction of property and 
villages without military necessity, All such acts are violations of 
the laws and customs of war on land laid down in the Hague 
Convention of 16 October1907, the rules of which, as stated in the 
Nuremberg Judgment in 1939 ‘were recognized by all civilized 
nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the law and 
customs of war.’”198
That ‘ordinary war damages’ fell outside the scope of resolution 194 (III) was also 
maintained in a later UNCCP document.199 It was accepted that war damage was separate 
from the refugee problem, should not be dealt with by the Commission, but in the peace 
treaty. In the view of the Commission, however,
“10. With regard to the compensation claims of... refugees not 
choosing to return to their homes.. Not only does paragraph 11, 
sub-paragraph 1, lay down a clear, direct and unconditional 
obligation to pay compensation, but the legislative history shows 
clearly., that the General Assembly intended to leave the question 
of ordinary war damages aside.
197 See, Compensation to Refugees fo r  Loss o f  or Damage to Property to be Made G ood Under Principles 
o f  International Law or in Equity, UN doc. W/30, 31 October 1949, op.cit, para. 4.
198 Ibid., para. 13.
199 See, Compensation to Refugees and the Question o f  War Damages, UN doc. W /50,4 August 1950.
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“11. The same conclusion is reached when a comparison is made 
of the respective character of the claims of compensation for 
abandoned property on the one hand and claims for ordinary war 
damage on the other hand. In the first place it should be noted that 
the right to compensation fo r  abandoned property is an individual 
right granted to each refugee by the resolution o f  the General 
Assembly, whereas the question of war damages directly is a 
question between the Governments concerned, to be settled in the 
Peace Treaty... Finally, it should be remembered that claims for 
abandoned property refer only to losses sustained by refugees, 
whereas the claims for ordinary war damage are generally 
attributed to all persons having suffered damage as the direct result 
of enemy action.”200
The important issue in relation to international law and equity is their conjunction, which 
implies a role for both law and justice. International law is relevant to the determination 
of questions such as the attribution of the acts of non-State entities, the extent of liability 
(direct injury), the measure of damage, or the payment of interest. Equity, on the other 
hand, may require the disregard of rules which might apply in normal cases (such as 
exhaustion of local remedies, nationality of claims, continuous nationality etc), but which
would tend to defeat the objective of compensation if applied to the particular
001circumstances of the Palestinian losses.
The fact that the General Assembly made Israel’s admission as a member to the United 
Nations conditional upon its implementation of Resolution 194 clearly indicates that the 
General Assembly considered Israel fully bound to ensure full implementation of the
200 Ibid., paras. 9, 10. In view o f the particular circumstances, the Commission recommended at the 1951 
Paris Conference that ‘ a mutual waiver o f war damage claims would be consonant with the general 
principles and purposes o f the United Nations’; see, “Historical Survey o f  Efforts o f  the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission for Palestine to Secure the Implementation o f  Paragraph 11 o f  General Assembly 
Resolution 194 (III), Question o f  Compensation", UN doc. A/C.25/W.81/Rev.2, 2 October 1961, paras. 76- 
81
201 See, Goodwin-Gill, International Framework, op.cit, p 21, available at the Jordanian Foreign Ministry 
Archives, Document Number Z2811.
92
Palestinian refugees’ right of return and liable for compensating those returning and those 
not wishing to return.202
Despite the clarity of the formulation of the legal obligations contained in Resolution 
194, which the General Assembly has reaffirmed annually203 without diminution since its 
original promulgation in 1948, Israel has completely ignored its obligations under it. 
Rather than immediately and fully repatriating the 1948 Palestinian refugees, as required 
by international law, Israel has instead deliberately blocked their return. Nevertheless, the 
right of return as articulated in Resolution 194 has remained, in the succeeding five 
decades of its initial promulgation, entirely consistent with binding norms of customary 
international law. This fact only strengthens the relevance of Resolution 194 as a 
framework for crafting a durable solution for the situation of the 1948 Palestinian 
refugees204.
While it could be contended that General Assembly resolutions are not themselves 
directly binding in law, they are not, however, devoid of legal effect. In particular, where 
they are adopted by consensus or unanimity, or at least by large majorities, and there is 
evidence that their language was intended to reflect a legal conclusion, it may be argued 
that they represent customary international law;205 this argument is greatly strengthened 
where, as in the context of Palestinian refugees, the substance of the resolutions has been
202 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 14.
203 Ibid.,
204 Ibid.,
205 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit; Goodwin-Gill, International Framework, op.cit, p 21, 
available at the Jordanian Foreign Ministry Archives, Document Number Z2811, op.cit, p. 28; Quigley, J. 
Displaced Palestinians and the Right o f  Return, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter 
1998), op.cit
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repeated on numerous occasions over more than 50 years. While UNGA resolution 
194(111) may have been adopted by a vote of 35 in favour, 15 against, and 8 abstentions, 
successive later resolutions have been adopted by very large majorities.
It is important to stress that paragraph 11 of UNGA Resolution 194(111) also makes it 
clear that return and compensation are complementary, not exclusive. Palestinians 
exercising their right of return are thus also entitled to compensation for loss of or 
damage to property ‘...under principles of international law or in equity’. The General 
Assembly has recognized that ‘Palestinians are entitled to their property and to the 
income derived from their property in conformity with the principles of justice and 
equity’ . The principle of return to land and property is complemented by the right to 
compensation for damage and loss.207
On 14 June 1967, the Security Council issued Resolution 237. In this resolution the 
Council called upon Israel, among other things, to facilitate the return of the inhabitants 
of the West Bank208 who had fled the area since the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June 
1967 209 Israel has also blocked the return of this category and did not implement this 
resolution to date. Additionally, The General Assembly has reiterated ‘the inalienable
206See, UNGA Resolution 34/146C, 16 December 1981, A/RES/36/146 (A-H) available at the United 
Nations’ Information System on Palestine (UNISPAL), website: http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF
207 See, Goodwin-Gill, International Framework, op.cit, p. 27.
208 The term inhabitants o f the West Bank covers both the original residents o f  the West Bank, which until 
it was occupied as a result o f the outbreak o f  the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, had been part o f the Hashemite 
Kingdom o f Jordan since 1948, in addition to Palestinian refugees who had fled to the West Bank and 
resided therein in the period o f 1947-1949. In the literature o f  the Arab-Israeli conflict, original residents o f  
the West Bank who fled as a result o f the 1967 War are referred to as “Displaced Persons” while those 
inhabitants o f the West Bank who ended residing therein and in other Arab countries as a result o f the 
1947-1949 conflict are referred to as “Refugees”.
209 See, Security Council Resolution 237, S/RES/237 (1967), available at available at the United Nations’ 
Information System on Palestine (UNISPAL), website: http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF
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right’ of displaced persons to return to their previous places of residence in the areas that 
Israel occupies since 1967 and declared that any attempt to diminish the freedom to 
exercise this right would or attaching any conditions thereto are not consistent with the 
‘inalienability’ of this right. It also called on Israel to take all necessary steps needed for 
the return of all displaced persons, to cease all measures that may hinder such return 
including measures that affect the natural and demographic structure of the Occupied 
Territories.210
(ii) The Right of Return in the Law of Nationality.
The Law of Nationality is a subset of the larger “law of nations”, which regulates state to 
011state obligations. The law of state succession is also a subset of the law of nations, 
which has particular implications for the application of the rules of the law of nationality. 
While questions of nationality are largely regulated by the domestic laws of respective 
states, international law is nevertheless applicable and can “trump domestic law if there is 
conflict between the two”.212
1- States’ Domestic Discretion to regulate Nationality Status is Limited by 
International Law.
While states have discretion in regulating their nationality status, this discretion has clear 
limits under international law and the actions of states in this regard will only be
210 See, UNGA Resolution 37/120, dated 16 December 1982.
211 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 15.
212 Ibid.,
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recognized at the international level ‘to the extent that they comply with international 
law’.213 This principle is ‘universally recognized’.214 The Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) articulated this principle in 1923.215 The rule was also 
articulated in the authoritative 1930 Hague Convention on certain Questions Relating to 
Conflict of Nationality Laws.216 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the 
Nottebohm Case reaffirmed this principle 217 Many United Nations bodies, including the 
General Assembly’s Sixth (Legal) Committee218and the United Nations High
<11Q
Commissioner For Refugees , have also taken this view.
Nevertheless, Israeli legislation pertaining to nationality status does not conform to 
international law on this matter. The two Israeli laws governing citizenship are the Law
2,3 Ibid.,
214 Ibid.,
215 See, Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Series B, No. 4 (1923), p24. The 
PCIJ stated that “in the present state o f international law, questions o f nationality are, in the opinion of the 
Court, in principle within the reserved [domestic jurisdiction o f states],” but qualifying that statement with 
the phrase “in principle” to provide for cases where international law would be relevant to determinations 
o f nationality status and could overturn domestic law determinations.
2,6 See, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict o f  Nationality Laws, League o f Nations 
Treaty Series (LNTS), vol. 179 (1930), p. 89. Article I stated the Principle as Follows:
“It is for each State to determine under its own laws who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by 
other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the 
principles o f law recognized with regard to nationality”.
See, Nottebhom Case, (Guatemala v. Liechtenstein) ICJ Reports (1955), pp 1, 23, stating that the 
principle that a state’s determination regarding conferral o f  nationality status can only be recognized by 
other states if  the determination has fallen within international standards regarding the existence of  
“genuine link” between the individual and the State.
218 See, GAOR, 51st Session, International Law Commission, 48th Session, Second Report on State 
Succession and its Impact on the Nationality o f  natural and Legal Persons, (Vaclav Mikulka, Special 
Rapporteur), UN doc. A/CN.4/474 (1996), p. 9 observing that in the UN General Assembly Sixth 
Committee debate, “it was generally recognized that, while nationality was essentially governed by internal 
law, certain restrictions on the freedom o f  action by States derived from international law”.
219 See, U.N. High Commissioner For Refugees, Regional Bureau for Europe, Division o f  International 
Protection, The Czech and Slovak Citizenship Laws and the Problem o f  Statelessness, (February 1996), 
stating that “ nationality matters fall within the sovereign domain o f each State and it is for each state to 
define the rules and principles governing the acquisition and loss o f  nationality provided  these rules do not 
contradict international law”.
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9 9 0of Return , which provides for automatic Israeli citizenship for any Jew in the world
•  •  •  9 9 1 •who wishes to immigrate to Israel thus ‘casting a wide arc, to grant Israeli citizenship
999to the largest number of Jews possible’. And the other Law is the 1952 Nationality 
Law223, which is for ‘non-Jews’.224 This law was drafted with the obvious purpose of 
excluding the largest number of the 1948 Palestinian Refugees from eligibility for Israeli 
citizenship. While this law carefully avoids the use of the term ‘non-Jew’ in describing
99  ^the narrowly defined categories of persons who became eligible for Israeli citizenship 
based upon the 1952 Nationality Law, it becomes clear the law was obviously intended to 
apply to non-Jews only because Jews would evidently avail themselves of the far easier 
terms and procedures of the Law of Return. In contrast, the 1952 Nationality Law, 
imposes very narrow and strict conditions and requirements on persons applying for 
nationality (or citizenship status) based on the law including the need to have been 
physically present inside the 1949 armistice lines between certain dates, which in effect 
rendered the vast majority of the 1948 Palestinian Refugees ‘factually incapable of
* « 99  f \meeting these strict physical presence requirements of Israel’s 1952 Nationality Law’. 
Hence, this entire large group of persons was denationalized by that law. It is on the basis 
of this purported denationalization that Israel asserts having a purported basis for 
obstructing the right of return of virtually the entire class of persons comprising the 1948 
Palestinian Refugees.
220 See, 4 Laws o f  The State O f Israel (1950), p. 114.
221 Ibid., Section I on the Law states that: “Every Jew has the right to come to his country[Israel] as an oleh 
[Jewish immigrant]”.
222 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 26.
223 Nationality Law, 5712/1952, 93 Official Gazette 22 (1952). op.cit.
224 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 26.
225 For example, former citizens o f the Palestine Mandate o f Arab origin could only qualify for Israeli 
naiionality(citizenship) under the 1952 Nationality Law if they met the stringent criteria under section 3 of  
the law outlined in detail in Chapter 1.
226 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 26.
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This law however completely violates the rule of the law of nationality prohibiting 
denationalization, thus it is completely illegal under international law.227 This is more so, 
since such a large number of persons was purported to be denationalized by this law. 
Additionally, the group chose for ‘selective denationalization was clearly selected on 
discriminatory grounds (i.e., racial, ethnic, religious or political criteria) prohibited by 
human rights law in particular and international law in general.228
The obligation to admit nationals by a state of nationality exists at two levels. First the 
State to State level, it is an obligation upon the State of nationality to the States where the 
absent nationals are located. Secondly, it is an obligation running from the State to its 
nationals as a protected human right.
The obligation to admit a national, it must be noted, has become “an inherent duty of
States resulting from the conception of nationality”. Therefore, a State’s refusal to
admit its national may violate the rights of the State in which the national is present, the
State of nationality bears an obligation toward a State where its absent national sojourns,
1
because the State of sojourn is entitled to control residence in its territory by aliens.
Accordingly, if the State of nationality refuses to admit its national, it is liable to the state
227 Ibid.,
228 Ibid.,
229 See, Quigley, J. Displaced Palestinians and the Right o f  Return, Harvard International Law Journal, 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter 1998), [hereinafter, Quigley, Displaced  Palestinians], p. 194.
230 See, Weis, P. Nationality and Statelessness in International Law , op.cit, p. 47.
231 See, Plender, R. International Migration Law, (1973), p. 71, in which he attes that “ The proposition that 
every state must admit its own nationals to its territory is so widely accepted that it may be described as a 
commonplace o f international law”.
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of sojourn and has an obligation to restore the status quo ante,232 specifically, to admit its 
national. A State’s obligation to admit its nationals applies even if the national has never 
set foot in the State’s territory.233
Also, this obligation of the State of nationality to admit its national applies as well if the 
state revokes nationality, as is the case on the impact of Israel’s 1952 nationality law on 
Arab Palestinians. Additionally, if a State revokes the nationality of a national located 
abroad, it must repatriate the person despite the revocation.
2- The Law of State Succession.
The law of state succession applies whenever a predecessor state is followed in the 
international administration of a geographical territory by a successor state.234
In the case of the 1948 Palestinian Refugees, it can be argued that the predecessor state 
was ‘the embryonic state of Palestine for which under international law, the British 
Mandate for Palestine constituted at most only a custodian or guarantor’. The 
successor State was Israel.
Under the law of state succession, when territory undergoes a change in sovereignty, the
232 See, Eagleton, C. The Responsibility o f  States in International Law, (1928), p. 182; Chorzow Factory 
Case , (Germany v. Poland) 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) at P. 47. [Hereinafter Chorzow Factory Case]; see also 
Final Articles on State Responsibility. Article 35.
233 See, Weis, P. Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, op.cit, p. 53 in which he states that” 
the State o f  nationality is also under an obligation to admit a national bom abroad who never resided on its 
territory if  his admission should be demanded by the state o f residence”.
234 See Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees,, op.cit, p. 17.
235 Ibid.,
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law of state succession requires that inhabitants (commonly referred to as “habitual
' I ' l r
residents” ) of the geographical territory coming under new sovereignty be offered 
nationality by the new state.237 This rule represents a customary international norm and is 
binding upon all states. What this rule means in practical terms is that when a change 
in sovereignty occurs over territory, the habitual residents thereof automatically acquire 
the nationality status in the successor state because it geographically contains their homes 
of origin, whose location remains unchanged. This rule applies regardless of whether the 
habitual residents of the territory in question are actually physically present within the 
territory undergoing the change of sovereignty on the actual date of the change or not.239
236 “ Habitual residents” are inhabitants o f a particular geographical area whose long term residence there 
has established that area as their place of permanent residence, containing their homes o f  origin. Regarding 
the selection o f the concept o f ‘habitual residents” as the operative concept upon which to base the rules o f  
the law o f state succession, see General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/153 (12 December 2000). Articles 
on Nationality o f  Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession o f  States, which endorsed the International 
Law Commission’s (ILC) choice o f “habitual residents” as the operative concept. The official commentary 
to Article 5 states:
“As regards the criterion on which this presumption relies, it derives from the application o f the principle o f  
effective nationality to the specific case o f the succession o f States. As Rezek has stressed, “ the juridical 
relationship o f nationality should not be based on formality or artifice, but on real connection between the 
individual and the State. Habitual residence is the test that has most often been used in practice for defining 
the basic body o f nationals o f the successor State, even if it was not the only one. This is explained by the 
fact that the population has ‘territorial’ or local status, and this is unaffected whether there is a universal or 
partial successor and whether there is cession, i.e., a ‘transfer’ o f sovereignty, or a relinquishment by one 
state followed by a disposition by international authority. Also in the view o f  experts o f the Office o f the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there is substantial connection with the 
territory concerned through residence itself’.
237 See, in General, Oppenheim, L, “International Law " (7th ed., 1948), stating that “ inhabitants o f  the 
subjugated and ceded territory acquire ipso facto  by the subjugation or cession the nationality o f  the State 
which acquires the territory”. And referring to this rule as being “settled by the customary law o f Nations”; 
Brownlie, I. The Relations o f  Nationality in Public International Law, 39 British Yearbook o f  International 
Law (BYIL) (1963), pp. 284, 320 [hereinafter, Brownlie, Relations o f  Nationality] in which he states that “ 
the evidence is overwhelmingly in support o f  the view that the population follows the change of  
sovereignty in matters o f nationality”; Mann, F. A. The Effect o f  Changes o f  Sovereignty upon Nationality, 5 
Modern Law Review (1941-1942), pp. 218, 221 in which he states that “ The modem rule o f  customary 
international law may be formulated as follows: The Nationality o f the predecessor state is lost and that of  
the successor state is acquired by such inhabitants o f  the ceded or annexed territory as were subjects o f  the 
superceded sovereign”.
238 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 17. See also, ibid.,
239 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit, p. 210.
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The issue of nationality of new, or newly configured, states arose in the wake of World 
War I. States were carved out of territories of defeated parties, and substantial minority 
populations resulted in many of them.240 The allies conferring in Versailles over the new 
dispensation for Europe understood that the governments of these new states might not 
look favorably on some of their minorities.241 The allies demanded hence, that these 
States conclude treaties in which they agreed to protect their minorities. A major element 
in that protection was recognition of the link between these populations and their 
territory. Minority rights treaties following World War I recognized this link, giving the 
minorities a right to nationality242, and requiring the newly created states to extend their 
nationalities to the minorities 243
When there is a change of sovereignty, the state taking a territory in question, or a new 
state if it is as such, must respect the nationality rights of the inhabitants. Also, a state 
achieving sovereignty in a territory may not deprive the inhabitants of nationality by 
refusing to offer them its nationality, which in effect is what the Israeli Nationality Law 
of 1952 does. The obligation of a state acquiring territory to extend its nationality has 
been affirmed by a working group established by the International Law Commission
240 Ibid, p. 206
241 See, Advisory Opinion on Certain Questions Arising out o f  the Application o f  Article 4 o f  the Polish 
Minorities Treaty, 1923 Permanent Court o f International Justice (PCIJ), (ser.B) No. 7 at p. 15 in which the 
PCIJ states that “ One o f the first problems which presented itself in connection with the protection of 
minorities was that o f  preventing these States from refusing their nationality, on racial, religious or 
linguistic grounds, to certain categories o f persons, in spite o f the link which effectively attached them to 
the territory allocated to one or other o f these States”.
242 See, Advisory Opinion on Certain Questions Arising out o f  the Application o f  Article 4 o f  the Polish 
Minorities Treaty, 1923 Permanent Court o f International Justice (PCIJ), (ser.B) No. 7, ibid, at p. 16. The 
Opinion States: “ Though, generally speaking, it is true that a sovereign State has the right to decide what 
persons shall be regarded as its nationals, it is no less true that this principle is applicable only subject to 
Treaty obligations referred to above”.
243 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit, p. 208, in which he refers to the stipulation to this effect o f  
Article 4 o f the Minorities Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland signed at 
Versailles on 28 June 1919.
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(ILC) to analyze nationality upon state succession.244 The working group stated as a 
preliminary conclusion that a new state must extend its nationality to the inhabitants.245
Under this rule, an inhabitant of territory coming under new sovereignty acquires the 
nationality of the new sovereign, unless the inhabitant ops for the nationality of the 
former sovereign 246 If the new state declines to offer its nationality, international law 
infers it.247 This proposition was accepted even by the Tel Aviv District Court in a 1951 
case, in which the Court stated that “every individual who, on the date of the 
establishment of the State of Israel was resident in the territory which today constitutes 
the State of Israel, is also a national of the State of Israel”. The Court further stated that 
following the transfer of territory, “every individual and inhabitant of the ceding State 
becomes automatically a national of the receiving State”249. One purpose of the mle that
• 9S0nationality transfers is to avoid statelessness. Another is to accord fair treatment to the 
inhabitants.251
244 See, Report o f  the International Law Commission on the work o f  its Forty Seventh Session, U.N. GAOR, 
50th Session., Supp. No. 10. p. 68, UN doc. A/50/10 (1995); see also, Rosenstock, R. The Forty seventh 
Session o f  the International Law Commission, 90 American Journal o f  International Law (AJIL) (1996), 
pp. 106, 113-114.
245 See, Report o f  the International Law Commission on the work o f  its Forty Seventh Session, U.N. GAOR, 
50th Session., Supp. No. 10, op.cit, pp. 271, 272-275.
246 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit, p. 207.
247 See, Research in International Law, Harvard University Law School, Nationality, Responsibility o f  
States, Territorial Waters: Drafts o f  Conventions Prepared in Anticipation o f  the First Conference on the 
Codification o f  International Law, The Hague, 1930, The Law o f Nationality , Article. 20, 23 (AJIL), 
(Supp. 1929), pp. 13, 16, hereinafter referred to as The Law o f Nationality.
248 See, A.B. v. M.B, op.cit, 3 P.M. p. 263, 272 (1950-1951) [District Court, Tel Aviv] 17 International Law 
Reports (ILR) (1950)pp. 110, 111.
249 Ibid.,
250 See, The Law o f Nationality, op.cit.
251 See, Brownlie, Relations o f  Nationality, op.cit, pp. 284, 325 in which he states that “ Sovereignty 
denotes responsibility, and a change o f sovereignty does not give the new sovereign the right to dispose o f  
the population concerned at the discretion o f  the government”; see also Nsereko, D.N. The Right to Return 
Home, 21 Indian Journal o f International Law (1981), pp. 335, 343 stating that “ the fact that territorial 
sovereignty over territory has, whether rightly or wrongly, changed and should not affect the inhabitants’ 
right to reside therein or return thereto”.
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The law of Human Rights reinforced the principle that inhabitants of a certain territory, 
assume the nationality of the new or newly configured States.252 With the treatment of the 
law of Human Rights of individuals as bearers of rights, the inhabitants of a territory 
undergoing a sovereignty change are viewed as possessing the right to a nationality. 
Thus, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination guarantees a “right to a nationality” , meaning that a denial of 
nationality grounded on a racial distinction, as Israel did towards the Majority of 1948 
Palestinian Refugees, is invalid as a violation of the rights of the individual. Also, the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights guarantees “a right to nationality” and states that 
no one may be arbitrarily deprived of it.254 The attachment of the individual to the 
territory provides the basis for such a right. A right based on that attachment ‘is not 
circumvented by a political change resulting in the creation of a new state.255
The preceding analysis of the acquisition of nationality by inhabitants depends on a 
change in sovereignty from a predecessor state to a successor state. The formation of 
Israel, however, did not involve the acquiring of sovereignty by one state from another,
'yzc
but the creation of a state in territory under a Mandate from the League of Nations.
This factual difference does not produce any difference in result as regards the
252 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit, p. 207.
253 See, The International Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination, Article 
5(d) (iii) cited in Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit, p. 153.
254 See also Article 15 o f the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights o f  1948, cited in Brownlie, Basic 
Documents, op.cit, p 24.
255See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit, p. 208.
256 See, General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), U.N. GAOR, 128th Plenary Meeting at UN DOC. A/519 
(1948). Cited in Bassioni, Documents, , op.cit, pp 300-316.
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acquisition of nationality. When a state emerges from mandate territory, the rationale for
7^ 7requiring an offer of nationality is stronger. The nationality status of the inhabitants of 
a League of Nations Mandate territory was a topic on which the authorities struggled for 
clarity. On the one hand, these inhabitants were not nationals of the administering 
power, which served as a “trustee” caring for the territory and its population pending 
their acquisition of a future new status. The new status in the case of “A” class Mandates, 
of which Palestine was one, was to be political independence.259 Britain followed this 
rule in Palestine and thus did not deem inhabitants of Palestine to be British nationals 260
However, the inhabitants of mandate territory were not stateless. The administering 
power could provide diplomatic protection for them in any controversy involving another
761 767state, and some kind of nationality. Britain did so for the inhabitants of Palestine, 
who previously had been nationals of the Ottoman Empire, but who lost that status 
following the defeat of the Empire in World War I and its withdrawal from Palestine 263 
Britain created a Palestine nationality and issued passport denominated “British 
passport—Palestine”.264
257 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit.
258 Ibid.,
259 See, Article 22 o f the Covenant o f the League o f  Nations cited in Mazzawi, Musa E, Palestine and the 
Law, Itacha Press (1997), op.cit, p 26.
260 See, The King v. Ketter, 1 K.B. (1940), cited in Quigley, J. Displaced Palestinians, op.cit, footnote 213. 
the Court found that status as citizen o f Palestine did not make the appellant a British subject.
261 See, Brownlie, Relations o f  Nationality, op.cit, p 317.
262 See, Mandate fo r  Palestine, Articles. 7, 8, republished by the United Nations, UN doc. A/70 (1946).
263 See, Kunz, J. L 'Option de Nationalite, 31 Hague Academy o f International Law, Recueil Des Cours 
(1930), p 135, stating that “as for ‘A ’ Mandatesfof which Palestine was one], it is certain that the 
inhabitants o f these countries lost their Turkish nationality; but in turn they did not acquire the nationality 
o f the mandatory power; they possess a separate nationality;....Palestinian nationality”.
264 See, Nationality Law, 5712/1952, 93 Official Gazette o f  Israel 22 (1952). op.cit, Article 3 referring to “a 
person who, immediately before the establishment o f the state, was a Palestinian citizen”, thus recognizing 
a Palestinian Citizenship during the mandate period; see also, Benwich, N. Nationality in Mandated 
Territories detachedfrom Turkey, 7 BYIL (1926). pp 97, 102.
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Sovereignty in territory under mandate, it was said, was “in abeyance”.265 But a 
community under mandate was a “subject of international law”, as the beneficiary of the 
trust arrangement. This is evidenced by the fact that Palestine was, in its own name, a 
party to a number of treaties during the two and a half decades of its existence.267
The creation of Israel and its formation involved the emergence of actual sovereignty in 
territory in which sovereignty was suspended. Accordingly, the rule of customary 
international law that, upon a substitution of sovereignty, the inhabitants acquire the 
nationality of the new state, obtains as well when a state is formed in Mandate 
territory.269 Israel’s 1952 Nationality Law270 followed this practice with respect to Arab 
nationals of mandate Palestine who were physically present at the time of transfer and
*yn i
who remained there after the transfer.
Israel’s 1952 Nationality Law,272however did not extend nationality to Palestinian Arab 
nationals of Palestine who were abroad at the time of the emergence of the State of Israel, 
or who left between the emergence of Israel and the enactment of the 1952 Nationality
265 See, separate opinion o f Judge McNair in the International Status o f  South-West Africa Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports (1950).
266 See, Institute o f International Law, Resolution on Mandates, 1931, para. 6, in Brown Scott, J. The Two 
Institutes o f  International Law, 26 AJIL (1932), pp. 87, 91.
267 See for example, Exchange of Notes constituting a Provisional Commercial Agreement between Egypt 
and Palestine (80 League o f Nations Treaty Series(LNTS) 277); Agreement Concerning Exchange o f Postal 
Parcels between Palestine and Switzerland (95 LNTS 395).
268 See, the International Status o f  South-West Africa Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1950), op.cit stating 
that “ if and when the inhabitants of the territory obtain recognition as an independent S ta te ....sovereignty 
will revive and vest in the new State”.
269 S e e ,, op.cit, p 210.
270 See, Nationality Law, 5712/1952,93 Official Gazette o f  Israel 22 (1952). op.cit
271 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit.
272 See, Nationality Law, 5712/1952,93 Official Gazette o f  Israel 22 (1952). op.cit
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Law.273
State practice suggests that the inference of nationality applies to all who carry the 
nationality of the prior State, regardless of their whereabouts on the date of transfer of 
sovereignty.274 The ILC’s working group has maintained that the inference of nationality 
applies to all nationals of the former state, regardless of where they reside.275 The 
inference would thus seem to also apply to Palestinians absent at the time Israel assumed 
sovereignty.
The manner by which the United Nations’ General Assembly (GA) treated the issue of 
nationality in its proposal for two states in Palestine, one Jewish and one Arab, supports 
the preceding conclusion. The GA anticipated that Jews living in the Arab State would 
hold its nationality, and that Arabs living in the Jewish State would hold its nationality.276 
The GA anticipated that the Jewish State would include substantial numbers of Arabs.277 
The constitution of each state, according to the proposal, was to guarantee “equal and 
non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. One such right would 
inevitably have been that to nationality.
273 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit.
274 Ibid.,
275 See, Report o f the International Law Commission on the work o f  its Forty Seventh Session, U.N. GAOR, 
50th Session., Supp. No. 10, op.cit, pp, 271,272-275 (Annex: Report o f the Working Group on State 
Succession and its Impact on the Nationality o f Natural and Legal Persons).
276 See, Rosenne, S. The Israeli Nationality Law and the Law o f  Return 5710-1950, 81 Journal Du Droit 
International (1954), p 9.
277 See, Estimated Population o f  Palestine as o f  December 1946, (Appendix I), Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Palestine Question, Summery Records o f Meetings, 25 September-25 November 1947, U.N. GAOR, 2d 
Sess., UN doc. A/AC.14/32 (1947), p. 304, estimating that in the proposed Jewish State there would be a 
large number o f Arabs.
278 See, U.N General Assembly Resolution 181, U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., Pt. IB, art. 10, p d, UN doc A/519 
(1947).
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(iii) The Right of Return Under Human Rights Law:
Human rights law, which confers rights directly upon individuals and not through a State, 
contains the right of return.279 This individually held right is found in a broad body of 
international and regional human rights instruments and, arguably, constitutes a 
customary norm of international human rights law.
981The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, constitutes the ‘foundation’282 for the 
individually held right of return in human rights law. Article 13(2) of the UDHR states 
that:
“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, 
and to return to his country”283
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights284 (ICCPR) also incorporated
the individually held right of return, stating in Article 12(4) that:
“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
country”285
279 See Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p 36; see also Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit, p 
196.
280 See, Lawland, K. The Right to Return o f  Palestinians in International Law, vol. 8, no.4 International 
Journal o f  Refugee Law (October 1996), op.cit, 532, 544.
281 For the full text o f (UDHR) see, Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit, p 21-27.
282 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit.
283 See, Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit, p. 24.
284 For the full text o f the ICCPR see, ibid, pp. 125-144.
285 Ibid., p. 130.
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Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination286 
(CERD), incorporates the individually held right of return in Article 5(d)(ii) 287 and lists it 
as an enumerated right subject to the categorical no-discrimination rule of the opening 
paragraph of Article 5 which states that:
“ ....State Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of 
everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or 
ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment 
of the following rights: ...d(ii) The right to leave any country, 
including one’s own, and to return to ones country”
Additionally, the American Convention on Human Rights contains the right of return in 
its Article 22(5). The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights refers to the right 
of return in Article 12(2).289 The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also contains the right of return in Article 3(2) of 
Protocol No. 4.290
Israel is a signatory to the ICCPR and ratified it too without making any reservations to 
Article 12(4), which addresses the right of return. Consequently, this article is fully 
binding for Israel being a multilateral treaty obligation.291
It must be noted that the phrasing of the right of return in Article 12(4) of the ICCPR,
286 For the full text o f the CERD see ibid, pp. 148-162.
287 Ibid., p. 151-152.
288 Ibid, p. 504.
289 Ibid, p. 554.
290 See, European Convention for the Protection o f  Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 
233; see also "Protocol N o.4”, in 46 European Treaty Series.
291 See Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees,. op.cit, p 37; see also Quigley, D isplaced Palestinians, op.cit. p 
196.
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which uses the term ‘enter’ is broader than the term ‘return’ which is used in Article 
13(2) of the UDHR. This phrasing of the ICCPR would cover the situation of second, 
third or forth generation of Palestinian (and other) refugees whose families have been 
seeking to exercise their right of return.
The United Nations Human rights Committee, which is the official body established 
under the ICCPR and charged with its interpretation, issued in November 1999 “General 
Comment No. 27, ”293interpreting the meaning of Article 12 of the ICCPR, generally and 
addressing the Article 12(4) right of return specifically. It confirms definitively the 
applicability of the Article 12(4) right of return to the case of Palestinian refugees in 
general and the 1948 refugees in particular. It establishes that the phrase “his own 
country” as used in Article 12(4) applies to a much broader group than merely 
“nationals” of a state. The term “his own country” according to the comment,294 is 
intended to include “nationals of a country who have been stripped of their nationality in 
violation of international law, individuals whose country of nationality has been 
incorporated in or transferred to another country, whose nationality is being denied to 
them and stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of 
their long term residence” 295 Palestinian refugees in general and the 1948 refugees in 
particular, fit actually into each of the three above mentioned categories listed in General 
Comment No. 27. Consequently, it can be stated that the Palestinian refugees hold an 
absolute right of return under Article 12(4) of the ICCPR.
292 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees , Ibid.,
293 See, General Comment No. 27: Freedom o f  Movement (Art. 12), U.N. Human Rights Committee, UN 
doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/ Add.9 (2 November 1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 27].
294 Ibid.,
It must be mentioned, that some legal commentators have argued that Israel’s invocation 
of security considerations is legitimate grounds for refusing to admit the Palestinians at 
least with respect to their right of return under human rights law. They argue that the 
general limitation clause of Article 29(2) of the UDHR which states that
“In exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society,”296
permits the non-application of the right of return of Palestinians, arguing that “the influx 
of more than one and a half million mostly hostile refugees would without doubt violate 
the “rights and freedoms of others” in Israel and would damage “public order and the
7Q7general welfare in a democratic society”
In the United Nation’s practice however, invocation of security considerations to evade 
an ‘obligation’298 to repatriate has been discouraged. With Namibia, which like Palestine, 
had been under a League of Nations Mandate, a process for the return of displaced 
Namibians was set in motion by the United Nations Security Council (SC), even though 
many of these Namibians had gone abroad to take up arms to drive South Africa out of
296 See, Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit, p. 27.
297 See, Lapidoth, R, The Right o f  Return in International Law, 16 Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights
(1967), p. 116; see also, Radley, K. The Palestinian Refugees: the Right o f  Return in International Law,12 
AJIL (1978), p. 613.
298 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit. p. 200.
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Namibia.299 The SC specified by resolution that repatriation of Namibians should be 
implemented by South Africa “pending a transfer of power without awaiting a political 
settlement”300
Additionally, The ICCPR, unlike the UDHR, has no general limitations clause. The
ICCPR allows for the suspension of certain rights, including those found in Article
12(ffeedom of movement) during a declared emergency.301 in certain Articles of the
ICCPR, one finds limitations provisions applicable to the concerned article alone. Article
12 contains some limitations language. The Article states that:
“ 1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within 
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to 
choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any 
restriction except those which are provided by law, are necessary 
to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public 
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are 
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
country.”302
It is evident from the stmcture of Article 12 that the limitations language found in 
paragraph 3 applies only to the rights enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2. it does not apply
299 See, Letter dated 10 April 1978 from the Representatives o f  Canada, Federal Republic o f  Germany, 
France, The UK and the USA to the President o f  the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. For 
Apr-June 1978, p 17, 18 at Paragraphs 7(c), (d). UN doc. S/12636 (1978). These five states which had been 
asked by the UNSC to make recommendations, said that displaced Namibians should be allowed to return.
300 See, Security Council Resolution 385, paragraph 11(d), U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess, Resolutions and 
Documents, UN doc. S/INF/32 (1977).
301 See Article 4 o f the ICCPR cited in Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit, p. 127.
302 Ibid., p. 129.
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to the right to enter one’s country contained in paragraph 4. Hence, the ICCPR, unlike the 
UDHR, does not permit a State to condition the right of admission based on security 
considerations.
The only qualification to the obligation to permit entry and return, in accordance with 
12(4) of the ICCPR, is if the refusal is not arbitrary. The qualification has been pointed to 
in support of Israel’s refusal to admit displaced Palestinian.303 The term ‘arbitrarily’ 
potentially gives a State of nationality great latitude to exclude nationals. However, the 
drafting history of the Article 12 suggests that this was not the intent.304
The term ‘arbitrarily’ had been inserted into Article 12(4) for, a particular purpose that 
leaves its meaning narrow. Some States that had participated in the drafting used exile as 
a penal sanction in their domestic law and where, thus unwilling to accept a blanket 
obligation to grant entry. It was proposed then to compel a State to grant entry with an
305exception regarding nationals who had been exiled.
On the other hand many States who had been participating in the drafting viewed exile as 
being unlawful as a penal sanction and were, thus unwilling to expressly state that exile 
as a penal sanction was permitted.306 Consequently, compromise language was sought to 
accommodate the use of exile as a penal sanction without spelling it out expressly or
303 See, Lapidoth, The Right o f  Return in International Law, op.cit, p. 115.
304 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit. p. 202.
305 Ibid.,
306 Ibid.,
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directly and the word ‘arbitrarily’ was inserted to serve this purpose exclusively.307
It was also argued, regarding Israel’s obligation, under human rights law, that Israel may 
legally delay repatriation of Palestinian refugees while it is still in a state of
308emergency.
The ICCPR allows States to derogate from certain obligations, including the freedom to 
leave or enter a country, during a declared emergency.309 This is based on the argument 
that in certain extreme situations, a State can be justified in taking measures that are not 
warranted in normal times.310
Israel’s provisional parliament had declared, in May 1948 a state of emergency311, and 
that declaration remains in force. In 1991, when Israel ratified the ICCPR, it made a 
formal declaration to explain its emergency and announcing that it thereby derogates 
from its obligations under Article 9 only of the ICCPR, which relates to detention and
■i p
arrest. The Israeli declaration did not mention Article 12(4) guaranteeing the right to 
enter one’s country. To avail of the option of derogating from ICCPR protected rights, a
307 See, Novak, M. U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, (1993), p 219 where 
he states that: “ In light o f the historical background, there can be no doubt that the limitation on the right to 
entry expressed with the word ‘arbitrarily’ is to relate exclusively to the cases o f lawful exile as punishment 
for a crime”; see also Bossuyt, M. Guide to the 'Travaux Preparatoires' o f  the International Covenant on 
Civil and political Rights (1987), pp. 260-263.
308 See, Lapidoth, R. The Right o f Return in International Law , op.cit, p. 115.
309 See, Article 4 o f the ICCPR, cited in Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit, p. 127.
310 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinian , op.cit. p. 203.
311 See, Law and Administration Ordinance, Article 9(a), 1 Laws o f The State o f Israel 7 (1948).
312 See, Multilateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General on the United Nations, at UN doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/14 (1996), p. 142.
113
State must indicate in its declaration, the specific provision from which it derogates.313 
The fact that Israel did not mention Article 12(4) in its declaration indicates that its 
refusal to allow Palestinian refugees is not related or based on its declared emergency.314
Nevertheless, Israel in principle can file a new communication in which it can indicate a 
need to derogate from Article 12(4). The ICCPR permits such a course of action so long 
as the State choosing to take this path is able to recite appropriate reasons for such a new 
communication regarding both, the existence of an emergency and to the need to derogate 
from particular provisions.
In the vent that Israel does in fact file such a new communication, the validity of such a 
communication would be open to doubt. Israel would have to explain in such a 
communication why keeping the Palestinian refugees out was ‘required by the exigencies
T1 £\ • • *of the emergency situation’ , an assertion that might be difficult to sustain.
It must be noted also that Israel’s long term state of emergency is without parallel in 
contemporary international practice317, and in human rights law, a state of emergency 
must be temporary.318 The Human Rights Committee that administers the ICCPR has said 
that an emergency may not be declared for an indefinite period or lengthy period as a
* 319pretext for the lengthy imposition of restrictions.
313 See, Article 4(3) o f the ICCPR, cited in Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit, p. 127.
3,4 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit. p. 204.
315 Ibid,
316 See, Article 4 o f the ICCPR, cited in Brownlie, Basic Documents, op.cit, p. 127.
317 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit. p. 204.
318 Ibid,
319 See, Report o f  the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 34th S ess, Supp. No. 40, UN doc. A/34/40
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The situation on which other States have declared emergencies, and which have been 
ascertained by decision making bodies as appropriate, have involved ongoing civil armed 
conflict of limited duration. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), administers 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms , which contains derogation provisions similar to those contained in the
3 2 1ICCPR. The ECHR has defined an emergency as “an exceptional situation of crisis or 
emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized 
life of the community of which the State is composed”.322 The Court found a validly 
declared emergency in Ireland in 1956-1957, because of the activities of the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) activities over a nine month period.323 In a later case, the ECHR 
found a validly declared emergency in Northern Ireland, again on the basis of military 
activities of the IRA.324 In a third case, however, the European Commission of Human 
Rights, which also adjudicates violations under the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,325 found invalid a declared 
emergency in Greece, owing to the fact that, unlike the situations refereed to above in
(1979), p. 20.
320 See, European Convention fo r  the Protection o f  Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 
233, op.cit, Article. 19.
321 Ibid., Article 15 states that “ In the time o f  war or other public emergency threatening the life o f the 
nation, any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this 
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies o f the situation, provided that such measures 
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”
322 See, Lawless Case, (Republic o f Ireland), 1961 Yearbook o f  the European Convention on Human 
Rights, pp. 472-474.
323 Ibid, p. 474.
324 See, Ireland v. United Kingdom Case, 1978 Yearbook o f  the European Convention on Human Rights,
pp. 602,608.
See, European Convention fo r the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 
233, op.cit, Article. 19.
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Northern Ireland, there was no military activity at the time.326
Judging by the standard reflected in the abovementioned European cases. A new Israeli 
declaration of emergency would probably be invalid. The factual assertion on which 
Israel’s continuing declaration of emergency may rely, namely, that Israel has on a 
continuing basis been the object of armed attacks from outside, would be difficult to 
sustain. Even if this assertion were accurate for the earlier period of Israel’s existence, it 
would not seem to be so in an era of actual and anticipated peace agreements with 
neighboring Arab States.327
(iv) the Right of Return under International Hum anitarian law:
The territory to which some of the displaced Palestinians seek return; namely the West 
Bank, is territory that falls under Israel’s belligerent occupation. Another body of law, 
humanitarian law, guarantees a spectrum of rights to persons who inhabit territory that is 
occupied by a foreigner. One such right is repatriation of those entitled to it.328 Both the 
Hague Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the laws and 
Customs of War on Land329 [hereinafter the “Hague Regulations”], (which are universally
326 See, Greek Case, cited in Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit, footnote 188.
327 See, Quigley, J. Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice, (1990), pp. 57-65, 156, 161-167, 195, 159- 
200 (Making the, controversial and heavily contested argument, that Israel had not been the target o f  
aggression in the hostilities o f 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1982).
328 See, Wright, Q. Legal Aspects o f  the Middle East Situation, 33 Law and Contemporary Problems
(1968), pp, 5, 19, stating , with reference to Palestinians displaced from occupied territories in 1967 that “ 
the law o f  war, applicable to all de facto  hostilities, requires the occupant to spare the civil population, and 
refusal to allow repatriation ...would violate international law”.
329 See, Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs o f  War on Land: 
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs o f  War on Land” [hereinafter Hague Regulations], in 
Roberts, A and Guelff, R. Documents on the Laws o f  War, third edition (2000) [hereinafter, Roberts and
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recognized, including by Israel330, to have achieved customary status by 1939) and the 
1949 Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of 
War331 [hereinafter the “IV Geneva Convention”] (to which Israel is a signatory) provide 
for the right of return of displaced persons to their homes following the cessation of 
hostilities. Thus the right of return exists as a binding norm of humanitarian law, and 
Israel is under a corresponding positive obligation to ensure its implementation.
The Hague Regulations on law of war require an occupant to respect and maintain the 
“public life” of territory.332The repatriation of nationals or non-national residents who 
happen to be abroad for whatever reason when the occupant enters into control would 
seem necessary in regard.
The sources of the right of return in the IV Geneva Convention are Article 4, Article 6(4) 
and Article 158(3). Article 4 defines the “protected persons” who are covered by the 
Convention as:
“...those who at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, 
find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of
Guellf, Laws o f  War], p. 73.
330 The Israeli High Court has ruled routinely, beginning with the famous Eichmann case, that the Hague 
Regulations constitute customary international law binding upon Israel. See, Attorney-General o f  Israel v. 
Adolf Eichmann, 36 International Law reports (ILR), (29 May 1962), p. 293. This ruling has been 
consistently upheld since then by the Israeli High Court.
331 See, the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection o f  Civilian Persons in the Time o f War 
[hereinafter the IV Geneva Convention], in Roberts and Guellf, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 299.
332 See, Article 43 o f the Hague Regulations, in Roberts and Guellf. Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 80. the Article 
requires the occupier to maintain la vie public in the occupied territory. The French text o f  the Hague 
regulations is the only official text. The term used in the erroneous English translation o f  the Article 
“public order and safety” is simply incorrect. See, Schwenk, E. Legislative Power o f  the Military Occupant 
under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 Yale Journal o f International Law (1945), pp. 393, 398 
constructing I ’ordre et la vie public to mean “ general safety and social functions and ordinary transactions 
which constitute daily life”. See also Dinstein, Y. The Israel Supreme Court and the Law o f  Belligerent 
Occupation: Deportations, 23 Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights (1993), pp. 1, 19-20, noting that the 
Israeli Supreme court has stated that the English text is wrong.
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a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not 
nationals”333
This definition of protected persons cover all habitual residents of a territory who may 
have become temporarily displaced from their place of origin during the conflict (for 
whatever reason), and provision for their repatriation has been made in two separate 
Articles of the Convention. The first repatriation provision appears in Article 6(4), which 
states that:
“Protected persons whose release, repatriation or re-establishment 
may take place after [the Convention would otherwise cease to be 
applicable] shall meanwhile continue to benefit by the present 
Convention”334
This provision covers “end dates” of the applicability of the Convention. Specifically, it 
states clearly that the Convention shall remain in effect even after the cessation of 
hostilities for those protected persons.
The second repatriation provision appears in Article 158, which states:
“ ...a denunciation ...shall not take effect until peace has been 
concluded, and until after operations connected with the release, 
repatriation and re-establishment of the persons protected by the 
present Convention have been terminated.”335
This second repatriation provision covers the procedures whereby a state may denounce 
the Convention. Specifically, Article 158(3) states that a denunciation may not take effect
333 See Article 4 o f IV Geneva Convention, in Roberts and Guellf, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 302.
334 See, Article 6, Paragraph 4 IV Geneva Convention, in Roberts and Guellf, Laws o f  War, ibid., p. 304.
335 See, Article 158IV Geneva Convention ", in Roberts and Guellf, Laws o f  War, ibid., p. 354.
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until repatriation of protected persons has occurred.
It is clear from the foregoing that the drafters of the IV Geneva Convention intended for 
the unqualified voluntary repatriation to their homes of origin of any and all habitual 
residents of a territory undergoing conflict temporarily displaced (for whatever reason) 
during that conflict. Thus the IV Geneva Convention incorporated the general customary 
humanitarian law right of return, which it inherited from the Hague Regulations
It should be noted that there is a second right of return in humanitarian law, that relates to 
“forcible (mass) expulsion” humanitarian law right of return. The issue of Forcible 
expulsion will be dealt with elsewhere in this study.336
It will suffice at this stage to state that this type of right of return found in humanitarian 
law exists as a legal remedy (corrective action) in cases where states have forcibly 
expelled populations in violation of international law. Forcible expulsions cases where 
displaced persons have been deliberately forced out of their homes (e.g., at gunpoint or 
by deliberate military “stampeding” of any type) and then subsequently have been
337prevented from returning to them.
Even a single case of forcible expulsion is prohibited under humanitarian law. The 
prohibition is accordingly magnified when large numbers of people are forcibly 
displaced. Because the rights of more people are adversely affected in cases of “mass”
336 See Chapter (III) o f this study.
337 See, Boling, 1948 Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p.32.
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forcible expulsion, the illegality of that action is even greater, under international law. 
Further, forcible expulsions carried out on a discriminatory basis are even more strongly 
prohibited because of the general customary norm of international law prohibiting 
governmental discrimination based upon race, ethnicity, religion or political belief 
generally. However, the involuntary (i.e., forcible) transfer (i.e., expulsion) of even a 
single individual - e.g., through deportation - is conclusively prohibited under 
humanitarian law.338
The outcome of a forcible expulsion is a population of habitual residents deliberately 
transferred away from, and prevented from returning to, their homes of origin - all against 
their will. The rule is quite simple: “deliberate mass expulsions of a population and 
population transfers are ... prohibited under international law.”339
(v) The Right of Palestinian Refugees to compensation:
In addition to the firm right of return that Palestinian refugees enjoy on the bases 
explained above, they also have the right to compensation. This right is explicitly stated 
in UNGA Res. 194(111) as explained previously in this study.
There is no doubt that in international law the breach of an international obligation carries 
with it the obligation to make adequate reparation, while the precise identification of the 
applicable law has some important consequences. That law is international law, but
338 Ibid.,
339 See, Rosand, E. The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia 
Precedent?, 19 Michigan Journal o f International Law (Summer 1998), pp. 1091, 1117.
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potential Palestinian claims arise not merely in a purely ‘civil’ context, such as the 
expropriation of property without compensation, but in a context which is delictual; in 
particular, the context involved the use of force in breach of the United Nations Charter 
and general international law. The measure of damages will therefore need to reflect this 
basis of liability and the imputability to Israel of the consequences of its unlawful 
actions.340
Among others, the test of remoteness of damage will require to be applied favourably, 
where there has been a deliberate intention to injure. The expulsion of Palestinians and 
the expropriation of their property, among others, were the result of policies and 
intentional acts adopted at the highest political level.341 As a leading authority, Professor 
Bin Cheng, observes:
“While, however, the objective criterion of normality and the 
subjective criterion of reasonable foreseeability generally coincide 
in the determination of proximate causality, the subjective criterion 
alone applies in the case o f  exceptional consequences intended by 
the author o f  the act. I f  intended by the author, such consequences 
are regarded as consequences o f the act fo r  which reparation has 
to be made, irrespective o f  whether such consequences are normal, 
or reasonably foreseeable.... The duty to make reparation extends 
only to those damages which are legally regarded as the 
consequences of an unlawful act. These are damages which would 
normally flow from such an act, or which a reasonable man in the 
position of the wrongdoer at the time would have foreseen as likely 
to result, as well as all intended damages. ”342
The governing principle of effective reparation requires extensive compensation in the
340See, Goodwin-Gill, International Framework, op.cit, p. 30.
341 See, Chapter I o f this study.
342 See, Cheng, B. General Principles o f  Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, (London, 
1953, reprinted, 1987), pp. 251, 253 and the authorities there cited.
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case of an unlawful act.343 Already in 1949, Israel recognized the principle of fu ll 
compensation, inter alia, to be paid to villagers for land they had left, as a consequence of 
the establishment of the Demarcation Line.344
It also must be stressed in this regard that the legal authority of General Assembly 
resolution 194 (III) in relation to the ‘general international law of compensation’ and its 
impact on the obligations of States, particularly Israel, cannot be ignored. Paragraph 11 
refers to compensation for the property, among others, for ‘those choosing not to return’. 
Although the resolution leaves open important questions, such as who should compensate 
and how, clearly the option (compensation for property in the event of non-return) is one 
which can only be exercised by the displaced and the dispossessed themselves. 
Compensation is due, ‘for loss of or damage to property... under principles of 
international law or in equity’, and the General Assembly has recognized that 
Palestinians ‘are entitled to their property and to the income derived from their property 
in conformity with the principles of justice and equity’345
In the Chorzow Factory case in 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice, on an 
issue involving expropriation emphasized that reparation ‘must, as far as possible, wipe
343 See, Chorzow Factory Case, op.cit, para. 34; see also, International law Commission Final Articles on 
State Responsibility fo r  Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted in July, 2001 and annexed to UNGA 
Resolution A/RES/56/83, 28 January 2002 [Hereinafter ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility]: Article 
31: Reparation.” 1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused 
by the internationally wrongful act. 2. Injury consists o f  any damage, whether material or moral, arising in 
consequence o f the internationally wrongful act o f  a State.” Article 37: Compensation. “1. The State 
responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused 
thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. 2. The compensation shall cover any 
financially assessable damage including loss o f  profits insofar as it is established.”.
344 See, General Armistice Agreement between Jordan and Israel, (3 April 1949), 42 UNTS, p. 303.
345 See, United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), para. 11(1), UN doc. A/810 (1948), op.cit.
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out all the consequences of the illegal act and establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.’ This could be achieved by 
way of restitution in kind, or, if that is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to 
the value which a restitution in kind would bear, or the payment of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind.346 In this case, the Court 
emphasized the priority of restitution (restitutio in integrum). Only if this is not possible 
does the obligation become that of paying the value of the property and compensation for 
resulting loss.
Central to the Court’s reasoning was the distinction between a lawful expropriation, 
which required fair compensation and the ‘seizure of property, rights and interests which 
could not be expropriated even against compensation’. In the Chorzow Factory case, the 
act of expropriation was illegal because it violated a treaty provision; in the case of 
Palestinian property claims, the dispossession is illegal among others things, because it 
violates the rights of individuals and groups, including a ‘recognized self-determination 
unit’347, to property and territory.
The International Law Commission (ILC) has maintained these basic principles in its 
Final Articles on State Responsibility adopted in July 2001 and annexed to General 
Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 28 January 2001. According to article 31, ‘injury includes 
any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a 
State’ and the responsible State is ‘under an obligation to make full reparation for the
346 See, Chorzow Factory Case, op.cit,.
347 See, Goodwin-Gill, International Framework, op.cit, p. 31.
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injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.’ 348, The ILC further notes that full 
reparation for injury ‘shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, 
either singly or in combination.’349
Specifically in relation to restitution, the ILC Articles recognize that the responsible State 
is obliged ‘to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was 
committed, provided and to the extent that restitution...’ is not materially impossible, and 
would not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution 
instead of compensation. 350 So far as damage is not made good by restitution (and, 
indeed, in practice, compensation tends to enjoy priority over restitution), then the 
responsible State is obliged to compensate, such compensation to cover ‘any financially 
assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established’351; interest is also 
payable. In the words of the Permanent Court in Chorzow Factory Case, compensation 
means the ‘payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind 
would bear.’353
Also, in practice, States have paid compensation to and on behalf of refugees from their 
territory and of victims of persecution and other human rights violations.354 As the
348 See, ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit, Article. 31.
349 Ibid., Article. 34.
350 Ibid., Article. 35
351 Ibid., Article. 36(2), Note Article 31, which provides that injury consists o f ‘ any damage, whether 
material or moral’.
352 Ibid., Article. 38.
353 See, Chorzow Factory Case, op.cit, at Para. 47. the duty to make reparation also applies where there is 
no direct taking o f property, but such an interference with property rights as to render them useless, such as 
deprivation o f  the effective use, control and benefits o f property, Tippets v. TAMS-ATTA, 6 Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal (1985), pp. 219,225.
354 According to Principle 4 o f the International Law Associations Cairo Declaration o f Principles o f
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UNCCP recorded in a 1950 working paper:
“8. After World War II, most of the former Axis and Axis- 
occupied countries passed laws in favour of such persons who had 
been persecuted or forced to leave the country. In the US occupied 
zone of Germany on 10 August 1949, a General Claims Law was 
passed. Article I of this law provides:
‘Those persons shall be entitled to restitution pursuant to this law 
who, under the National Socialist dictatorship (30 Jan 1933 to 8 
May 1945J, were persecuted because of political convictions or on 
racial, religious or ideological grounds and have therefore suffered 
damage to life and limb, health, liberty, possessions, property or 
economic advancement.’
Machinery is set up under this law for the filing of individual 
claims and provisions are made for the payment of compensation.
In the British zone of occupation in Germany, Law No. 59 entitled 
Restitution of identifiable Property to Victims of Nazi Oppression 
was passed on 12 May 1949. Article 1 of this law provides:
“The purpose of this Law is to effect to the largest extent possible 
the speedy restitution of identifiable property (tangible and 
intangible) to persons whether natural or juristic who were unjustly 
deprived of such property between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 
1945 for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political views, or 
political opposition to National Socialism,’
This law also establishes a procedure for the filing of individual claims for restitution
International Law on Compensation to Refugees, ‘a State is obligated to compensate its own nationals 
forced to leave their homes to the same extent as it is obligated to compensate an alien': 87 AJIL (1986), p. 
532. Although no international mechanisms presently exist through which refugees may seek 
compensation. There are a number o f relevant precedents including, for example, the compensation 
arrangements established by the Federal Republic o f Germany for those persecuted under the Nazi regime. 
Article 3 o f the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs o f  War on Land provides that ‘a 
belligerent party which violates.., the (Regulations) shall, if  the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation’: in Hague Regulations annexed to Convention No. IV respecting the Laws and Customs o f  
War on Land, 1907 cited in Roberts and Guellf, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 80. It has also been argued that 
violations o f  human rights entail the obligation to provide for compensation as a means to ‘repair’ a 
wrongful act or a wrongful situation; see Van Boven. T., Study concerning the Right to Restitution, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation fo r  Victims o f  Gross Violations o f  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/10; see also 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture 
cited in Brownlie, Basic Documents op.cit, p. 38. See also UNCCP, Historical Precedents fo r  Restitution o f  
Property or Payment o f  Compensation to Refugees. Working paper prepared by the Secretariat). UN doc. 
W /41,18 March 1950.
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with appropriate provision for compensation
9. Even before these acts for individual restitution in Germany, the 
Allied Governments in the Final Act of the Paris Conference on 
Reparations of 21 December 1945 and the Agreement of 14 June 
1946 provided for a lump sum payment into a fund for non- 
repatriable victims of German action”.355
More recent and related examples of States providing compensation to refugees, are also 
found in the mechanisms for recovery of property established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
further to the Dayton Accords, and compensation for Asians expelled from Uganda in 
1970.356
(b) bases of Jo rdan’s right to bring compensation claims, on behalf of its nationals 
who are of Palestinian refugee origin, to and against Israel and to seek to implement 
the right of return and its right to seek compensation as a host country.
Palestinian refugees in Jordan357 and Jordan as a host country are analogous to other 
victims that have sustained injuries as a result of a State’s violation of international law358 
and the other bodies o f law identified previously in this chapter. As early as 1646, 
Grotius enunciated the legal maxim that every ‘fault creates the obligation to make good
355 See, UNCCP. Historical Precedents fo r  Restitution o f  Property or Payment o f  Compensation to 
Refugees, (Working paper prepared by the Secretariat). UN doc. W /41,18 March 1950. op.cit. paras. 8-9.
356 See, Goodwin-Gill, International Framework, op.cit, p. 32-33.
357 The term Palestinian Refugees is used despite the fact that the overwhelming majority o f  Palestinian 
refugees in Jordan are full Jordanian national as explained in Chapter (1).
358 See, Lee, L. The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries o f  Asylum", 80 AJIL (1986), p. 536. 
[Hereinafter. Lee, The Right to Compensation]
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359the loss.’ To deny the liability of a State for wrongs it has committed would in effect 
abolish the duty of a State to observe the rules of international law.360 The most common 
remedy for the breach of an international obligation is adequate compensation, which 
may be defined as “the payment of such a sum as will restore the claimant to the position 
the claimant would have enjoyed had not the breach occurred”.361 The duty to make 
reparation is based on the fact that ‘in international law, as in domestic law, rights 
without remedies are illusory, i.e., ‘no rights’ at all’.
Eagleton described state responsibility as follows:
“Responsibility is simply the principle which establishes an 
obligation to make good any violation of international law 
producing injury, committed by the respondent State....Whether 
reparation be made through diplomacy or in any other manner is a 
matter of procedure, and an entirely distinct problem.” 363
Over the centuries, this fundamental principle has been a cornerstone of interstate 
relations.364 Article 1 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) final articles on
• l / ' f
Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts (Part One) reflects the 
importance of this principle by providing that “Every internationally wrongful act of A
« « •  •  "XftfiState entails international responsibility of that state.”
359 See, Grotius, Hugo, De Jure Belli Ac P ads, book. II, chapter. XVII, p. 430 (1646 ed., Carnegie 
Endowment Translation. 1925.). Three elements must be present: (1) possible fault on part of the 
respondent government, (2) loss sustained, and (3) reparation to make good the loss.
360 See, Lee, The Right to Compensation, op.cit.
361 See, Oliver, Legal Remedies and Sanctions, in Lillich, R, International Law o f  State Responsibility fo r  
Injuries To Aliens, (1983), pp. 61, 71.
362 Ibid., p. 61
363 See, Eagleton, C, The Responsibility o f  States in International Law, (1928), p. 23-24. [hereinafter, 
Eagleton, The Responsibility o f  States]
364 See, Lee, The Right to Compensation, op.cit, p. 537.
365 See, ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit.
366 Ibid., Article. 1.
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The right of return and right to compensation which Jordan may seek to bring into effect 
on behalf of its Palestinian Refugee population is founded on the premise of Israel’s 
responsibility for the wrongful act of generating refugees, its failure to repatriate then, 
and failure to compensate them. Jordan’s right to seek compensation as a host country 
also emanates from Israel’s aforementioned internationally wrongful acts that caused
'yf.n
injury to Jordan. This chapter will proceed to explore in further detail the issue of 
Israel’s responsibility owed to Jordan, and in certain aspects to the international 
community, at large as a result of its internationally wrongful act of creating the 
circumstances leading to the exodus of Palestinian Refugees and also owed to Jordan as a 
host State.
It will then proceed to assess the procedures and mechanisms provided by the Jordan- 
Israel Peace Treaty of 1994 that would give Jordan the right to seek to enforce the right 
of return/compensation for its Palestinian refugee population and its right to seek 
compensation as a host State.
(i) State Responsibility:
Every internationally wrongful act of a certain State entails the international
367 See, ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit, Article. 42
368 See, Treaty o f  Peace between the Hashemite Kingdom o f  Jordan and the State o f  Israel, signed on 26 
October 1994, in 34 International Legal Materials (ILM) (1995), p. 43. [Hereinafter “Jordan-Israel Peace 
Treaty”].
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responsibility of that State. This international responsibility of a State arises when 
there is ‘a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not 
in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of the origin or 
character’. Therefore a State would be in breach of an international obligation when its 
act or omission in question is not in conformity with what is required by the obligation
T71 1 7 '}concerned “regardless of its origin or character.” Such an international obligation 
may arise from a customary international law rule, a treaty, a general principle applicable
•  •  •  T7Twithin the international order, or by a unilateral act.
States act through entities and individuals. Accordingly, a wrongful act would only occur 
when conduct (action or omission) of the entity or individual is attributable to the State 
concerned under international law and when the conduct constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of that State374 regardless of the origin or character of the 
obligation in question.
Every State is injured through the materialization of an internationally wrongful act is 
entitled to invoke responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is owed to the 
State concerned individually or a group of States including that state, or the international
369 See, ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit, Article. 1.
370 Ibid., Article. 12.
371 See, Crawford, J. The International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries, (2002), p. 127 [hereinafter, Crawford, The International Law Commission]
372 See, ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit, Article. 12. Additionally, in the Gabcikovo- 
Nagimaros Project Case(Hungary v. Slovakia), the ICJ stated that it is “well established that, when a State 
has committed an internationally wrongful act, its international responsibility is likely to be involved 
whatever the nature o f the obligation it has failed to respect, ICJ Reports (1997), p. 38, para. 47.
373 See, Crawford, The International Law Commission, op.cit
374 See, ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit, Article. 2.
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community as a whole, and the breach of the obligation specifically affects that State.375
Applying these rules to the specific subject matter of this study, clearly demonstrates, as 
has been shown previously in this chapter, that Israel has in fact breached international 
obligations through the systematic measures and conduct that it had adopted with the 
intention to expel Palestinian Arabs in 1947-1949 period, taking their land and property 
and failure to repatriate them and compensate them in a manner that was-and still is- 
inconsistent with international obligations arising primarily from customary international 
law rules that were, at the time binding, upon Israel. It also clearly demonstrates that 
Israel has breached international obligations emanating from customary international law 
rules and from treaties that were binding upon it through its occupation of the West Bank 
in 1967 and the deliberate policies adopted by Israel with the intention of expelling 
residents of the West Bank, including, the establishment of settlements, land confiscation 
and moving large portions of its civilian population to the West Bank, in addition to its 
failure to repatriate them and compensate them until now. The nature of these breaches
376by Israel is one that has a continuing character.
The acts committed during the 1947-1949 period by Jewish paramilitary groups such as
the Haganah, Palmach, Irgun are acts that are attributable to the State of Israel. Article
10 of the ILC final articles on State Responsibility states that:
“2. the conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which 
succeeds in establishing a new State in part of the territory of a 
pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be
375 Ibid., Article. 42.
376 Ibid., Article 14.
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considered an act of the new State under international law”377
Clearly, this article applies to the Jewish paramilitary groups that operated in mandate 
Palestine, primarily under the direction of the Jewish Agency, prior to the establishment 
of the state of Israel. The Jewish Agency and those groups subsequently became the main 
governmental and Army apparatus of the New State of Israel. They are clearly within the 
scope of Article 10(2) of the Final Articles on State Responsibility which ‘focuses on the 
continuity of the movement concerned and the eventual new government or State, as the 
case may be”.378
Issues of attribution are even clearer regarding the conduct of the State of Israel from 
1948 onwards.
Clearly Jordan is an injured state within the meaning of Article 42 of the ILC final 
Articles on State Responsibility for the obligations breached by Israel regarding the issue 
of Refugees ‘specifically affected Jordan’ and the obligations breached by Israel, or some 
of them at least are owed the ‘international community as a whole’. The fact the almost 
half of Jordan’s population today is of Palestinian refugee origin demonstrates clearly 
that the generation of refugees by Israel ‘specifically affected Jordan’. This unnatural 
growth in population has indeed taken its heavy toll on Jordan. Jordan’s inherent meager 
water resources were further exhausted by this unnatural growth in population emanating 
from the influx of Palestinian Refugees in the 1947-1949 and the post June 1967 era.
377 Ibid., Article. 10.
378 See, Crawford, The International Law Commission, op.cit, p. 119 (Commenting on Article 10(2))
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Jordan’s meager economic, financial and natural resources have been adversely affected 
by this unnatural growth in population.
Israel’s failure to repatriate and compensate those Jordanian nationals of Palestinian 
refugee origin is a breach of international obligations owed to Jordan by Israel in the 
context of State Responsibility. Equally, it is a breach that has affected Jordan as a host 
state for these refugees as explained above that would entitle Jordan for reparation.
Palestinian Refugees in general, including those who are Jordanian nationals face 
formidable as well as procedural obstacles under international law to seeking to 
implement the right of return or compensation. They do not inherently have a standing to 
nor is there a forum379 in which they can directly bring claims to or against Israel. In the 
case of Palestinian Refugees who are Jordanian nationals, Jordan can extend diplomatic 
protection to them by espousing their claims emanating from the wrong that was done to 
them by Israel and elevating it to an interstate level. Such a possible Jordanian action 
would have, for admissibility purposes to be in conformity with applicable rules relating 
to the nationality of claims and the claims in question would have to be ones to which the 
rule of exhaustion of local remedies that are available and effective have in fact been 
exhausted.380
1- Nationality of Claims.
379 See, Lee, The Right to Compensation, op.cit, p. 537.
380 See, ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit, Article. 44.
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Jordan is the State of Nationality for those Palestinian refugees who are Jordanian 
nationals. The issue of nationality, which is traditionally central to the exercise of 
diplomatic protection, is far from straightforward in the unique circumstances of 
Palestinian claims. The existing rules, which are based on State practice in typical 
situations of loss or injury suffered by citizens abroad, could present difficulties in 
negotiations, related forums or in litigation before a tribunal applying international law. 
In the following paragraphs, it is attempted to set out as clearly as possible the problems, 
and the scope for solutions. The argument for, Jordan’s protection can be made with a 
reasonable chance of success, but in the circumstances there still remains an area of 
uncertainty.
Jordan is in principle entitled to present claims on behalf of its nationals. In practice, this 
means that the Kingdom of Jordan is entitled to put forward claims to and against Israel 
on behalf of, or in respect of injury suffered by, Palestinian Arabs who now have 
Jordanian nationality. There is thus no reason why Jordan should not proceed to put 
forward claims on behalf of present Jordanian nationals. The categories of claimants 
would also include the heirs of those who were killed in the massacres of 1948-1949 or 
1967 and subsequently, as well as Jordanians who had to flee the West Bank after 1967. 
The simple presentation of such claims, however, is not the end of the matter, and Israel 
can be expected to make counter-arguments, particularly on Jordan’s legal entitlement to 
exercise protection.
Among those counter-arguments, Israel will likely argue that Jordan is not entitled to
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present claims in respect of injury to its present nationals unless they also had Jordanian 
nationality at the time they suffered injury. International law generally requires that the 
claimant State’s nationality must be possessed not only at the time the claim is made, but 
also at the time the injury is suffered (the rule of ‘continuous nationality’). If, as is 
probable, Israel does so argue, it will then be for Jordan to counter that argument. This it 
can possibly do by arguing, either separately or in combination, that:
(a) In many cases (especially as regards displaced persons) the injured person was a 
Jordanian national at the time of the injury as well as being one now; this will be a matter 
to be demonstrated in each individual case.
(b) Even if they were not Jordanian nationals at the time o f the injury, and although 
the international rule invoked by Israel is the general rule, it is not an absolute rule.
(c) In particular, it has no application to mass expulsions o f people who at the time 
they suffered injury had no other State entitled to protect them and who had fled to, had 
established close, enduring and effective links with, but were now nationals of, the State 
which is not seeking to protect them.
(d) By Article 8 of the Peace Treaty381, Jordan’s locus standi in relation to both 
refugees and displaced persons, with no mention of nationality, has been accepted by 
Israel, which is now estopped from denying Jordan’s right to protect them. The 
framework within the Jordan-Israel Peace treaty will be addressed in more detail later in
381 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 8 which addresses the issue o f Palestinian Refugees.
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this chapter and in chapter 4 of this study.
(e) There are also erga omnes aspects to Jordan’s claims. Such claims emanate form the 
nature of the breach of the international obligation in question by the state committing 
the wrong and the fact that the breach would be one that gives rise to state 
responsibility “‘which is entailed by serious breach by a State of an obligation arising 
under a peremptory norm of general international law”382. Such breach of obligations 
erga omnes give rise to ‘aggravated State Responsibility.’383 ‘Ordinary responsibility’ 
rises in the context of breaches of bilateral or multilateral treaties, or general rules 
laying down ‘synallagmatic’^obligations, meaning rules protecting reciprocal interests 
of States. The consequence of any breach of such rule creates a ‘bilateral relation’385 
between the delinquent State and the injured State. Thus, the whole relation remains a 
private bilateral matter between the two. ‘Aggravated Responsibility’, on the other hand 
has markedly distinct features from ‘ordinary responsibility’. It arises when a State 
violates a general rule laying down a community obligation; that is a customary 
obligation erga omnes protecting fundamental international values such as peace, 
human rights and self determination of peoples, or an obligation erga omnes 
contractantes laid down in a multilateral treaty safeguarding those fundamental values 
and accordingly entitling ‘any State or any other party to a multilateral treaty, can 
invoke the responsibility of the wrong doer, thus acting on behalf of the whole world 
community or the collectivity of State parties to a multilateral treaty in what is a ‘public
382 See, ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit, Article. 40(1).
383383 See, Cassese, A. International Law, (2001), p. 184-206 [Hereinafter, Cassese, International Law]
384 Ibid., p. 185.
385 Ibid.,
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relationship’.386
The right of Palestinians to self-determination is arguably one of the peremptory norms, 
whose breach would lead to the rise of ‘aggravated State Responsibility’.387 The right of 
return, taking into consideration the fact that most of the Palestinian population today is 
in the Diaspora, is indeed a necessary prelude to the exercise of the right of self- 
determination. Israel’s refusal to allow Palestinian refugees to return would, inevitably 
impair their right to self-determination. Accordingly, a possible claim by Jordan to or 
against Israel in relation to allowing Palestinian Refugees to return and linking this to the 
right to self-determination would give Jordan a standing, owing to the peremptory nature 
of the right to self-determination.
Also the measures that were adopted by Israel against Palestinian Arabs leading them to 
flee, failing to repatriate them and the inherent discrimination in Israel’s nationality 
legislation which was explained before in this chapter could qualify as ‘racial 
discrimination’ measures. Prohibition of racial discrimination is arguably a peremptory 
norm within the meaning of Article 40(1) of the ILC final Articles on State
AUIU*)
387 See, Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, (23 May 1969), UNTS, vol. 1155, p.331. [Hereinafter, 
“Vienna Convention”]. Article 53 o f the o f  the Convention defines a peremptory norm as one which is 
“...accepted and recognized by the international community o f States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm o f  general international law 
having the same character”; see also, Crawford, The International Law Commission, op.cit, p. 247, 
commenting on the right to self-determination as one o f the obligations arising under a peremptory norm o f  
general international law. See also, East Timor Case (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1995), p. 102, 
para.29 stating that “the principle o f self-determination ...is  one o f the essential principles o f  contemporary 
international law”; see also, Declaration on Principles o f  International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation Among State in Accordance with the Charter o f  the United Nations", UNGA Resolution 
2625 (XXV) o f 24 October 1970, fifth principle; see also "ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility", 
op.cit, Article. 40(1).
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Responsibility.388
Basic rules of international humanitarian law are also peremptory norms. 389 These rules 
clearly apply to Palestinian Refugees too. Breaches of peremptory norms give rise to 
‘aggravated State Responsibility’. Thus, the nationality of claims rule becomes less 
relevant if the obligation breached is one that has a peremptory character.
Historically, the doctrine and practice of diplomatic protection have been linked to that of 
State responsibility for injury caused to aliens. This focus entailed certain consequential 
rules, for example, in regard to the connection required to exist between the party injured 
and the State seeking to exercise diplomatic protection. In the Mavrommatis Concessions 
case,390 the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that:
“By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to 
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his 
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights - its right to 
ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of 
international law.”
Again, in Mavrommatis, the Permanent Court said:
“it is an elementary principle of international law that a State is 
entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to
388 See, , Crawford, The International Law Commission, op.cit, p. 246 commenting on Article 40(1) in 
which he refers to ‘the prohibition against racial discrimination’ as a peremptory norm within the meaning 
of Article 40(1) o f the ILC final Article on State responsibility.
389 find.,
390 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), PCIJ, Ser. A. No.2,12 (30 Aug. 
1924)
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international law committed by another State, from whom they 
have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary 
channels.”391
In the present context, Israel may be expected to raise various objections to the 
entitlement of Jordan to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of Jordanian citizens of 
Palestinian origin and other Palestinians connected with Jordan (that is, to take up their 
cause and to act for their benefit by reason of their having suffered injury and/or denial of 
justice in another State). These objections are likely to be based on, among others, 
aspects of the traditional doctrine relating to the ‘nationality of claims’.
In particular, Israel may argue that, at the time of their loss, the potential claimants were 
not in fact citizens of Jordan, or that they were stateless, or that they have ceased to be 
citizens of Jordan.
Various counter arguments may be made to such objections. First, in any agreement on 
the mechanisms for a final claims settlement, the parties - Jordan and Israel - may 
expressly provide for individual access to a compensation procedure for individuals, 
irrespective of their precise national status at the time of loss or at any time thereafter. 
Israel may also simply concede Jordan’s right to exercise protection on behalf of 
Jordanian Palestinians, or, in a lump sum settlement, it may be left to Jordan to decide 
how to award compensation and how to define the beneficiaries.
391 Ibid., See also Art. 3, 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: Art. 5, 1963 Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations.
392 See Jennings, R and Watts, A. (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9* edn. (1992), 1.513, for 
examples o f  treaties allowing the exercise o f  diplomatic protection o f  non-nationals [hereinafter, Jennings
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Under the rules of the United Nations Compensation Commission, a government may 
submit claims on behalf of its nationals and, ‘at its discretion, of other persons resident in 
its territory.’393
Israel may also be expected to seek to rely on the fact that, at the 1974 Summit in Rabat, 
Morocco, the Arab States recognized the PLO as the ‘sole’ representative of the 
Palestinian people. It may be argued that this recognition applied only to the political 
purpose of Palestinian self-determination and the struggle for independent statehood, and 
that it cannot therefore deprive Jordan of its normal right to protect its own nationals. 
Also, It must be stressed in this context that, when the Arab Summit recognized the PLO 
as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian People, Jordan made a clear 
reservation regarding this resolution of the Summit to the effect that this is ‘without 
prejudice to the full and exclusive right of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in relation 
to all nationals thereof’394
In any event, in relation specifically to refugees and displaced persons Israel is estopped 
from denying Jordan’s entitlement to exercise protection by virtue of Article 8 of the 
Peace Treaty.
and Watts, Oppenheim’s; See also Encyclopedia o f  Public International Law. ‘Diplomatic Protection, 
ppl067-70’ ‘Agreement between Chile and the United States’. 11 June 1990: 30 ILM 412 (1991). 
‘Decision o f the Chile-United States Commission with regard to the dispute concerning responsibility for 
the deaths o f Letelier and Moffit’, 11 Jan. 1992:31 ILM 1 (1992); Separate Concurring Opinion o f  
Commissioner Francisco Orrego Vicuna, noting that the protecting State was nut substituting its own 
rights, but was acting on behalf o f the families protected: ibid., Art. 5.2.
393 United Nations Compensation Commission. ‘Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure’, 1992. Art. 
5(11(a). Note also that provision is made for the protection o f  persons not otherwise able to involve the 
assistance o f  a government; the Governing Council o f the UNCC may appoint a person, authority or body 
for this purpose: ibid ..Art. 5.2.
394 See for the text o f the Resolution o f the Arab League Rabat Summit Meeting and the text o f Jordan’s 
reservation in the authentic Arabic text, MAJMUATALWATHAIK,(\915), op.cit, p. 243-245.
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The rule relating to the continuity of nationality has been put as follows:
“From the time of the occurrence of the injury until the making of 
the award the claim must continuously and without interruption 
have belonged to a person or series of persons (a) having the 
nationality of the State by whom it is put forward, and (b) not 
having the nationality of the State against whom it is put 
forward.”395
Israel may argue that Jordan’s entitlement to exercise protection depends upon the 
individual having possessed Jordanian nationality at the time of injury, and of having 
retained such nationality to the moment at which any claim is finally determined, or at 
least until it is presented for settlement.
The rationale for this limitation is said to be the need for stability and certainty. However, 
in the context of the settlement of claims between Jordan and Israel, questions of stability 
and certainty are not so critical as they would be in determining a rule of general
•in/*
application. Also The International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur on 
diplomatic protection considers that there is a need to reassess the continuity of 
nationality rule.397
395 See, Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim’s, opcit, p512.
396 See Draft Convention on International Responsibility prepared by Louis II. Sohn and Richard R. Baxter 
for Harvard Law School; text in F. V. Garcia-Amador, The Changing Law o f  International Claims, Vol. IIr 
p858, Art 23(6): ‘A State shall not be precluded from presenting a claim on behalf o f  a person by reason o f  
the fact that that person became a national o f that State subsequent to that injury.’
397 ‘First report on diplomatic protection’, John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur, International Law 
Commission: UN doc. A/CN.4/506/Add.l, 29 Apr. 2000, paras. 1, 18, 21: Jennings and Watts 
Oppenheim ’s, op.cit p 426-7. See also Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. Separate Opinion. Barcelona Traction Light 
and Power Limited Case, 1970 ICJ Reports, p. 101-102: [T]too rigid and sweeping an application o f  the 
continuity rule can lead to situations in which important interests go unprotected, claimants unsupported 
and injuries unredressed, not on account o f  any thing relating to their merits, but because purely technical
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Israel may also argue that Jordanian Palestinians injured by the events of 1947-49 were 
stateless persons, and therefore not within the protection of any government; or, though 
this is less likely in view of the policies of dispossession and transfer, that at that time 
they were (de facto) nationals of the (emergent) State of Israel, and that the ‘new’ State of 
nationality is not entitled to claim against the former State of nationality for wrongs 
which the individual may have suffered under the formers’ jurisdiction at the time they 
suffered injury.
In fact, Palestinians, including those who subsequently fled to Jordan, were not stateless. 
At least initially during the conflict of 1947-1949, they were citizens of Palestine under 
British mandate and, as ‘British protected persons, entitled to the protection of the 
Crown. With the termination of the British mandate on 14/15 May 1948, their nationality 
status may have become uncertain from a municipal law perspective, although from an 
international law perspective, their ‘link’ to the territory remained.398
With one exception only, Israeli courts held that Palestine citizens lost their citizenship
considerations bring it about that no State is entitled to act This situation is the less defensible at the 
present date in that what was always regarded as the other main justification for the continuity rule (and 
even sometimes thought to be its real fons et origo), namely the need to prevent the abuses that would 
result if  claims could be assigned for value to nationals o f States whose Governments would compel 
acceptance o f them by the defendant State, has largely lost its validity.
398 UN General Assembly resolution 194 (111) recognizes this principle; moreover, the international status o f  
Palestinians as mandate citizens arguably entails a right o f representation and protection in favor o f  
countries o f refuge, on behalf o f the international community and on the basis o f UN General Assembly 
and Security Council resolutions. In the absence o f any such protection function, the attainment o f  the 
compensation and related goals established internationally would be unlikely and the relevant resolutions 
rendered ineffective.
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without acquiring any other.399 Thus, in Hussein ’s case, the Court agreed that Palestinian 
citizenship had come to an end, and that former Palestine citizens had not become Israeli 
citizens. 400
The Israeli Nationality Law confirmed the repeal of the Palestine Citizenship Orders 
1925-42, retroactively to the day of the establishment of the State of Israel. It declared 
itself the exclusive law on citizenship, which was available by way of return (Law of 
Return, 5710-1950), residence, birth, and naturalization (Nationality Law, 5712-1952, s. 
1).
Former Palestinian citizens of Arab origin might be incorporated in the body of Israeli 
citizens, but had to meet stringent conditions: they must have been registered under the 
Register of Inhabitants Ordinance on 1 March 1952; have been inhabitants of Israel on 
the day of entry into force of the Nationality Law (14 July 1952); and have been in Israel, 
or an area which became Israel, from the day of establishment of the State to the day of 
entry into force of the law, or have entered legally during that period.
The majority of those displaced by the events of 1947-1949 were thus denied Israeli 
citizenship and the possibility of returning to their land. Moreover, under section 30(a) of 
the Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law 1954, the Minister of 
Defence is empowered to order the deportation of an infiltrator, defined by section 1 as a
399 See, Oseri v. Oseri, op.cit (1953) 8 PM 76; 17 ILR 111 (1950). Compare A.B. v. MB. 17 ILR 110(1950), 
but note the retroactive effect o f the Israeli Nationality Law.
400 See, Hussein v. Governor o f  Acre Prison, op.cit (1952) 6 PD 897, 901: 17 ILR 111 (1950). See also 
Nakara v . Minister o f  the Interior (1953) 7 PD 955; 20 ILR 49.
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person who has entered Israel knowingly and unlawfully, and who, at any time between 
29 November 1947 (the date of the UN decision to partition Palestine) and his entry was 
a national, resident or visitor in the Arab countries hostile to Israel, or a former Palestine 
citizen or resident who had left his ordinary place of residence in an area which became 
part of Israel.401
By contrast, the Jordanian Nationality Law of 4 February 1954 (following a 1949 
amendment of the 1928 Trans-Jordan Nationality Law) conferred citizenship on all 
inhabitants of the West Bank and on residents who had been Palestinian citizens before 
15 May 1948, were ordinarily resident in Jordan, and not Jewish 402
Israel has never objected to the conferment of Jordanian nationality on Palestinian 
refugees.
The Jordanian nationality of the claimants and Jordan’s right to exercise protection on 
their behalf are therefore opposable to the State of Israel. Israel cannot argue that it is not 
responsible because ‘the person injured or the person on behalf of whom the claim is 
made was or is its own national’.403 In any event, Israel has never claimed and does not 
now claim that expelled or exiled Palestinians were in fact its nationals. On the contrary, 
by refusing the right of return and by insisting that Palestinians could only re-enter as
401 See, Jordanian Nationality Law, law number (6) (1954), in the Official Gazette o f  Jordan, issue Number 
1171 (16 February 1954), p. 105.
402 See generally, Laws concerning Nationality. UN Leg. Ser., 1954, 1959.
403 Harvard Draft Convention on Responsibility o f  States for Damages Done In Their Territory to the 
Person or Property o f Foreigners, Art. 16(a): (1929) 23 AJIL Special Supplement 22.
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immigrants , it has purported to treat them as aliens.404
Jordan’s entitlement to exercise protection over persons who are now its nationals but 
who were not at the time of the injury finds further support in the general principles and 
practice applicable in cases of dual nationality 405 While in detail there is room for a lot of 
controversy as to the applicable rules in this situation, the general trend in international 
practice is for the State with which the dual national has the closest real connections to be 
entitled to protect him, even as against the State of his other effective nationality 406 The 
weight thus given to real and effective links with a State, as was emphasized by the 
International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case107 rather than reliance on formal 
considerations of national status, is of obvious help to Jordan.
Jordan does have an effective, genuine and sufficient link with the Palestinians who 
found refuge within its territory, and with their descendants who are now citizens or 
residents. In many cases, Jordan will therefore be entitled to pursue the claims of refugee 
and displaced Palestinians for injuries resulting from the expulsion, including loss of and 
damage to property.
Some individual cases, or groups of cases, may prove problematic for the preceding
404See, Naqara v. Minister o f  the Inferior, op.cit, p. 49.
405 See, Goodwin-Gill, International Framework, op.cit, p. 27.
406 See cases cited in Jennings and Watts. Oppenheim.s, op.cit, pp. 515-517; Aldrich, R., The Jurisprudence 
o f  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, (1996), 55ff.
407 Nottebohm Case, op cit. ICJ Reports, 1955, 4, 23. The Court explained the notion o f  genuine 
connection' in terms o f a relationship, ‘having as its basis a social fact o f attachment, a genuine connection 
o f existence, interests and sentiments, together with existence o f reciprocal rights and duties.., the juridical 
expression o f the fact that the individual.., is in fact more closely connected with the population o f the State 
conferring nationality than with that o f any other State.’
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reasons. In these instances, it will be necessary for Jordan to defend its claim to protect, 
or to show the inapplicability of the general rule in the particular circumstances.
Hence, and bearing in mind the above, Jordan is entitled to pursue compensation claims 
of displaced Palestinians in relation to property expropriated, directly or indirectly, by 
Israel.
As indicated before, traditional doctrine has tended to describe diplomatic protection in 
terms of the injury supposedly done to the protecting State, through the person of its 
national.408
The circumstances in which injury was suffered by Palestinian Jordanians, however, do 
not fit the pattern for which the traditional rules of diplomatic protection were intended, 
namely, injury caused to the person or property of an alien. Those who suffered loss by 
reason of the events of 1947-1949 were clearly not aliens (in the sense of being 
foreigners in relation to the local area), but individuals with an historic claim to the land 
from which they were dispossessed, at least initially, by the militant forces of a State in 
statu nascendi. Those actions were subsequently adopted and approved by the State of 
Israel, which consolidated their effects through local legislation in order to confirm 
expropriation.
In this case, Jordan exercises protection on behalf of the displaced and dispossessed
408 ‘First report on diplomatic protection’, John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur, International Law 
Commission: UN doc .A/CN.4/506, 7 Mar. 2000, paras. 61-74.
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individuals linked to it by residence and citizenship. Jordan acts also as the representative 
of the international community, in furtherance of the objectives laid down, among others, 
in UNGA resolution 194 (III). What matters is not the indeterminate, sui generis status of 
those injured in 1947-1949, but the fact that they are now the citizens and/or residents of 
Jordan, or the descendants of such persons, on whose behalf protection is exercised.
2- Exhaustion of local remedies.
Hundreds of thousands of complaints have been made by Palestinian refugees who are 
Jordanian Nationals to the Jordanian Foreign Ministry.409 Those complaints increased 
immensely in number after the signing of the Jordan-Israel Treaty of Peace.410 Clearly, 
the overwhelming majority of Jordanian Nationals of Palestinian refugee origin have 
sought remedies in the context of the domestic Israeli system whether in the land of the 
State of Israel or in the West Bank. Their efforts were in vein and none of their 
complaints have been addresses effectively. Thus the issue of exhaustion of local 
remedies is “not a procedural hurdle facing Jordan in the event that it decides to bring 
claims to or against Israel on behalf of those Jordanian National.” 411
409 The Foreign Ministry has a department named the Department o f Palestinian Affairs. This department 
has the institutional jurisdiction over Palestinian Refugees camps in Jordan and over protecting the interests 
of Jordanian Nationals o f  Palestinian Refugee origin. Although the exact number o f documented 
complaints presented by Palestinian refugees over the issue o f the issue o f  denial o f justice, discriminatory 
treatment by Israel and the lack o f any effective remedy for them in the Israel domestic system to address 
their rights even in the Judicial field, is classified, I can confirm that there are hundreds o f  thousands o f  
such complaints that I have been to see the inventory in my official capacity. I have also seen the content o f  
some sample complaints in which the issue o f  denial o f Justice is very evident and confirmed.
410 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit,
411 See, Opinion rendered by H.E Mr. Awn Al-Khasawneh, Advisor o f  State for International Legal 
Affairs, contained in The Foreign Ministry o f  Jordan Classified Archive documents, Document number 
FMSC/281139, dated 25 December 1996.
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Israel is also internationally responsible towards Jordan in the latter’s capacity as a host 
State for Palestinian refugees. It is clearly ‘delinquent in its duty towards, the right of 
other states’412; in this case Jordan through the means of, not only allowing the flight of 
massive numbers of refugees into Jordan, but also adopting policies and actions 
deliberately intended to produce such a result. The flight of Palestinian refugees to Jordan 
has indeed ‘specifically affected Jordan’413 and its does constitute a breach by Israel of an 
obligation ‘owed to Jordan.’414 Jordan had to provide for those refugees and exhaust its 
resources to cover their needs. Their expulsion have caused injury to persons and 
property situated in Jordan and to the State of Jordan itself by stretching its inherently 
meager resources to provide for Refugees for almost 60 years.
In the Trail Smelter Arbitration,415 which was concerned with the diffusion of deleterious 
gases from a factory in Canada thus damaging agricultural land in the United States. The 
tribunal in this arbitration maintained that
“No state has the right to use or permit the use of its territories in 
such a manner as. to cause injury by. way. of fumes in or to the . 
territory of another or properties or persons therein, when the case 
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence”.
Although refugees are not fumes, nevertheless drawing an analogy here is possible since 
the essence of the issue was the causation of injury to another state or properties and 
persons therein, thereby implying that a similar restriction would be applicable in the case
412 See, Lee, "The Right to Compensation”, op.cit, p. 553.
4,3 See, ILC, Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit, Article. 42(b)(i).
414 Ibid., Article 42(a).
415 See, Harris, D.J, Cases and Materials on International Law  p 245.
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of generating refugees, thus causing injury to another State in this case Jordan. Also 
refugees, like ‘fumes’ in the Trail Smelter may cross international boundaries from 
countries of origin and like ‘fumes’ such crossings are preventable by the country of 
origin, the crossings are not made, in both cases, with the voluntary consent of the 
receiving country and finally such crossings impose economic and social burdens upon 
the receiving State (Jordan in our case), for which the country of origin (Israel) is 
responsible.416
One major difference with the Trail Smelter lies in the fact that while States cannot 
prevent fumes from crossing into their territories, they can, prevent or deter the entry of 
refugees into through a variety of measures.417 The exercise of such measures, is 
increasingly being considered as inimical to respect for minimum standards of humane 
treatment or human rights418, which are epitomized in the Declaration on Territorial 
Asylum419: which States that:
“ No person...shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at 
the frontier or, if he has already entered the territory iii which he 
seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any state.. .”420
It would be deeply ironic if source States could evade responsibility for their own 
inhumanity by arguing that host States could avoid their burdens “by being equally
416 See, Lee, The Right to Compensation, op.cit, p. 553.
417 Ibid., p. 554.
418 Ibid.,
419 See, The Declaration on Territorial Asylum, adopted by UNGA Resolution. 2312 (XXII) (14 December 
1967).
420 Ibid., Article 3(1).
148
inhumane”421.
Such a limitation is also to be found in the Corfu Channel case,422 in which the 
International Court of Justice maintained in its judgment that “Every state is under an 
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
others”. Like the Trail Smelter Award, this case was not concerned with the generation of 
refugees, however, the analogy seems appropriate since the underlying principle in both 
cases, that one country in exercising its alleged sovereign rights should not harm or injure 
the corresponding rights of other countries, is of relevance to the issue of Injury done to 
Jordan as a result of measures and actions conducted by Israel that led to the influx of 
Palestinian refugees into Jordan.
Israeli nationality legislation423 produced the effect of denationalizing Palestinian 
Refugees in general and those who are Jordanian nationals now in particular. The right of 
return in laws on nationality is owed to the country of sojourn424, in this case Jordan. 
Israel’s unilateral termination of nationality of Palestinian Refugees and the consequent 
result of their settlement in Jordan and inability to return as a result of Israel’s obstruction 
makes Israel incur responsibility. It is clear in this case that “the withdrawal of nationality 
was itself part of the delictual conduct facilitating the result” 425
421 See, Lee, The Right to Compensation, op.cit, p. 555.
422See, 1949ICJ Reports at para 4, p 22.
423 See, Israel Law o f  Return, 4 Laws o f  The State O f Israel (1950), p. 114. and the Nationality Law, op.cit, 
5712/1952, 93 Official Gazette 22 (1952). op.cit.
424 See, Quigley, Displaced Palestinians, op.cit, p. 194.
425 See, Brownlie, Ian, Principles o f  Public International Law,
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It is significant to point to the fact that the Committee on International Assistance to 
Refugees, had presented a report to the League of Nations on 20 June 1936 stating that:
“in view of the heavy burden placed on the countries of refuge,
The Committee considers it an international duty for countries of 
origin of refugees at least to alleviate to some extent, the burdens 
imposed by the presence of refugees in the territory of another 
State” 426
Israel, owing to the fact that its conduct leading to the generation of refugees was illegal, 
is thus, under a duty to assist Jordan as a state of settlement in the problem of refugees 
which it (Israel) has given rise to.427
(ii) The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty
Article 8 of the Jordan Israel Peace Treaty States that:
“Recognizing the massive human problems caused to both Parties 
by the conflict in the Middle East, as well as the contribution made 
by them towards the alleviation of human suffering, the parties will 
seek to further alleviate those problems arising on a bilateral level.- 
1. Recognizing that the above human problems caused by the conflict 
in the Middle East cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral level, 
the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate forums, in 
accordance with international law, including the following: 
a. In the case of displaced persons , in the quadripartite 
committee429 together with Egypt and the Palestinians.
426 See League o f  Nations Document. C.2 M.2 (1936) XII quoted in Jennings, R., Some International Law 
Aspects o f  the Refugee Question, 20 BYIL (1939), pp. 98, 102.
See, Jennings, R.. “Some International Law Aspects o f  the Refugee Question”, 20 BYIL (1939), ibid., p. 
113.
428 Those are, as explained before in this study, Palestinians who are original inhabitants o f  the Occupied 
West Bank and who were rendered refugees as a result o f the 1967 war and Israel’s occupation o f  the West 
Bank which still exists to date.
429 This Committee finds its basis in Article XII o f the Declaration o f Principles on Interim Self -  
Government Arrangements signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State o f  Israel on
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b. In the case of refugees,
(i) In the framework of the Multilateral Working Group430 on Refugees;
(ii) In negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or otherwise in
conjunction with and at the same time as the permanent status 
negotiations pertaining to the territories referred to in Article 3 of 
this treaty;
c. Through the implementation of agreed United Nations programs 
and other agreed international economic programs concerning 
refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their 
resettlement.”431
This procedural mechanisms contained in this article in which Jordan can present claims 
and discuss solutions in relation to Palestinian refugee of the 1947-1949 period and the 
ones from the 1967 period (commonly referred to as displaced persons) will be examined 
in detail in the ensuing chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, which deals with the 
legal bases which can serve Jordan in presenting claims to and against Israel, it will 
suffice to say at this stage that this Article clearly gives Jordan a formal standing and an 
additional legal base to address issues pertaining to Palestinian Refugees with Israel in 
many ways and through different mechanisms.432 The solution envisaged in this Article is
13 September 1993, 32 ILM (1993), p. 1525. Article XII reads as follows: “ Liaison and Cooperation with 
Jordan and Egypt: The two Parties will invite the Government o f  Jordan and Egypt to participate in 
establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government o f Israel and the 
Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments o f  Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, 
to promote, Cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution o f a Continuing 
Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities o f admission o f persons displaced from the
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.
Other matters o f concern will be dealt with by this Committee.”
430 The Multilateral Working Group is the product o f  the design o f  the Madrid Peace Process, the US- 
Soviet letter o f  invitation to the Peace Conference in Madrid which was sent to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, 
Israel and the Palestinians (within the Jordanian Delegation) contained the following paragraph: “ ...Those 
Parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after opening the conference to 
organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide 
issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugees issues, environment, economic 
development and other subjects o f mutual interest”, cited in Tekkenberg, Lex, Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, 
p. 34.
431 See, Article 8 o f  The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit.
432 See Chapter (4) o f this study for a detailed analysis o f Article 8.
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to be based on ‘international law’.
While Article 8 confirms Jordan’s locus standi in relation to Palestinian refugees in 
general and those who are nationals of Jordan in particular, it does not address the issue 
of Jordan’s right to compensation as a host State.
However, the Peace Treaty stipulates in Article 24 that “The Parties agree to establish a 
claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims”.433 This Article will 
be addressed in detail in another part of this thesis. It will suffice to say that this Article 
provides a basis for Jordan to seek compensation from Israel in relation to the losses that 
it has incurred as a result of hosting Palestinian refugees for the past 60 years. Again, in 
the context of the current chapter, this article is highlighted as the article which Jordan 
can argue is the one that provides a legal basis for it to bring compensation claims as a 
host country to and against Israel in relation to the financial losses that is has been 
incurring for caring and shouldering Palestinian refugees. This article will be examined 
thoroughly in the context, of the ensuing, chapter in the context of it providing a. Jordan- 
Israel Peace treaty based mechanism and procedure for the pursuit of possible claims by 
Jordan to and against Israel in relation to Jordan as a host country and in relation to 
Jordanian Nationals of Palestinian refugee origin.
It is clear that Palestinian refugees have a right of return, under international law, and that 
Israel continues to obstruct this right. They also have a right to compensation with is a 
complementary and not exclusive right in relation to the right of return. Israel has failed
433 The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 24.
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to pay compensation to Palestinian refugees too. This failure continues to date. No 
effective local remedies are available before those refugees owing to the fact the Israeli 
legislation on nationality and on property and other matters discriminates against them 
and provides them with no remedy to be exhausted.434
International law provides no forum or standing for Palestinian refugees to directly bring 
claims in relation to their right of return and compensation.
Jordan is the only State in which Palestinian refugees are officially nationals since 1954. 
Also Jordan almost one third of the entire Palestinian refugee population in the Diaspora 
are Jordanian nationals. There seems to be sufficient legal bases available to Jordan as the 
State of nationality, thus, to bring claims on behalf of those refugees to and against Israel 
for its wrongful act of displacing them, failing to repatriate them, expropriating their 
property and failing to compensate them.
Jordan is also an injured State itself in the context of State responsibility as indicated in 
the preceding analysis. While there is little, if any State practice on the issue of an 
existing right to host State to seek compensation from refugee generating states, still, in 
the peculiar circumstances of the Palestinian refugee problem, there is a case for Jordan, 
to seek compensation as a host State from Israel for generating refugees who settled in 
Jordan forcing it to provide for them for decades.
434 See, Opinion rendered by H.E Mr. Awn Al-Khasawneh, Advisor o f  State for International Legal 
Affairs, contained in The Foreign Ministry o f Jordan Classified Archive documents, Document number 
FMSC/281139, dated 25 December 1996.
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The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty confirms Jordan’s standing in relation to solving the 
problem of Palestinian refugees. It also contains provisions that would provide Jordan 
with forums outlined in the provisions concerned in which it can bring claims on behalf 
of its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin and compensation claims, as a host State, to 
and against Israel. As indicated, these article will be highlighted and assessed in detail in 
chapter 4 of this thesis in the context of them providing mechanism and procedures for 
the pursuit of claims by Jordan.
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Chapter (3)
Legal Assessment of Major Claims that Jordan Can Make:
In light of the factual background and context explained and highlighted in chapter 1 and 
the legal bases available that would allow Jordan to bring claims to and against Israel 
explained in the chapter 2, Jordan has a number of possible Major Claims in relation to 
the issue of refugees and displaced Palestinian persons in Jordan and compensation for 
Jordan as the host state thereto.
While the preceding chapter explained and examined the legal bases available to Jordan 
for presenting claims to and against Israel, this chapter attempts to highlight and assess 
the major specific claims that Jordan could bring to and against Israel, in accordance with 
international law. The chapter will highlight the claims and critically assess them. Again 
in the context of this thesis’ ambitious attempt to constitute a ‘roadmap’ or ‘blueprint’ 
that could guide the process of Jordan’s potential future presentation of claims to and 
against Israel, the highlighting of the specific heads of claims is imperative as is the issue 
of the need to assess such claims and their legal merits.
The chapter is structured in a manner that places the heads of claims separately dealing 
with claims that Jordan can bring on behalf of its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin 
who had fled in the 1947-1949 period and their descendents under one heading. Heads of 
claims that Jordan could bring on behalf of Palestinian refugees who fled as a result of
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the 1967 war and their descendents are placed and a separate heading. This is the case 
owing to the fact that certain international law principles apply to one category while they 
do not necessarily apply to or are not relevant to the other or certain rules of international 
law were not in existence in relation to the former category and became developed and 
acquired a binding nature in relation to the other category 20 years later. It ought to be 
pointed out however, in advance that the issue of Israeli legislation whose cumulative 
effect, it is argued, in this chapter amount to unlawful expropriation of Palestinian owned 
property and does not provide for compensation or effective redress applies equally to 
both categories of Palestinian refugees. This is the case because Israel extended the 
application of this legislation to all territories that it occupied in the 1967 war. Israel’s 
breaches of Article 11 of the Jordan-Israel Peace treaty are placed under a third heading 
in this chapter as a possible head of claims. This article deals with an obligation 
undertaken by both Jordan and Israel to repeal all discriminatory references and 
legislation that discriminates against the nationals of either country. This violation is very 
pertinent in relation to Israeli legislation discussed in the chapter because Israel did not in 
effect until now amend this legislation in a manner that would proyide effective redress 
and remedy to Jordanian nationals of Palestinian refugee origin in recovering their 
property or exercising return or receiving compensation. Claims relating to direct losses 
suffered by Jordan as a host State are placed under another separate heading and finally a 
brief and concise assessment of remedies Jordan could seek is placed under the last 
heading.
However, before examining and assessing these claims and prior to analyzing their legal
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bases, strengths, problems, weakness and validity, four issues ought to be highlighted.
The first is that there is a close connection between all or most o f the possible approaches 
to potential or possible claims and the use of force by Israel or by entities or agents for 
whose actions Israel is accountable. As a general proposition, that use of force was 
unlawful either ab initio or by reason of its unlawful purpose or disproportionate nature. 
While these issues are, as specific grounds of complaint, beyond the scope of this study, 
they inevitably color the analysis of the consequences which that unlawful use of force 
produced for the refugees and displaced persons. In particular, the fact that the situation 
of refugees and displaced persons has its origins in unlawful uses of force has 
implications for the measure of damages which may be claimed.
The second matter is that the approaches to possible claims being considered in this 
thesis are to be resolved on the basis of international law. This not only follows as a 
matter of general principle, but also as a consequence of the agreed stipulation in Article 
843.5 of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, in which the Parties undertook to seek to resolve 
the human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East ‘in accordance with 
international law’. The human problems referred to in Article 8 clearly include the 
problems of refugees and displaced persons - those two terms being terms of art (that is, 
terms having a particular meaning) in both general international law and in the Jordan- 
Israel context.
The third issue is the question of exhaustion of local remedies. The rule relating to local
435 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 8.
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remedies states that a claim will not be admissible at the international level unless the 
injured party has first exhausted the legal remedies available in the State which is alleged 
to be the author of the injury. It may be that Israel would seek to invoke the rule should 
Jordan present a claim at the international level, but it is not an absolute requirement. 
First, it does not apply to direct State-to-State claims, nor does it apply if there are no 
local remedies to exhaust. It the opinion of the author that, the local remedies rule is not a 
substantial, or an across-the-board obstacle in the way of Jordanian potential claims 
against Israel.
The fourth issue concerns the ‘nationality of claims’ which was explained the previous 
chapter of this thesis, meaning that such claims must satisfy this procedural requirement.
a. Injury and loss arising out of the events of 1947-1949
The events of 1947-1949 are often characterized as ‘the first Israeli-Arab war’. As a 
general description of the.circumstances of the time this characterization has some value. 
Israel was conceived in conflict and bom in active hostilities with its Arab neighbors, 
whose lands they regarded as being forcefully tom from them. Yet notions of ‘war’ and 
‘belligerency’ in their traditional international law meanings must be used circumspectly. 
Although the Arab States and Israel regarded themselves as being ‘at weir’, and some of 
them (including Jordan) have signed a ‘Peace’ Treaty with Israel436, many other States 
have regarded the traditional concept of a state of war as inconsistent with the legal order
436 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treat, op.cit,
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established by the UN Charter.437
Nevertheless, the conflict surrounding the creation of the State of Israel produced a 
situation typical of the chaos and fluidity of warfare. The circumstances surrounding the 
various matters in relation to which claims by Jordan against Israel may be possible were 
accordingly not in any way clear-cut or tidy.
(i) Expulsion of the Palestinian population
As explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis , the evidence is overwhelming that Israel 
(including entities and agents for whose acts Israel is responsible) intentionally arranged 
the expulsion of large parts of the Palestinian population of the territory which became 
part of the State of Israel, and that this expulsion was part of a conscious and long­
standing policy to create a Jewish State in which there was to be no room for significant 
other religious or ethnic communities.439
The fact that there was in 1948-1949 an intentionally organized Jewish-Israeli coerced 
expulsion of the local Arab population of Palestine, is clearly established. Accordingly, 
there remain for consideration only certain important legal arguments which may affect 
Jordan’s right to present a claim against Israel for the wrongful expulsion of the Arab 
Palestinians. These arguments are the following, whether the coerced expulsion of a large
437 See, Charter o f the United Nations, in Evans, Malcolm D, Blakstone’s International Law Documents, 
1999, p. 8. [hereinafter UN Charter]
438 See Chapter 1.
439 Ibid.,
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local population is contrary to international law; whether Israel is responsible for acts of 
Jewish entities active in Palestine before the State of Israel was proclaimed on 14 May 
1948 and subsequently recognized, or for acts of parastatal entities after the creation of 
the State; andwhether Jordan is entitled to present claims against Israel in respect of the 
expulsion of the Arab Palestinians.
1- Coerced expulsions in international law
It must first be noted that as a matter of general principle a juridical fact must be 
appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it (the so-called intertemporal 
law).440 Thus the legality of the expulsions must be assessed in the light of international 
law as it stood in 1947-1949.
The law relating to expulsion was less clear in 1947-1949 than it is today. It was then 
generally accepted that a State has a broad discretion regarding the expulsion of aliens,
, although that discretion .was not absolute and, for. example,, was not .to. be exercised 
arbitrarily but only for good reasons connected with the alien’s behavior. But that broad 
rule was developed in the context of individual expulsions, and it was widely accepted 
that the same considerations did not necessarily apply to the mass expulsion of aliens of a 
particular nationality or other group, if only because mass expulsions were less likely to
440 Judge Huber in Island o f  Palmas case stated that” a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light o f the 
law contemporary with it, and not o f the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls 
to be settled”, in United Nations Reports o f International Arbitral Awards (RIIA) (1949), vol. II, p. 845; see 
also generally on intertemporal law, the resolution o f the Institute o f International law, Annuaire de 
Vinstitute de Droit International, vol. 56 (1975), pp. 536-540; see also, Karl, W, "the Time Factor in the 
Law o f  State Responsibility", in Spinedi, M and Simma, B (eds.), United Nations Codification o f  State 
Responsibility, (1987), p. 95.
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be defensible on the basis of the conduct of the expelled persons.
In relation to the expulsion of individuals, the expelling State may be in breach of its 
international obligations both in respect of the fact of the expulsion and in respect of the 
circumstances in which it took place.441 There seems to be no reason why this same 
duality of responsibility should not apply equally in the case of mass expulsions. 
Moreover, the circumstances of the expulsions may not only be in themselves a basis of 
claim, but they will also affect the reparation which may be due.
A complication which is relevant in the present context is that it has long been 
established that a belligerent may in the event of hostilities expel all hostile nationals 
residing in its territory. Given that the circumstances surrounding the 1948-1949 
expulsions were those of Israeli-Arab hostilities, an Israeli argument based on an analogy 
with this common practice of belligerents cannot be ruled out: indeed, Israel’s rejection 
of any right of return on the ground, inter alia, of the continued existence of a state of 
war with some Arab States,, makes it likely that this.line .of.argument will.be used. Yet 
even in those circumstances, a belligerent is not entitled to expel hostile aliens with the 
brutality which characterized the expulsions of 1948-1949 442
A further complication is that at the time of their expulsion, it is far from clear that the 
Palestinians were to be regarded as aliens. To the extent that they should be regarded as
441 See, Goodwin-Gill. International Framework, op.cit, p. 41.
442 See, Opinion rendered by H.E Mr. Awn Al-Khasawneh, Advisor o f State for International Legal 
Affairs, contained in The Foreign Ministry o f Jordan Classified Archive documents, Document number 
FMSC/281139, dated 25 December 1996.
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still being local nationals, whatever that may mean in the peculiar circumstances of 
Palestine at that time, their mass expulsion is that much more difficult for Israel to 
defend.443
At the same time, however, it has to be borne in mind that it is not enough to find an 
international obligation of which Israel may be said to be in breach. It must also be 
established that that obligation is one which is owed to Jordan, and which Jordan may 
consequently invoke as against Israel. This link to Jordan is usually established by there 
being some link of national status between Jordan and the individuals affected, by there 
being in force between Jordan and Israel some relevant treaty, noting that there was no 
such treaty which could be relied on in 1948-1949^, or by the obligation in question 
being one which is owed by every State erga omnes (i.e. an obligation of such a kind that 
all States have an interest in the protection of the right involved and may thus raise a 
claim in respect of their violation even if the ‘nationality of claims’ rule is not 
satisfied).445 This last possibility could be helpful in relation to mass expulsions in 
circumstances such as/those of 1948-.1949, although it has to.be noted that the general 
and express recognition that some rules of international law apply erga omnes is 
relatively recent (and probably post-1948), and is a still-developing part of international 
law.
2- Israel’s responsibility for the acts of various entities both before and after the
443 Ibid.,
444 However, the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 1994 contains relevant provisions which would assist an 
argument that Israel accepts Jordan’s standing to raise, as against Israel, matters affecting the position o f  
the refugees
445 See, for the treatment o f the nationality o f claims issue, Chapter 2 o f  this thesis.
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creation of the State of Israel
There is no doubt that Israel may be held responsible for acts of the State of Israel, 
including acts of State organizations such as the army, and police and security forces.
More open to argument is whether Israel is responsible for acts of entities which were 
active before the State of Israel came into existence, and whether Israel is responsible for 
acts committed after the State came into existence by organizations which were not an 
official part of the structure of the State. As a matter of general principle, the conduct of a 
person or group of persons may be attributed to the State if it is established that such 
person or group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of that State.446
The dispossession and expulsion of Palestinians occurred both during the initial stages of 
the establishment of the State of Israel, and at various periods thereafter. Responsibility 
for harm caused during the initial period exists by analogy with the rule that ‘the 
government set up by successful revolutionists must accept responsibility .for their acts as 
insurgents from the beginning, a conclusion logically deducible from the fact that the acts 
of the insurgents have now become the acts of the government, for which it must now 
accept responsibility’.447
The preceding analysis also demonstrates that, irrespective of the question of attribution
446 See, ILC Final Articles on State Responsibility, op.cit, Articles 5 ,3 .9 ,
447 Eagleton, C. Responsibility o f  States. 1928, p. 147, also cited in Brownlie. I. System o f  the Law o f  
Nations -  State Responsibility, Part I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. pp.177-178 [Hereinafter, Brownlie, 
State Responsibilty. See also the cases cited in Jennings, and Watts, Oppenheim ', op.cit, I, p. 554, n. 19.
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during the early period, the acts of militant forces have since been adopted and approved 
by the State of Israel, through the enactment of laws and the actions of officials.448 In 
relation to events subsequent to the establishment of Israel, responsibility may be 
attributed by reason of the actions of the armed forces as agents of the State, as well as 
those of organizations, volunteers and others ‘associated with the government as 
combatants’.449
In this whole context the applicable legal rules are reasonably well-established. It is 
largely a question of fact and evidence to establish who carried out the acts complained 
of, whether those persons acted as State organs of the State of Israel, whether those 
persons were not part of the official structure of the State of Israel but were nevertheless 
persons for whose conduct Israel is internationally responsible, and whether the State of 
Israel subsequently approved and adopted the conduct in question. The evidence in the 
vast majority of instances is likely to show that the conduct being complained of is 
conduct for which Israel is responsible in international law.
(ii) Loss of, damage to, and expropriation of Palestinian property
1- Loss and damage
The property of expelled Palestinians (and also of many non-expelled Palestinians) was 
severely damaged during the process of expulsion. Houses and their contents were
448 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (1980) ICJ Reports, pp. 3, 29- 
30, 33-36.
449 Brownlie, State Responsibility, op.cit,, p 140.
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burned or otherwise destroyed, property was looted, and so on.450 Whether such loss and 
damage involves a violation of international law for which Israel is responsible is a 
difficult question. The first issue is whether such loss or damage was the result of actions 
for which Israel can now be held responsible. The considerations relevant to this question 
of attribution have been set out previously.
Questions as to the national status of the owners of the property are probably more 
significant in this context than in that of the mass expulsion of individuals, since 
questions of loss or damage must be considered on an individual basis. It must be 
established that the owners were not, at the time of the loss or damage, Israeli nationals.
Moreover, not all loss or damage to property gives rise to responsibility on the part of the 
State in whose territory the loss or damage occurs. A State’s duty to protect the property 
of aliens (or at least, non-nationals) is not absolute. In particular, loss or damage 
occurring during the normal course of hostilities, and not as a result of the specific 
targeting of. civilian or particular. ethnically-owned property, or .as. the .result of .the 
territorial State failing to exercise due diligence to protect such property,451 likely does 
not give rise to responsibility on the part of the territorial State.
A particular further consideration concerns the extent to which loss or damage to 
property in the circumstances obtaining in 1948-1949 can be regarded as a breach of the 
then-existing human rights of the persons concerned. The right to own property, and the
450 See, Records o f  the Palestinian Affairs Department, (1953), pp.423-501.
451 This standard is dependent on the factual context; the degree o f diligence ‘due’ in the normal times and 
times o f armed conflict will differ.
right to not be arbitrarily deprived of it, are included in Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948452, but this does not quite extend to guarantee 
property from loss or damage. Later developments in human rights law, which may give 
greater protection to the owners of private property, are not directly relevant to the 
situation as it was in 1948-1949. Equally, it must be noted that the loss or damage 
constitutes for the owner a continuing situation, with the result that even if international 
human rights law does assist the owner with regard to the original loss or damage, the 
evolution of that law over the last half century may help with regard to the continuing 
situation to which the original loss or damage still gives rise.
Moreover, given the linkage between the Palestinian situation and the principle of self- 
determination, the losses suffered by Palestinian refugees are distinguishable from those 
of ‘normal’ aliens whose property has been lost or damaged.453
In any event, if loss or damage to property is to be the basis for a claim against Israel, the 
loss or damage must to.be substantiated.. This is no.light task, particularly after the 
passage o f over half a century. It will be necessary to establish the ownership (including 
national status) of the property and its value, along with the facts and circumstances of its 
loss or damage.
If such substantiation materializes, and the loss or damage can be proved to be a part of 
the expulsion process and governed by the same motivation, it can in principle be argued
452 See, Brownlie. Basic Documents . op.cit, p. 24.
453 See. Goodwin-Gill. International Framework, op.cit, p. 55.
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to involve a violation of international law for which Israel is responsible.
Successive United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions have acknowledged 
the right of the Palestinians to compensation for their lost or damaged property and that 
they are entitled to the income derived from their property.454
These General Assembly resolutions are helpful, but are not without their weaknesses 
when looked at carefully. Thus, Resolution 194 (III)(1948) is based on ''principles of 
international law or in equity which suggests some hesitation as to whether there were 
binding rules of international law to the required effect. Similarly, Resolution 55/128 
(2000) referred to the refugees’ entitlement to their property and its income as being in 
conformity with the ‘principles of justice and equity’, which is much weaker than stating 
that it was based on rules of international law.
2- Expropriation
In addition to the loss of or damage to Palestinian property, one result of the 1948-1949 
conflict was that much Palestinian property was in effect expropriated. This has
454 See, for example UNGA Resolutions; 194 (III) (1948) which recognizes, in paragraph 11, that the 
payment o f compensation ‘for loss or damage to property which, under principles o f international law or in 
equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible’;Resolution 34/146C (1981) 
recognizing that Palestinians ‘are entitled to their property and to the income derived from their property in 
conformity with the principles o f justice and equity’.Resolution 54/69 (1999) noting ‘with regret that... 
compensation o f the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 o f its resolution 194(111) has not yet been 
effected’ (paragraph 1); Resolution 55/128(2000) reaffirming ‘that the Palestinian Arab refugees are 
entitled to their property and to the income derived therefrom, in conformity with the principles o f justice 
and equity’, and recalled ‘that the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and the principles o f  
international law uphold the principle that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived o f his or her property, 
(preambular paragraphs).
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principally been the result of the application of various Israeli laws providing for the 
treatment of Palestinian property in form, as a ‘custodianship’ of the property of 
‘absentee’ Palestinian owners, but in substance an effective expropriation by Israel of 
property owned by Palestinian refugees.
Palestinian refugee land property constitutes some eighty per cent of the land area of 
Israel. Out of a total land area of some 20,300 sq. km, around 17,300 sq. km represent 
refugee lands.455 Much of the land continues to be held by the State of Israel or by quasi- 
State bodies such as the Jewish National Fund (JNF),456 and administered under the Israel 
Lands Authority (ILA).457
During the 1948-1949 war and immediately afterwards, a large amount of movable
A C O
property and assets was looted and destroyed. Refugee property was effectively 
expropriated under a series of laws adopted after 1948, particularly the Absentees’ 
Property Law 1950.459 By 1954, some 4.6 million dunums of refugee land had been
455 The United Nations Conciliation Commission completed an individual documentation and evaluation o f  
Palestinian refugee lands in 1964, consisting o f some 453,000 records and 1.5 million individual holdings. 
These records comprise the most comprehensive collection o f refugee property documentation to date.
456 The JNF was first established and incorporated in Great Britain in the early 1900s for the purpose o f  
purchasing land in Palestine for the settlement o f Jews. Following the creation o f  Israel, a second JNF was 
incorporated in Israel. The original fund in Great Britain continued to operate and manage lands held in 
other parts o f the Arab world, like Syria. According to the terms o f its statute, the JNF cannot sell land and 
is not permitted to grant long-term leases to non-Jews. See generally Kretzme, David. The Legal Status o f  
the Arabs in Israel. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. pp63-4; Lehn, Walter. The Jewish National Fund. 
London: Kegan Paul International, 1988.
457 Under the Israel Lands Administration Law 1960, land held by the Custodian o f Absentee Property, the 
Development Authority and the Jewish National Fund, was brought under one government body, the Israel 
Lands Authority (ILA). According to the law, these lands cannot be transferred.
458 Tom Segev, an Israeli researcher, has reported that Israel State Archives include files still inaccessible to 
researchers with index titles such as Plunder o f Abandoned Arab Property, Looting, Possession without 
Permit, and Robbery. Segev, T. 1949: The First Israelis. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Inc., 1986,
P72-
Laws o f  the State o f  Israel. Authorized Translation from the Hebrew. Vol. IV, 5710-1949/50, pp.68-82: 
see further below.
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transferred to the State under this law.460 In 1953, the government decided to sell urban 
absentee property. The income was returned to the Development Authority for immigrant 
absorption461 Later laws made some provision for compensation,462 but Palestinian 
refugees fell outside the rules, as explained below.
New Jewish immigrants were settled in refugee homes and on refugee land. According to 
Ezra Danin, a Senior Israeli Intelligence Officer in 1948, Palestinian Arab refugees had to 
be confronted with faits accomplis to prevent their return. In a letter to Joseph Weitz in 
May 1948, Danin noted that this included ‘settling Jews in all the area evacuated’ and 
‘expropriating Arab property’.463 Palestinian refugee towns and villages were renamed 
with Hebrew names to reflect the new demographic composition of the area and to 
eradicate all signs of the original inhabitants.464 The occupation or acquisition in fact of 
Palestinian refugee property was followed by legislation and legal processes designed to 
effect and consolidate the ‘transfer’ of title.
3- Absentee Property Legislation.
It should be noted here that all Israeli absentee property legislation that are examined
460 Cano, J. The Question o f  Land in the National Conflict Between Jews and Arabs 1917-1990 [Hebrew] 
Poalim Library, 1992. p i02. By the end o f  1952. the Custodian o f  Absentee Property claimed to hold 1.5 
million dunums o f land and at the end o f 1956 had transferred 2.3 million dunums to the Development 
Authority and sold under the terms of a 1953 agreement between the Jewish National Fund and the 
Custodian. Peretz, D. Palestinian Refugee Compensation. Washington. DC: The Center for Policy Analysis 
on Palestine, 1996, p7
461 Pererz, Palestinian Refugee Compensation, ibid., p8.
462 Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law 1953 .Absentees Property 
(Compensation) Law 1973, Absentees’ Property (Compensation) Amendment Law 1976.
463 Yosef Weitz Papers (Institute for the Study o f Settlement, Rehovot). Danin to Weitz. 18 May 1945, 
cited in Morris, Birth, op.cit, p i35.
464 See Benvenisti, M. Sacred Landscape, The Buried History o f  the Holy Land Since 1948. Los Angeles: 
University o f  California Press, 2000, ch. 1.
169
hereunder were extended in application by Israel to all territories that it had occupied in 
the 1967 war. Therefore the effects of these legislation extends to and applies to the 
displacements and Palestinian refugee owned property of Jordanian nationals of 
Palestinian refugee origin who fled as a result of the 1967 war from the West Bank to 
Jordan. These legislation also extended to Jordanian Government owned property in the 
West Bank.
(a) Absentees’ Property Law, 5710-1950465
The following summarizes key features in Israel’s ‘absentee property’ legislation. The 
summary identifies such property in general terms, and shows how it may pass from 
original ownership into Israeli government and private hands.
Apart from various measures taken under the Trading with the Enemy Ordinance 1939, 
the first substantive legislation to deal with Palestinian Arab property following the 
establishment of the State .of. Israel was the Absentees’. Property. Law, 5710-1950. It 
provided that ‘property’ should include ‘immovable and movable property, moneys, a 
vested or contingent right in property, goodwill and any right in a body of persons or in 
its management’ (section 1(a))466. An absentee was defined as,
(l)a  person who, at any time during the period between [29 
November 1947] and the day on which a declaration is published.., 
that the state of emergency... has ceased to exist, was a legal owner
465 See, Saleh, Nael A, Qawanin Dawlat Israel (The Laws o f  the State o f Israel), (1998), p. 115 
[hereinafter, Saleh, Qawanin Israel]
466 Ibid., p. 116.
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of any property situated in the area of Israel or enjoyed or held it, 
whether by himself or through another, and who, at any time 
during the said period - was a national or citizen of the Lebanon,
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan, Iraq or the Yemen, or
(ii) was in one of these countries or in any part of Palestine outside 
the area of Israel, or
(iii) was a Palestinian citizen and left his ordinary place 
of residence in Palestine,
(a) for a place outside Palestine before [1 September 1948]; or
(b) for a place in Palestine held at the time by forces which sought 
to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or which fought 
against it after its establishment...467
The Law defined ‘absentees’ property’ as property -the legal owner of which- at any time 
between 29 November 1947 and the day on which the state of emergency was declared to 
be over, ‘was an absentee, or which, at any time as aforesaid, an absentee held or 
enjoyed, whether by himself or through another...’. It further defined ‘vested property’ 
as property vested in the Custodian under this law, and ‘held property’ as vested property 
actually held by the Custodian, including property acquired in exchange for vested 
. property.469
Under section 4(a) and subject to the provisions of the Law,
(l)all absentees’ property is hereby vested in the Custodian as 
from the day of publication of his appointment or the day on which
467 Ibid., Absentees’ Property Law, 5710-1950. s. 1(b)(1). A Palestinian citizen was defined to mean a 
person who on 29 November 1947, ‘was a Palestinian citizen according to the provisions o f the Palestine 
Citizenship Orders. 1925-1941, Consolidated.., and includes a Palestinian resident who, on the said day or 
thereafter, had not nationality or citizenship or whose nationality or citizenship was undefined or unclear.’ 
Ibid., s. 1(c).
468 Ibid., s. 1(e).
465 Ibid., s. 1(f), (g).
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it becomes absentees’ property, whichever is the later date;
(2) every right an absentee had in any property shall pass 
automatically to the Custodian at the time of the vesting of the 
property; and the status of the Custodian shall be the same as was 
that of the owner of the property.470
Moreover, ‘vested property’, which may be taken over by the Custodian (wherever he 
may find it, shall remain such so long as it has not become ‘released property under 
section 28, or ceased to be absentees’ property under section 27).471
Under section 27, if the Custodian is of the opinion that someone, whom it is possible to 
define as an absentee under section 1, left his place of residence, either ‘for fear that the 
enemies of Israel might cause him harm, or... otherwise than by reason or for fear of 
military operations’472 he may provide such person with written confirmation that he is 
not an absentee. However, it is not open to a person to claim that he is not an absentee by 
reason only that he had no control over the causes for which he left his place of 
residence 473
In relation to ‘vested property’, the Custodian enjoys full rights of ownership, including, 
in the case of businesses, the power of winding up or liquidation 474 The Law provides for 
anyone in possession of absentees’ property to hand it over to the Custodian475 who is to
470 Ibid., s. 4(a).
471 Ibid., s. 4(c).
472 Ibid., s. 27(a), (b).
473 Ibid., s.30(i), Moreover, the Custodian may not exercise his powers under s. 27, or his powers to 
‘release’ vested property under s. 28. unless this has been recommended, ‘in respect o f  each ease or a 
particular class o f  cases’, by a special committee to be appointed by the Government.
474 Ibid., s. 8.
475 Ibid., s. 6.
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take care of such property ’either himself or through others having his consent.476 Where 
property is mistakenly dealt with as absentees’ or vested property, no liability attaches 
and transactions in relation to such property are not invalidated 477
In the case of immovable property, the Custodian shall not sell it or grant a lease 
exceeding six years, except to the Development Authority, and then only at a price ‘not
A *TO
less than the official value of the property.’ Although the Law provides a basis for 
calculating ‘official value’ by reference to the net annual value determined in the last 
assessment before 15 May 1948, subject to a multiplier (16 2/3), it also provides that the 
Minister of Finance may reduce any of the governing rates where the possibilities of use 
are, in his opinion, limited ‘owing to damage or neglect or for other similar reason.’479
Section 21 requires any person or body holding ‘vested property’ to provide the 
Custodian with details (whether of land, securities, partnership shares), and to provide 
returns and accounts from time to time. All dealings, including acting as legal 
representative, require the consent of .the Custodian,480.and an. absentee’s representation 
by an advocate requires the written consent of the Attorney General.481
A ‘transfer or handing-over of property to an absentee or to another for the benefit of an 
absentee’ in the relevant period is null and void, and the Law creates a presumption
476 Ibid., s. 7.
477 Ibid, ss. 16,17; 34.
478 Ibid, s. 19.
479 Ibid, s. 19(d).
480 Ibid, s. 22
481 Ibid, s. 22(a).
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482against the bona fide character of any such transfer.
The Custodian enjoys broad discretionary competence to determine that a person or body 
of persons is an absentee, or that property is absentee property, and any certification in 
point prevails, ‘so long as the contrary has not been proved’. A certificate by the Minister 
of Defense that ‘a place in Palestine was at a particular time held by forces which sought 
to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or which fought against it after its 
establishment shall be conclusive evidence of its contents’. 484The Custodian’s written 
confirmation of matters within the scope of his functions is to be accepted as prima facie 
evidence of the facts stated therein485, and there is no duty on the Custodian to produce 
any ‘book, file or other document’, the contents of which can be ‘proved’ by such written 
confirmation.486
The State remains entitled to ‘remuneration’ equal to four per cent of the value of the 
property at the time of transfer.487 The value of immovable property is to be calculated on 
the basis of the criteria set out in section 19, and the. value of other property is to be ‘the 
price which in the opinion of the Custodian it would have been possible to obtain for it... 
if it had been sold on the free market by a willing seller to a willing buyer’. In addition 
to remuneration, the Custodian may recover ‘all expenses’.
482 Ibid., s. 23.
483 Ibid., s. 22(a), (b).
484 Ibid., s. 30(c).
485 Ibid, s. 30(e).
486 Ibid, s. 30(f).
487 Ibid, s. 32(a).
488 Ibid, s. 32(b).
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(b) Absentees’ Property (Compensation) Law, 5733-1973489
The Absentees’ Property (Compensation) Law 5733-1973, makes provision for the 
payment of some compensation in relation to certain immovable property vested in the 
Custodian, or transferred by him to the Development Authority, or validly expropriated 
from him 490 The compensation provisions are limited to persons resident in Israel on the 
entry into force of the law, or who become resident thereafter.491 In general, claims for 
compensation must be filed within three years, and advisory committees were to be 
established to clarify claimants’ rights and to determine value492 Any award not 
exceeding 10,000 pounds was payable in cash,493 with any greater amount payable in 
bonds redeemable, with interest, over fifteen years 494
More significant than the limited provisions on compensation, however, are the terms of 
section 18, entitled ‘Abrogation of right of claim against the Custodian’. This provides 
that:
“From the date of the coming into force of this Law, an absentee’s 
claim for a right in property, or for the release of property under 
section 28 of the Absentees’ Property Law 5710-1950... shall not 
be heard save in accordance with this Law.”
The Law came into force on 1 July 1973. Since it is limited to claims by residents, the
489 See, Absentee’ Property (Compensation) Law, 5733-1973, in , Saleh, Qawanin Israel, op.cit, p. 324.
490 Ibid., s. 1.
effect of this provision is effectively to complete the process of expropriation without 
compensation of all property whose owners were compelled or constrained to leave the 
area of Palestine now occupied by Israel, and who have been refused permission to 
return. One theoretical saving clause is to be found in section 20. which enables the 
Government, ‘with the approval of the Finance Committee of the Knesset [to] designate 
categories of holders of a right in immovable property vested in the Custodian who shall 
be entitled to compensation... although they are not claimants within the meaning of this 
Law.’ This power does not appear ever to have been exercised.
(c) Administrator-General Law, 5738-1978495
The Administrator-General Law 5738-1978, provides for the administration of 
‘abandoned property’, that is, property in respect of which ‘no one has been found who is 
authorized and able to deal with it as an owner or to manage it, or its owner is not 
known’, and who is in Israel or, if abroad, is owned by an Israeli national, a resident of 
Israel-or a body • corporate registered or established-in Israel.496-As in the case of 
absentees’ property, those in possession of property known or believed to be abandoned 
must notify the Administrator-General.497
The Administrator-General is obliged to collect and administer such property for the 
benefit of the persons interested therein,498 and is required to make an inventory and to
495 See, Administrator-General Law, 5738-1978, in Saleh, Qawanin Israel, op.cit, p.579.
496 Ibid., s. 1.
497 Ibid., s. 5.
498 Ibid., s. 9.
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keep accounts of such property.499 If, after fifteen years, no person appears who 
establishes that he is authorized to receive it, the court may order the Administrator- 
General to transfer the property to the State,500 subject to an interested person’s 
continuing entitlement to claim its value.
Property subject to administration under the Law includes property vested in the 
Custodian of Enemy Property under the Trading with the Enemy Ordinance 1939.501
(d) Cumulative effect of Absentees’ Property legislation
There seems to be little doubt that an impartial dispute settlement mechanism or 
international tribunal would find that this sequence of laws, and the manner of their 
implementation, constituted expropriation. Expropriation represents the deprivation of a 
person’s use and enjoyment of his property, either as the result of a formal act having that 
consequence, or as the result of other actions which de facto have that effect.
It has long been accepted that expropriation involves ‘the deprivation by State organs of 
a right of property either as such, or by permanent transfer of the power of management 
and control’.502 Again, in international law, the obligation to make full reparation is
499 Ibid., s. 11.
500 Ibid., s. 15.
501 Ibid., s. 21.
502 See Brownlie, I., Principles o f  Public International Law, 6th edn., Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 53; 
3rd edn., 1979. p 532: see also Christie, British Year Book o f  International Law, Vol. 38 (1962), p 307-38. 
The point has been made succinctly by a NAFTA Tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada when the Tribunal 
states that ‘expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal o f the ability o f  an owner to make use of its 
economic rights’; Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 283. The same point has been made by the Iran- 
US Claims Tribunal in Amoco International Finance Corporation v. The Islamic Republic o f  Iran with
177
premised on liability, that is, the attribution or imputability of an internationally wrongful 
act to the responsible State.
Expropriation alone, however, does not constitute a breach of international law. For that 
it is usually regarded as required that the expropriation should not be discriminatory, 
should be for a public purpose, and should be accompanied by adequate compensation. 
While Israel might have a plausible argument that the purpose of its Absentee Property 
laws was ‘public’ in that it was intended to protect that property in the absence of its 
owners (although in the circumstances even that argument is scarcely self-evident), it 
seems clear that the actions taken by Israel through its legislation were (in practice if not 
in form) discriminatory against Palestinian Arab refugees and were not accompanied by 
any compensation.503 Consequently, it can be said that the application of Israeli 
legislation regarding the property of Palestinian refugees constituted expropriation in 
breach of the requirements of international law.
Once again, however, there arise the two questions already discussed previously, in other 
contexts, namely the right of Jordan to present claims in respect of the expropriation of 
Palestinian property, and the need for expropriations to be substantiated by evidence. 
This will be no light task, given the passage of time. It will be necessary to establish the 
ownership (including national status) of the property and its value, and the facts and
regard to the question whether the rights created under a joint venture agreement could be the object o f  
expropriation: ‘Expropriation, which can be defined as a compulsory transfer o f  property rights, may 
extend to any right which can be the object o f a commercial transaction, i.e. freely sold and bought, and 
thus has a monetary value’: (1987) 15 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 1S9, para. 108; see also Aldrich, G. The 
Jurisprudence o f  the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. (1996), 217, p 238-9.
503 See, Records o f  the Palestinian Affairs Department, (1953), op.cit, p.505.
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circumstances of its expropriation.
(iii) Denial of the right to return
The right to return to one’s own country has a clear international legal dimension. At the 
level of State-to-State relations, one State’s obligation to admit its nationals is the 
correlative to another’s right of expulsion. Additionally, the State’s right of protection 
over its citizens abroad is matched by its duty to receive those of its citizens who are not 
allowed to remain on the territory of other States. To this inter-State, reciprocal 
relationship of rights and duties may now be added a human rights dimension: the 
individual’s right to return to the State of which he or she is a national. As an incident of 
nationality, the duty to allow return thus encompasses both the rights of other States (who 
themselves have no general duty to accommodate foreign citizens), and the right of the 
individual to be admitted to his or her own country. The human right to return to one’s 
own country is implied in Article 9504 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
prohibiting ‘arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’, and in.the prohibitions on the expulsion 
of nationals, and it is expressly recognized in Article 13505 and in Article 12506 of the 
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The existence of the right to return and the duty to admit are beyond dispute. Instances in 
which return has been denied or heavily qualified have generally been part of broader 
contexts involving persecution, other violations of human rights, or situations in which
504 See, Brownlie. Basic Documents, op.cit, p. 23.
505 Ibid., p. 130.
506 Ibid., p. 129.
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political issues have prevailed over legal entitlements, as has been the case with 
Palestinians expelled from Israel and subsequently refused permission to return.
It is a matter of record that Israel has persistently refused to allow Palestinians to return, 
and that it has invoked a number of reasons. These have included the ground that it was
• r r » 7
still at war with a number of Arab States or because of the lack of space due to the 
settlement of new Jewish immigrants in refugee homes;508 and the desire to maintain 
post-war demographic changes and the composition of the State.509 In addition, Israel has 
claimed that, as the Palestinians expelled or forced to leave in 1948-1949 were never 
nationals of the State of Israel, there was therefore no obligation on the State to admit 
them.
The legal situation described previously is that of the ‘normal’ situation and does not 
translate easily to the facts of the Palestinian expulsions and/or the entitlement of Jordan
507 See, Reply of the Provisional Government o f Israel to the Proposal Regarding the Return of Arab 
Refugees: UN doe. A /468,-1 -Aug. 1948,-Annex II. In June 1948, the. Director o f  the IDF Intelligence 
Department warned the Foreign Ministry’s Political Division that the return o f Palestinian refugees would 
constitute a serious danger and a potential fifth column: Israel State Archives, FM2426/9, Director, IDF 
Intelligence Department, to Shiloah, 16 June 1948 cited in Benny Morris, The Birth o f  the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, op cit (1987), 139.
508 According to Israeli comments submitted to the United Nations, ‘The question o f  housing the [Jewish] 
newcomers was partly solved by placing them in the habitable houses in abandoned Arab towns and 
villages... [The] individual return o f Arab refugees to their former places o f residence is an impossible 
thing... their houses have gone, their jobs have gone: UN doc. A/1367/Rev.l, 23 Oct. 1951. Israeli officials 
acknowledged that with the homes and property o f Palestinian refugees, it would have been impossible to 
absorb the large number o f new Jewish immigrants to the country. The cost o f placing an immigrant family 
in a refugee home for example, was around 31.300 as compared to between $7,000 and $9,000 for placing 
the immigrants in a new settlement. The estimate was provided by Joseph Schechtman, an expert in 
population transfer, cited in Simha F. The State o f  Israel: Myths and Realities, op.cit, London: Croom Helm, 
1987. p 108.
509 A typical view is that expressed by Joseph Weitz, the Zionist official who headed several so-called 
transfer committees. In his June 1948 transfer plan, entitled, ‘Retroactive Transfer, A Scheme for the 
Solution o f the Arab Question in the State o f Israel’, Weitz wrote that the new state was to be a state 
‘inhabited largely by Jews, so that there will be in it very few non—Jews’: cited in Morris. Birth, op.cit, p 
136.
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to ‘protect’ their right of return. Indeed, the ‘traditional’ approach is characterized by 
certain pitfalls. If the right of return is premised on Israel’s duty to readmit its ‘nationals’, 
then they would fall outside Jordan’s right of protection.510 On the other hand, if such 
persons are classified as aliens or non-nationals, then no State apart from their State of 
nationality is obliged to admit them.511 However, an equally traditional approach to the 
consequences of an international wrong is to look to the restoration of the status quo ante 
as the primary remedy for the breach. In this context, a right of return clearly emerges, 
since the expulsions were unlawful in international law.
Given the different ways of looking at the problem as a matter of broad principle, it is 
difficult to be sure how an international tribunal would react to the assertion of a right of 
return, were that to be advanced by Jordan on behalf of certain Palestinians. It should also 
be stressed that Jordan is not seeking to vindicate the right of return for all Palestinian 
refugees, which is a matter within the competence of the Palestinian Authority, but only 
for those who now have a sufficient link with Jordan.
It would thus seem that, there are good grounds for arguing for such a right, in which the 
following elements would be emphasized.
5,0 The American and European Conventions both provide that citizens shall not be deprived o f the right to 
enter their own country: Art. 3, Protocol 4, European Convention on Human Rights; Art. 22 (5), American 
Convention on Human Rights.
511 See, Article 13(2) o f the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and Article 12(4) of the 1960 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights., cited in Brownlie. Basic Documents, op.cit.
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1- The Illegality of the Expulsion
The expulsions were illegal in international law, and therefore the appropriate 
international law remedy is, in principle, a return to the status quo ante, requiring that the 
expellees be allowed to return. The required remedy is thus one which restores the 
situation to that which it would have been had the unlawful act not occurred. The 
question of the appropriate reparation to be made for the unlawful acts of expulsion is 
considered further later on in this chapter but the starting point, in principle, is as just 
stated.
2- The entitlement of Palestinians to Self-Determination
The Palestinian situation is distinguished from other situations of population 
displacement by its linkage to the principle of self-determination. After the departure 
of the British, the Palestinians were a people entitled to the right of self-determination. 
Israel, however, denied, them the exercise of that, right by, inter alia, .a systematic pattern 
of expulsions.
The right of self-determination derives from a rule of international law having the status 
of ius cogens. Moreover, the International Court of Justice noted in the East Timor Case 
that ‘Portugal’s assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved
512 See, for example, UNGA Resolution 3236 (XXIX). 22 November 1974. reaffirming the ‘inalienable 
rights o f the Palestinian People... including... the right to self-determination without external interference... 
(and)... to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted.’ See also 
Chapter 2 o f this thesis.
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from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is 
irreproachable’, and ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’.513 
Israel is thus under an inescapable obligation to allow the right of self-determination to be 
exercised, and a sine qua non for the exercise of the right is the return of the population 
which constitutes the ‘people’ in question, i.e. the Palestinians.
The link to self-determination shows clearly that the situation of the Palestinians is quite 
different, as a matter of law, from a typical situation involving the expulsion of aliens, so 
that the ‘normal’ rules about a State’s right to expel and its duty to receive back only its 
own nationals, are beside the point. Moreover, so far as return is linked to territory, 
national identity and self-determination, then as a matter of principle, the objective of 
‘restitution’ would not be satisfied by an award of equivalent land elsewhere or monetary 
compensation.
3- Recognition of the Palestinians’ right of return by the United Nations
The Palestinians’ right of return has been repeatedly affirmed by the General Assembly, 
including in, by way of example, the following resolutions.
(a)Resolution 194 (III) (1948) refers to the refugees’ right ‘to return to their homes’.
(b)Resolution 3236 (XXIX) (1974) reaffirms the ‘inalienable rights of the Palestinian 
people... including the right to self-determination without external interference... [and]... 
to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and
5I3See, East Timor Case (Portugal v. Australia) ICJ Reports, 1995, op.cit, pp. 90, 102.
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uprooted’.514
(c)Resolution 54/69 (1999) noted ‘with regret that repatriation as provided for in 
paragraph 11 of its resolution 194(111), has not yet been effected (paragraph 1).
The last-mentioned resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 155-1-2, not only 
reaffirmed the right of return/repatriation, but did so by express reference to Resolution 
194 (III). The General Assembly thereby clearly underlined the continuing relevance and 
applicability of the principles for solution first laid down fifty-three years before, in 
1948.515
Although United Nations General Assembly resolutions, as indicated previously in 
chapter 2, are not themselves directly binding in law. They certainly are not without legal 
effect. This is especially true where such resolutions, as explained previously, are 
adopted by consensus, unanimity, or by large majorities. This is also the case when there 
is evidence that the language of such resolutions is intended to reflect a legal conclusion 
and may be argued to represent customary international law.
Therefore, a strong argument can be made that the refugees are entitled to return to 
their homes, both as a matter of general principle and as a consequence of 
consistent practice of States in the adoption of General Assembly resolutions
514 Admittedly, there are certain weaknesses in the language o f  relevant General Assembly resolutions must 
be noted; resolutions 194 (III) (1948) and 3236 (XXIX) (1974), for example, in referring to the right to 
return ‘to their homes’, are not capable o f strict application when those homes no longer exist.
515 See also General Assembly resolution 55/55, adopted on 1 December 2000 by a vote o f  149-2-3, which 
stresses the need for ‘resolving the problem of the Palestinian refugees in conformity with.,, resolution 194 
(III).’
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over a period of more than 50 years. Nevertheless, as indicated previously, a word of 
caution must be expressed pertaining to the attitude which might be adopted by an 
impartial international tribunal, should such a case arise before it. Such a tribunal would 
be likely to attach considerable weight to two factors in particular. First, that the 
expulsions took place over half a century ago, and that, when many of the original 
refugees will have either established new lives elsewhere or will have died, there could 
be something unreasonable in now seeking to return to the status quo ante for the 
diminishing numbers of survivors and the many descendants of the original expellees. 
Second, that the sudden influx of a very large number of people into Israel would have a 
seriously disruptive effect upon the social and economic fabric of the country.
While, therefore, Jordan is entitled to claim, on the basis of international law, that the 
refugees have a right to return to their homes (or at least to the lands on which their 
homes were located), and that Jordan should not hesitate to advance a claim on that basis, 
it is probable that that claim is more likely to be upheld and given effect in practice 
(perhaps, in part).in diplomatic.negotiation,, rather, than before a tribunal applying, 
international law. A tribunal might well accept that in principle the denial of the right of 
return is a breach of an international obligation, but would be more likely to seek to 
remedy that breach by the payment of compensation or some other remedy, rather than 
by imposing on Israel an obligation to accept all refugees into its territory.
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b. In jury  and loss arising out of the events of 1967 and thereafter
Israel’s occupation of Arab territory in the 1967 war must be understood against the 
background of Israel’s territorial origins. Although there is no intention or room for 
contesting Israel’s current status as a lawful member of the international community of 
States, it should be noted that Israel was created in armed conflict against the will of the 
local (i.e. Palestinian) inhabitants and its origins were of doubtful international 
legitimacy. As Professor James Crawford notes, ‘Israel was created by the use of force, 
without the consent of any previous sovereign and without complying with any valid act 
o f disposition.’516
With the United Kingdom’s relinquishment of the Mandate, Israel secured its effective 
de facto  existence by establishing, by force, a stable and effective government over the
ctn
territory under its control.
Israel’s effective territorial control extended over much more territory than that accorded 
to it under the UN partition plan endorsed by General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), and 
its territorial extent is not therefore based on that Resolution. Rather, Israel’s original 
territorial extent was based on the armistice agreements of 1949, which brought Arab- 
Israeli hostilities to an end. It follows that the territory of Israel, at the date of its
516 Crawford, J. Israel (1948-1949) and Palestine (1998-1999): Two Studies in the Creation o f  States, in 
Goodwin-Gill. G. & Talmon. S.. The Reality o f  International Law: Essays in Honor o f  Ian Brownlie. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1999. pp. 95-124, 108. [hereinafter, Crawford. Israel and Palestine]
5,7 In Crawford’s view, Israel’s qualification for statehood derived from the fact that, as an entity in 
possession o f  stable and effective government over a territory, it was a seceding State from Palestine, 
‘which must be regarded as a single self-determination unit’, and that its secession from Palestine was 
effectively established by about January 1949: Crawford, Israel and Palestine., Ibid.
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admission to membership of the United Nations following the decision of the Security 
Council on 4 March 1949,518 was no greater than that area, and what was left of the 
Mandate territory of Palestine was and is not open to conquest, accession or settlement by 
Israel or any other State, and Israel had (and has) no latent or putative claim to 
sovereignty over that territory.
The legal status of that part of Palestine which was outside Israel’s ‘armistice territory’, 
particularly the West Bank, was at that time ambiguous. However, it would seem in one 
way or another to be attributable to the indigenous people of Palestine, who can be 
regarded as at that time having some sort of transitional and residual ownership of it.
The effective and de facto protecting authority in relation to the West Bank was Jordan 
from the time of its administration by Jordan in 1948 during the 1948-1949 war followed 
by its formal incorporation through unity into the Kingdom took place in April 1950. The 
uncertain legal effects of Jordan’s ‘administrative disengagement’ from the West Bank in 
. 198S have already been adverted to previously.519
The 1967 conflict involved fierce but brief hostilities between 5-11 June, as a result of 
which Israel occupied territories in Jordan, Egypt and Syria, including in particular East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank. The circumstances surrounding Israel’s use of force have
518 SC res S/RES/70,4 Mar. 1949 (9-1-1); UNGA res. 273 (III), 11 May 1949 (37-12-9)
519 Following Jordan’s disengagement in 1988, it may be that the sovereign in effect is the Palestinian 
people and its representatives. See Crawford. Israel and Palestine, op.cit. p 109: ‘...the Jewish people had 
a right o f  self-determination in respect o f Palestine as a whole. But so too did the Palestinian people. Israel 
could be regarded as an expression of the principle o f self-determination for the Jewish people o f Palestine 
as at 1948... but there was no equivalent expression for the Palestinian population.’ However, there are 
weights’ arguments to show that Jordan has not yet been shown to have relinquished its previous 
sovereignty.
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commonly been presented as an instance of (pre-emptive) self-defense. However, it is 
disputed whether Egypt, Syria or Jordan, individually or collectively, ever intended or 
planned to attack Israel, or that Israel’s existence was threatened at any time, or that there 
was any substantial or imminent armed attack on Israel such as would justify Israel’s use 
of force in self-defense, or that the use of force by Israel was in any event proportionate 
in the circumstances.520
For the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to recall that at the relevant time, Jordan and 
Egypt were parties to the 1964 Arab Defense Pact and a bilateral 1967 Mutual Defense
M 1
Treaty , committing each to assist the other in the event of an attack. In the days 
preceding the outbreak of hostilities, Israel border positions with Jordan were reinforced, 
and included the introduction of tanks into the demilitarized zone around Jerusalem, in 
violation of the 1949 Armistice Agreement (Article 111.2; Annex 11.2). Random small 
arms fire against Jordanian positions in Jerusalem was also reported in the early hours of 
5 June 1967. When Jordan learned of Israel’s attack on Egypt, it acted under its mutual 
defense obligations and opened fire on-Israel positions. Israel responded-by invading 
Jordan, and occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where it remains to this day.
However one might characterize that conflict, by the time it occurred the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949523 had been concluded and had entered into force, and it was clear 
that they applied to any international armed conflict whether or not it was formally
520 See generally Parker, R., ed.. The Six Day War: A Retrospective. University o f Florida Press. 1996.
521 See, Arab League Treaties, (1977), Arab League Publication.
522 See, General Armistice Agreement between Jordan and Israel, (3 April 1949), 42 UNTS, p. 303.
523 See, for the text o f  the Geneva Conventions, Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f  War, op.cit.
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characterized as ‘war’. It follows that Israel’s subsequent presence in the territories which 
it occupied as a result of that conflict has to be regarded as involving only occupation 
with certain limited rights of administration in those occupied territories, and does not 
involve Israel having sovereignty over them. In particular, Israel’s rights and obligations 
are governed by the IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War 1949,524
(i)Displacement of Palestinian and Jordanian populations
There is no doubt that, as a result of the 1967 hostilities, large numbers of inhabitants of 
the West Bank in particular moved from that part of Jordan to other places. There seems 
also, no doubt that this was largely the result of the same policies of expulsion which 
Israel had applied at the time of the 1948-1949 conflict.
Equally, there is no doubt that Jordan is entitled to raise with Israel the situation of those 
who were displaced from the West Bank in.1967 as a result of the .hostilities.. Article 8(2)
(a)525 of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 1994 recognizes Jordan’s standing in this respect.
As to the other two questions which fell to be considered in this respect in relation to the 
1948-1949 expulsions, it is clear that in 1967 the actions taken were taken by the State of 
Israel or by those authorized by it. There is thus no shadow of doubt over attribution.
524 Ibid, p. 299.
525 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit.
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The other question concerned the degree to which the coerced displacement of people 
was contrary to international law. Very little doubt exists that whatever doubts there may 
have been as to the position in international law in 1947-1949, by 1967 the coerced 
displacement of large populations from territory under ‘belligerent’ occupation was 
contrary to international law.526 United Nations Security Council Resolution 237, 
adopted on 14 June 1967, is specifically directed at those displaced by the Six Day War. 
It requires Israel to ensure their safety and welfare, and endorsed the application of the 
IV Geneva Convention.
At the time of that conflict, Israel was legally bound by the 1949 Fourth Geneva
MO
Convention. Article 49 of that Convention expressly prohibits ‘individual or mass 
forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons’ (that latter term includes,
c n  q  ,
by virtue of Article 4 , the inhabitants of a territory under occupation). A compelling
case could be made out by Jordan to the effect that what occurred was either a ‘mass 
forcible transfer’ or a ‘deportation’ within the meaning of Article 49.
(ii)Loss of, damage to, and expropriation of Palestinian and Jordanian property
That arguments made the context of assessing a claim for loss of, damage to and 
expropriation of Palestinian and Jordanian property in the context of the 1947-1949
526 See, among others, General Assembly resolution 55/125 on ‘Persons displaced as a result o f  the June
1967 and subsequent hostilities’. Adopted by a vote o f 156-2-2, this resolution refers expressly to the right 
o f such persons to return to their homes or former places o f residence (paragraph 1).
527 The Camp David accords also called for the phased return o f displaced persons.
528 See, Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 317.
529 Ibid., p. 302.
190
period applies here too. Additionally, quantifying the losses is also clearer owing to the 
fact that Jordan during its control over the West Bank that extended from 1950 to 1967 
had marinated real estate and land registers that are still to date in the possession of the 
Jordanian government.
It should be restated here again here that the Israeli Legislation pertaining to property was 
extended in its application to the West Bank after Israel’s occupation. Thus, again the 
cumulative effect of Israel property legislation in relation to refugees, which had been 
thoroughly examined in the context of the 1947-1949 period in a previous part of this 
chapter apply to the West Bank too.
(iii) Violations of the human rights of residents of the West Bank
Accountability for violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law 
derives from the fact of control over territory and/or control over the agents of the State 
responsible for the acts in question.530 In Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), the 
European Court of Human Rights held that the concept of jurisdiction under Article 1 of 
the European Convention was not restricted to the national territory of the parties. Their 
responsibility could be invoked because of acts of their authorities, whether performed 
within or outside national boundaries, which produce effects outside their own territory, 
or as a consequence of military action - whether lawful or unlawful - where a State 
exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory.
530 See, See. Goodwin-Gill. International Framework, op.cit, p. 57.
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“The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms 
set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control 
whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or 
through a subordinate local administration. 531
Although arising within the context of a regional treaty regime not otherwise applicable 
to the present circumstances, the statement of principle is nevertheless of general 
application.532
(iv) Violations of international humanitarian law
Israel’s obligations as an occupying power are clear as regards Jordanian territory and 
the population of such territory that came under Israeli authority in 1967. Israel’s 
responsibilities extend to persons who fled the war and who have not been allowed to 
return, and to persons whose property was expropriated or damaged as a result of the 
invasion and occupation, and/or of events in the succeeding years. The Occupying 
Power’s obligations, based in treaty, are independent international humanitarian 
. obligations. They do. not depend for their force on reciprocity (see, .for example, Article 
2, Fourth Geneva Convention), nor are they contingent on the existence of some prior
533sovereign.
531 Preliminary Objections, para. 62; (40/1993/435/514). 23 March 1995.
532 It is a generally recognized principle o f international law that every State is responsible for ensuring and 
protecting the human rights o f everyone within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. Article 1. 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights; European Court o f Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey, (Merits), 
(40/1993/435/514), Judgment, Strasbourg, 18 December 1996. Article 1, 1969 American Convention on 
Human Rights; Article 2(1), 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, De Lopez v. Uruguay; de Casanego v. Uruguay; also, Kuchenmeister' v. Home Office [1958] 1 
QB 496.
533 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection o f  Civilian Persons in Time o f War. 12 August 
1949: 75 UNTS 287. Dinstein, Y. Laws o f  War, pp 212-3; Roberts, A. Prolonged Military Occupation: The 
Israeli-Occupied Territories 1967-1988. in Playfair. E., ed., International Law and the Administration o f
192
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are concerned neither with the origins of conflict nor the 
status of territory. Article 2534 of the Fourth Convention provides that the Convention 
shall ‘apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party’, while Article l 535 calls for respect of the Convention ‘in all 
circumstances’, (and not, therefore, on a basis of reciprocity). Article 4536 provides 
further that the inhabitants of a territory under occupation shall be ‘protected persons’:
“Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given 
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of 
a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”.
In 1976, the President of the UN Security Council, after consulting all the members and 
concluding that the majority agreed, stated that, ‘The Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the 
Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967.’
Occupied Territories, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1992, p 25-85, 43-9. Cf. arguments raised by defendants 
but rejected in the war crimes tribunals set up after the Second World War, to the effect that they were not 
bound by the law o f  belligerent occupation since the territories in question had been annexed to Germany: 
cited in Mallison, S. V. & Mallison, W. T., Settlements and the Law A Juridical Analysis o f the Israeli 
Settlements in the Occupied Territories. Washington. DC American Educational Trust, 1983, p 2-3.
534 See, Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 301.
535 Ibid., p. 300.
536 Ibid, p.302
537 UN SC Presidential Statement: UN doc. S/PV.1922, 26 May 1976. The statement deplored, ‘the 
measures taken by Israel in the occupied territories which alter their demographic composition or 
geographical character, and in particular establishment o f settlements.’ Four years later, the Security 
Council unanimously adopted resolution 465 (1980), in which it, 'Determines that all measures taken by 
Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status o f the 
Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have 
no legal validity and that Israel’s policy and practices o f settling parts o f its population and new immigrants 
in these territories constitute a flagrant violation o f the Fourth Geneva Convention...’
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In 1980, by a vote of 14 to none, with one abstention, the Security Council censured the 
enactment by Israel of a ‘basic law’ on Jerusalem, which it found to constitute a violation 
of international law that did not affect the continued application of the Fourth 
Convention. The Security Council reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force is 
inadmissible - a principle of international law older than the State of Israel.538 It decided 
not to recognize the ‘basic law’ and other actions seeking to alter the character and status
f l Q
o f Jerusalem.
The applicability of the Fourth Convention has also been maintained by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (which enjoys a special status in the interpretation and 
supervision of application of the conventions and of international humanitarian law at 
large), and has even been recognized at certain periods by the Government of Israel 
itself.540
The applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories occupied by Israel in 
196.7 .has been, consistently upheld by. the international community of States. The 
Government of the United States has observed, for example, that,
538 See, Article 2(4), UN Charter 1945; UN SC resolution 242 (1967).
539 UN doc. S/RES/478, 20 Aug. 1980; under Art. 25 o f the United Nations Charter, all Member States 
‘agree to accept and carry out the decisions o f the Security Council...’. The UN General Assembly has 
taken the same position on the applicability o f  the Fourth Convention; see, among many others. UNGA res. 
35/122A, 3 Nov. 1980; UNGA res. 54/77, 6 Dec. 1999: UNGA res. 55/131. 8 Dec.2000.
540 See Boyd, The Applicability o f  International Law to the Occupied Territories, (1971) Israeli Yearbook 
o f  Human Rights, p. 259; Kassem, Legal Systems and Developments in Palestine, (1980) Palestine 
Yearbook of Int'l Law 19, p. 20. The arguments attempted by Blum, Y. The Missing Reversionary: 
Reflections on the Status o f  Judea and Samaria, 3 Israel Law Review (1968), p.279, and Rostow.E. 
Palestinian Self-determination: Possible Futures fo r  the Unallocated Territories o f  the Palestine Mandate, 
5 Yale Studies in World Public Order 147 (1979)) have received no scholarly or political support, other 
than within the Government o f Israel; see Mallison & Mallison, Settlements and the Law, op.ci, pp 10-20: 
Cassese. A. Self-Determination o f  Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal. Cambridge University Press, 1995, p 35- 
7.
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“the paramount purposes [of the Convention] are protecting the 
civilian population of an occupied territory and reserving 
permanent territorial changes, if any, until settlement of the 
conflict The Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Israel, Egypt 
and Jordan are parties, binds signatories with respect to their 
territory and the territory of other contracting parties, and 'in all 
circumstances’ (Article 1), in ‘all cases’ of armed conflict among 
them (Article 2) and with respect to all persons who ‘in any 
manner whatsoever’ find themselves under the control of a party of 
which they are not nationals (Article 4).”541
The United States concluded that, while Israel may undertake actions necessary to meet 
its military needs and to provide for orderly government during the occupation, ‘the 
establishment of civilian settlements in those territories is inconsistent with international 
law.’542
During the period of occupation, Israel has violated and continues to violate provisions 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection o f  Civilian Persons in Time 
o f War of 1949. The following are illustrative examples;
First, Article 27543 of the IV Convention declares that ‘protected persons are entitled, in 
all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honor, their family rights, their 
religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.’ While paragraph 4 
permits control measures against protected persons where ‘necessary’ for security
541 Digest o f  US Practice in International Law, 1978, pp 1575-8.
542 Ibid. See also Mr. McHenry (USA) in debate in the Security Council on SC resolution 465 .1  Mar. 1980: 
UN doc. S/PV.2203, para. 19; US Department of State. Human Rights Report, 1988: The Occupied 
Territories. P 1376 (1988); to similar effect, see statement by US Representative Mr. Charles Yost in the 
Security Council on 1 Jul. 1969: Department o f State Bulletin. 28 Jul. 1969, p 76-7. Other States, including 
the United Kingdom, have expressed similar views.
543 See, Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 311.
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reasons, Israeli government and military practice has consistently employed this limited 
exception to justify collective detention and community punishment, inhumane 
conditions, and denial of judicial control.544
Second, Article 3 3545 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that, ‘No protected 
person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. 
Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are 
prohibited... Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.
Third, Article 49546 of the IV Geneva Convention prohibits ‘individual or mass forcible 
transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons’. It further provides in paragraph 6 
that ‘The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies.’547 While temporary transfers of civilian 
populations in aid of the military might be acceptable, the establishment and peopling of 
permanent settlements is unlawful. Such settlements, in the case of the West Bank, have 
. been intended to effect basic.demo graphic change in the population of the territory.548
544 See, Pacheco, A. Occupying an Uprising, 532-52; AI-Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights 
violations during the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-December 1988; US Department o f State, 
Human Rights Report 1988, 1379ff; Amnesty International, ‘Report on Administrative Detention’. 1988.
545 See, Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p.312; see also Article 50 o f  the Hague Regulations at p. 
81.
546 Ibid., p. 317.
547 Pictet, J., ed. Commentary: Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection o f  Civilian Persons in 
Time o f  War. Geneva: ICRC, 1958, p 283.
548 See, for example, Benvenisti, M and Khayat, S. The West Bank and Gaza Atlas. Jerusalem. West Bank 
Database Project. 1988, pp 58-9, 94, describing the 1983 Likud Government settlement plan calling for the 
establishment o f  Jewish settlements housing 800.000 persons in the West Bank. The occupation o f territory 
in wartime is essentially temporary: Pictet. Commentary, Ibid, p 275. The US Government has expressed 
the view that Israeli civilian settlements ‘thus appear to constitute a 'transfer o f parts o f its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies’ within the scope o f  paragraph 6’.
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Article 46549 of the 1907 Hague Regulations prohibits the confiscation of private 
property, and while Article 52550 allows the Occupying Power to take land against 
compensation, this is limited by the requirement of military needs. Where government 
property is concerned, Article 5 5551 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides only for 
limited rights of use, since the occupier is not sovereign and may not do any act 
amounting to unilateral annexation of the territory or any part thereof.552
The only permanent changes permitted are those which are intended to benefit the local 
population. Israeli Government activities, on the contrary, have involved ‘the expansion 
of existing colonies and the establishment of new ones, the construction of by-passes to 
isolated colonies and the confiscation of land..., the uprooting of olive tees and the forced 
transfer o f Bedouin...’553
The Occupying Power has duties towards the local civilian population and may not, 
among others, detain persons outside the occupied territories. In its Annual Report 1999, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross noted that. ‘Throughout 1999. an average 
of 3,500 Palestinians were being held by the Israeli authorities at any one time. The rate 
of arrest remained unchanged at about 300 people per month, a quarter of them for 
security reasons. All Palestinian detainees were imprisoned in places of detention on 
Israeli territory, in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.’554
549 See, Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 81.
550 Ibid., p. 82.
551 Ibid.,
552 Dinstein, Y., Laws o f War, op.cit, pp 211,220.
553 International Committee o f the Red Cross. Annual Report 1999, ‘Israel, the occupied territories and the 
autonomous territories’: http://www.icrc.org.
554 Ibid.
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The conditions of detention over the years have been widely criticized,555 while the 
Israeli High Court of Justice has also recognized that Israeli security forces have 
employed, as a matter of administrative practice, methods of interrogation incompatible 
with the standards of international law.556
The Occupying Power has specific responsibilities towards the population under its 
control. Among others, these include ‘the duty of ensuring’ food and medical supplies557 , 
and ‘the duty of ensuring and maintaining’ medical and hospital establishments and 
services, public health and hygiene. The Occupying Power is obliged not to requisition 
‘foodstuffs, articles or medical supplies’, save for limited purposes, ‘and then only if the 
requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account’558 ; the Occupying 
Power must also ensure that ‘fair value is paid for requisitioned goods’.559
According to Article 147560, ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 
justified by. military necessity’ is a ‘grave breach’ of the Convention, for which no State, 
party ‘shall be allowed to absolve itself, or any other State party, of liability. The 
Government of Israel has repeatedly ordered and implemented policies involving the 
willful destruction of Palestinian rural and urban property.
555 Pacheco, A. Occupying an Uprising, op.cit; The Geneva Law and Israeli Administrative Detention 
Policy during the First Year o f  the Palestinian General Uprising, 21 Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 
pp 515-63 (1990).
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel and others v. The State o f Israel and The General Security 
Service and others, High Court o f Israel. 6 September 1999
557 See, Article 55 o f IV Geneva Convention in Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 319.
558 Ibid., para 2.
559 Ibid, para 3.
560 See, Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f  War, op.cit, p. 352.
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The Israeli courts have shown themselves unwilling or unable to review governmental 
actions against the standards of international law. Consequently, the rights of Jordan and 
of the citizens and residents of the Occupied Territories have been violated, contrary to 
international law.561
As indicated previously, the liability of the Occupying Power for its unlawful occupation 
and the consequences thereof are determined by the general principles of law.
(v) Denial of the right of return
What has been previously argued regarding the right of return in relation to refugees of 
the 1947-1949 period applies even more strongly in the case of Palestinian refugees 
displaced as a result of the 1967 war (Displaced Persons), given the express provision in 
Article 49 of the IV Geneva Convention. Their removal by Israel or as result of Israeli 
actions .was unlawful,. and. consequently the effects of that unlawful act should be 
remedied by their return to the places from which they were displaced.
The United Nations General Assembly has expressly affirmed the right of return of 
displaced persons. In resolution 55/125 (2000), adopted by a vote of 156-2-2 it reaffirmed 
‘the right of all persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities 
to return to their homes or former places of residence in the territories occupied by Israel
561 Ginbar, Y. Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories as a Violation o f  Human Rights: Legal and 
Conceptual Aspects. B ’Tselem, Jerusalem. Mar. 1997.
562 See, Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f  War, op. cit, p. 317.
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since 1967’ (paragraph 1). Similarly, the Camp David accords also called for the phased 
return of displaced persons.
Jordan is clearly entitled to invoke such statements of principle recognizing the right of 
return, and to base a claim against Israel on Israel's refusal to give effect to that right. As 
noted above, an international tribunal might be reluctant to require Israel to give effect to 
a right of return, but it should feel able (a) to recognize that such a right exists, (b) to find 
that Israel is denying that right, and (c) to order some other form of reparation than full 
enforcement of the right to return.
c . Israel’s Breaches of Obligations under the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 1994
It must be noted that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 1994 does not contain any provision 
of the kind which is often included in peace treaties, to the effect that the two parties 
mutually waive all their outstanding claims against each other. The mere fact of 
. concluding a peace treaty does not bring about such a consequence, and such claims are 
accordingly still ‘alive’ and may still be pursued.
In the general context of refugee problems there are respectable arguments that Israel is 
in breach of its obligations under the Peace Treaty, namely: Israel has failed to fulfill its 
obligations under Article 11.1(b)564 (reinforced by Article 26)565 ‘to repeal all adverse or
563 Perhaps through partial application of the right, and/or compensation, and/or other provisions whereby 
Israel may make good the consequences o f its refusal to honor the right to return.
564 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op. cit.
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discriminatory references and expressions of hostility in [its] legislation, Israel has also 
failed to fulfill its obligations under Article 11.1(d)566 to allow Jordanian citizens ‘due 
process of law within [Israel’s] legal systems and before [Israel’s] courts, and Israel has 
failed to fulfill its obligations under Articles 25567 and 8568 to negotiate in good faith a 
settlement of the human problems involving the position of refugees and displaced 
persons.
(i) Article 11.1(b) of the Peace Treaty
Although Israel has enacted certain amendments to the Absentee Property Law, Section 
6 o f the Implementing Act569 does not go as far as a reasonable interpretation of that 
Article requires. However, by enacting Section 6 of the Implementing Act, Israel has 
acknowledged that the Absentee Property Law comes within the scope of its obligations 
under Article 11.
' While the obligation under Article 11.1(b)570 is to Tepeal ‘adverse or discriminatory’ 
legislation, and it is not entirely beyond argument what ‘discriminatory’ means, there is a 
sound argument that on any reasonable interpretation of that term there remain, in Israeli 
legislation, provisions which are to be regarded as discriminatory. Moreover, whatever 
doubts there may be about ‘discriminatory’, there can be very few about ‘adverse’: the
565 Ibid.,
566 Ibid.,
567 Ibid.,
568 Ibid.,
569 See, Israel’s  Implementing Act o f  the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, Jordanian Foreign Ministry Archive 
Document 1117 dated 22/2/ 1995.
570 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit.
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inclusion of people with a Jordanian connection within the scope of the Absentees’ 
Property Law is clearly ‘adverse’ to their interests.
Israel’s obligation under Article 11 is to repeal ‘references’ in its legislation, rather than 
to repeal the legislation itself. The Article, however, leaves unclear the extent of such a 
repeal. Even if the legislation as a whole is repealed (in its application, say, to Jordan and 
Jordanian nationals), there is a question whether that repeal has to apply only to actions 
occurring after the date of the repeal, or whether it must also be to some extent 
retroactive, and constitute an attempt to undo matters carried out under the said 
legislation.
Section 6 of Israel’s Implementing Act adopts a minimalist interpretation of Israel’s 
obligations under Article 11.1(b). It provides that property is not to be considered 
absentee property ‘only’ on the basis that a person with a right to it was a ‘a citizen or a
•  C 7 1subject of Jordan’, or was present in Jordan after 10 November 1994.
Very little, if any property has become absentee property in recent years or would (but 
for the Implementing Act) acquire that status in the future. Generally most Jordan-linked 
property will already have become absentee property by virtue of being owned by a 
Jordanian national or a person present in Jordan before 10 November 1994. If this is the 
case, then the practical effect of Section 6 of Israel’s Implementing Act is minimal. The 
great bulk of absentee property still remains absentee property, unaffected by the
571 See, Israel’s Implementing Act o f  the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, Jordanian Foreign Ministry Archive 
Document 1117 dated 22/2/ 1995, op.cit.
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provisions of Article 11 of the Peace Treaty.
A maximalist interpretation of Article 11 would require that all absentee property which 
was treated as such because of its Jordanian connection should no longer be treated as 
absentee property and should be placed at the free disposal of its owners. If disposed of 
by the Custodian it should be recovered and returned to its owners - and if such recovery 
is now impossible, compensation should be paid.
While Israel will presumably not be ready to accept any such maximalist interpretation 
of its obligations under Article 11, Jordan need not on that account give up such a 
maximalist position.572 First, it is not an unreasonable interpretation of the language used 
in Article 11; secondly, it would be consistent with the general concept o f ‘custodianship’ 
usually associated with enemy property in time of war, or absentee property in the 
present instance (i.e. that property has to be looked after by the ‘custodian’ and when 
peace is restored it is returned to its owners, subject to any provision for its retention with 
or without.compensation made in the. peace treaty)..Thirdly, if Jordan is entering into 
negotiations under Article 11.3, or a financial claim under Article 24, the option should 
be retained as a bargaining chip.
The language of Article 11 clearly supports an interpretation which goes well beyond 
Israel's minimalist position. It requires Israel to ‘repeal all adverse or discriminatory 
references in [... its...] legislation’.
572 Interview with Dr. Hani Mulki. Head o f  the Jordanian Negotiating team and later Foreign Minister o f  
Jordan. (6 February 2006), [Hereinafter, interview with Mulki].
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(a) Treaties are to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
573purpose; Article 11 is part of a peace treaty, the object and purpose of which is to 
restore peace between the parties and improve relations between them;
(b) ‘All’ adverse or discriminatory references have to be repealed;
(c) ‘Repeal’ means ‘repeal’, and not some sort of special and limited interpretative rule 
like that embodied in Section 6 of the Implementing Act. The offending references 
should disappear from the statute book;
(d)In terms of the Absentee Property Law, Section l(b)(i),574 includes Trans-Jordan in the 
list of ‘offending’ countries; this is clearly an ‘adverse’ reference, and arguably also a 
‘discriminatory’ one, which has to be repealed. If this took place, the whole structure of 
the Law would cease to apply to Jordanian nationals or persons present in Jordan.
Overall, there is a strong case for Jordan to maintain that Israel’s Implementing Act falls 
far short of what is needed to comply with Article 11 (although there is room for 
argument regarding the extent of Israel’s obligations under that Article with reference to 
the ‘maximalist’ position outlined above). Jordan is entitled to request from Israel the 
complete fulfillment of its obligations under Article 11.1(b) and Article 26 of the Peace 
Treaty, which involves primarily the proper ‘repeal’ of ‘all’ the offending references in
573 See, Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, op.cit. Article 31.
574 See, Absentee’s Property Law, 5710-1950, in Saleh, Qawanin Israel, op.cit p. 115.
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the Absentees’ Property Law covered by Article 1 Ll(b).
(ii) Article 11.1(d) of the Peace Treaty
Not withstanding the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel, 
Jordanian citizens are still not enjoying due process of law within Israel’s legal system 
and before Israeli courts, as required by Article 11.1 (d).575 This is particularly the case 
for those Jordanian citizens who are ‘absentee owners’ of property or otherwise fall 
within the scope of Israel’s Absentee Property Law. This is a matter which requires 
further investigation. If such denial of due process can be established, it may also 
comprise an element in a comprehensive claim by Jordan against Israel.
(iii) IsraePs failure to negotiate in good faith
As a matter of both customary international law and the terms of the Peace Treaty, Israel 
. is under.an obligation to negotiate in.good faith. As. for the. Peace.Treaty, Article 25.2 
stipulates that ‘The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this 
Treaty...’ Israel’s lack of good faith in conducting the negotiations provided for in 
Article 8 can be substantiated.
575 The Jordanian Foreign Ministry has a department named the Department o f  Palestinian Affairs. This 
department has the institutional jurisdiction over Palestinian Refugees camps in Jordan and over protecting 
the interests o f Jordanian Nationals o f Palestinian Refugee origin. Although the exact number o f  
documented complaints presented by Palestinian refugees over the issue o f the denial o f justice, 
discriminatory treatment by Israel and the lack o f  any effective remedy for them in the Israel domestic 
system to address their rights even in the Judicial field, is classified, I can confirm that there are hundreds 
of thousands o f such complaints that I have been to see the inventory in my official capacity. I have also 
seen the content o f some sample complaints in which the issue o f  denial o f  Justice is very evident and 
confirmed. Many such complaints continued after the signing o f the Peace Treaty.
576 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit.
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The burden of the Jordanian argument would be that:
(a) In various respects Article 8 of the Peace Treaty imposed on Jordan and Israel 
obligations to negotiate a settlement of the human problems involving refugees and 
displaced persons;
(b) These obligations were to be met through the Quadripartite Committee, the 
Multilateral Working Group, in conjunction with the ‘permanent status’ negotiations, and 
through UN and other international programmes;
(c) In practice Israel has either prevented those procedures front starting or has ensured 
that, once discussions in those fora have begun, they have failed to make progress; and
(d) Israel is therefore in breach of its obligations (1) to apply Article 8 as it must be 
. reasonably interpreted and (2) to negotiate in good faith as required by. Article 25.2 and
by customary international law.
d. Direct losses Suffered by Jordan and remedies that Jordan might seek.
Jordan is entitled to claim for losses of State-owned property which may have resulted 
from the movements of refugees across its borders at various periods since 1947-1949. 
There does not appear to be any case on record in which a State of asylum or refuge has
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sought damages from the country of origin by reason of the losses suffered in receiving 
and according protection to refugees. However, States have paid compensation to and on 
behalf of refugees from their territory and of victims of persecution and other human
enn
rights violations. The relatively few examples in practice suggest that political 
considerations may have weighed against the making of such claims, but the general 
principles of liability are nevertheless well-established in other areas where the State is 
responsible for events within its own territory or jurisdiction which result in injury and 
loss to and in another State.
In relation to the expulsion of Palestinians and Jordanians, it is necessary to account 
separately for the loss and damage suffered by the individuals concerned as a result of 
their unlawful expulsion and for the loss and damage suffered by Jordan in taking in, 
caring for and absorbing the refugees.
In so far as Jordan can substantiate claims against Israel, the question then arises of the 
. reparation (including compensation) .which Jordan can. seek.
577 According to Principle 4 o f the International Law Association’s Cairo Declaration o f  Principles o f  
International Law on Compensation to Refugees, ‘a State is obligated to compensate its own nationals 
forced to leave their homes to the same extent as it is obligated to compensate an alien’: 87 AJIL(1986), 
p.532 Although no international mechanisms presently exist through which refugees may obtain 
compensation, there are a number of relevant precedents including, for example, the compensation 
arrangements established by the Federal Republic o f Germany for those persecuted under the Nazi regime. 
Article 3 o f  the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs o f  War on Land provides that a 
‘belligerent party which violates.., the (Regulations) shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation’: Hague Regulations annexed to Convention No. IV respecting the Laws and Customs o f  
War on Land. 1907: in Roberts and Guelff, Laws o f War, op.cit, It has also been argued that violations of 
human rights entail the obligation to provide for compensation as a means to ‘repair a wrongful act or a 
wrongful situation’: see van Boven, T., Study concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and 
Rehabilitation fo r  Victims o f  Gross Violations o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'. UN doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/10: see also article 14, 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture.
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There is no doubt that in international law the breach of an international obligation 
carries with it the obligation to make adequate reparation, while the precise identification 
of the applicable law has some important consequences. That law is international law, but 
the claims of Jordan arise not merely in a purely ‘civil’ context, such as the expropriation 
of property without compensation, but in a context which is delictual, involving, in 
particular, the use of force in breach of the United Nations Charter and general 
international law. The measure of damages will therefore need to reflect this basis of 
liability and the imputability to Israel of the consequences of its unlawful actions.
Among others, the test of remoteness of damage will require to be applied favourably to 
the claimant, Jordan, where there has been a deliberate intention to injure. This applies in 
relation to direct injury to the claimant State, injury to the nationals or other persons 
within the protection of the claimant State, and violations generally of the law of human 
rights and international humanitarian law. As the events described in Chapter 1 have 
shown, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation. of their property, among 
others, where the result of policies and intentional acts adopted at the highest level.
The injured or dispossessed as a result of the events the 1967 war, particularly as they 
affected the West Bank, were not injured as aliens, but as lawful citizens and inhabitants 
of a territory taken under military occupation. In this case, Jordan exercises protection on 
behalf of its citizens who suffered loss, as citizens, in the territory under the sovereign 
authority of Jordan and in consequence of its military occupation by Israel.
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Jordan also can claim by reason of direct injury to itself as a sovereign. In relation to 
Israeli acts affecting the West Bank and its population, the Government of Jordan has 
been directly affected and its rights violated. Thus, it had to receive the very many 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians expelled by Israel during the 1947-1949 events, 
and has been obliged further to meet the costs of maintaining substantial numbers of 
refugees, as a direct consequence of Israel’s refusal to re-admit the displaced population.
Jordan is thus entitled to compensation and other appropriate remedies in regard to, inter 
alia, hosting and maintaining Palestinian refugees who fled during the 1947-1949 period, 
the invasion and occupation, by Israel, of the West Bank, the establishment of settlements 
on the West Bank, the costs incurred by Jordan in receiving substantial number of 
persons displaced from the West Bank by the 1967 war and thereafter, the injuries 
suffered by Palestinian and Jordanian citizens resident in the West Bank as a result of the 
occupation, by Israel, and its unlawful administration of the West Bank, the willful 
destruction by Israel of Jordanian and Palestinian property and breaches of international 
humanitarian Jaw.
e. Remedies that Jordan  may seek.
The remedies that Jordan might seek may include some or all o f the following, whether 
separately or in combination:
(a) finding/acknowledgement that Israel has acted in breach of specific 
international obligations owed to Jordan;
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(b) declaration that Israel must immediately cease such unlawful conduct;
(c) compensation for Jordan;
(d) compensation for Jordanian nationals;
(e) return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of origin;
(g) return of property taken from refugees and displaced persons.
There are various refinements for several of these possible remedies, particularly as 
regards the question whether the persons to be protected by the remedy sought are only 
Jordanian nationals, or cover also other Palestinians resident or domiciled in Jordan, or 
even Palestinians not so resident or domiciled. There are clearly important issues of both 
law and policy in this area, particularly as regards the interplay of the interests of Jordan 
and the Palestinian Authority.
So far as concerns compensation for losses suffered by individuals, an important question 
is whether Jordan should seek to have those claims dealt with at the international level on 
an individual basis, or whether on a  lump sum basis. This question has a direct bearing on 
the resources which Jordan will have to devote to the processing of claims.
Particular matters which will have to be addressed in this context are considered in 
greater detail in a later part of this thesis, but for present purposes it may be helpful to 
indicate some general considerations which bear on the outcome.
If Jordan seeks and obtains a lump sum payment of compensation, the nature of both the
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negotiation with Israel and the payment of compensation to individuals would be directly 
affected. So far as concerns negotiations with Israel, the matter would in practice be 
likely to be decided on a fairly general and rounded basis, rather than as a detailed 
calculation of specific claims. While Jordan would have to have a good basis for 
whatever lump sum claim it puts forward, the actual agreement on whatever lump sum is 
to be paid would be likely to be reached on a political/ diplomatic basis-$x million, or $y 
million. This will make the negotiation with Israel easier (in the sense of being less 
complicated), and should enable a final solution (at the international level) to be reached 
more quickly. But Jordan would assume responsibility for the adequacy of the lump sum 
received from Israel, against a background of perhaps high expectations on the part of 
affected individuals. The principal practical consequence of the Tump sum’ approach 
would be that the burden of arranging the distribution of the compensation to individuals 
would fall on the Jordanian authorities. Individuals would have to present claims to those 
authorities, which would have to decide how to distribute the lump sum to the claimants. 
Handling claims could prove a very lengthy and complex process.
On the other hand, if Jordan were to seek to have claims dealt with on an individual basis 
at the international level, the situation would be very different. The negotiation with 
Israel would be directed principally at deciding upon (i) the categories of claims to be 
covered, and (ii) the procedures for dealing with them (almost certainly some kind of 
claims commission). The sums to be awarded as compensation to individuals would not 
be decided in the agreement with Israel, but by the claims commission. The presentation 
of the individual claims could either be done by the persons concerned submitting their
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claims directly to the claims commission, or by the claims being submitted by them to the 
Jordanian authorities for onward transmission to the commission. Clearly a procedure 
whereby claims would be determined and assessed by a claims commission would relieve 
the Jordanian authorities of much of the work which would otherwise be involved in the 
processing of claims, but at the same time Jordan would have less control of (and of 
course less responsibility for) the outcome of individual claims, not only in respect of the 
amounts which might be awarded but also in respect of the time taken by the whole 
process.
A ‘mixed* procedure could also be envisaged for a given category of claims, whereby the 
Jordan-Israel agreement would provide for a lump sum payment of compensation, but 
leave that lump sum to be distributed by an international, or mixed Jordan-Israel, claims 
commission. In those circumstances the lump sum would in effect be a ‘cap* on the total 
amount of compensation, leaving individual claimants with the probability of getting less 
than 100% of the sums to which they might be entitled.
In deciding between these broad alternatives, two general considerations need to be 
borne in mind. First, the great majority of the individual claimants are likely to be 
relatively unsophisticated people, for whom complex and expensive claims procedures 
would be inappropriate. Second, different categories of claims could be dealt with in 
different ways. For example, personal injuries claims could be dealt with by a lump sum 
payment to Jordan for distribution to affected claimants, while property claims could be 
referred to a claims commission.
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This chapter has surveyed, examined and assessed the major heads of claims that Jordan 
may realistically present to and against Israel and that are claims emanating from 
breaches by Israel of international legal obligations that it has towards Jordan. 
Furthermore it has briefly and concisely sketched out for illustrative purposes remedies 
that Jordan could seek.
Indeed such heads of claims and their procedural pursuit require the existence 
mechanisms and forums in which such claims are to be made. Without such existing or 
perceived mechanisms and forums, such claims along with the legal bases remain in the 
realm of theoretical rights and theoretical claims.
The next and final chapter, again in the context of the attempt of this thesis to serve as a 
‘roadmap’ or ‘blueprint’ for presentation of claims by Jordan, will examine the available 
mechanisms both in the context of the express provision of the Jordan-Israel Peace treaty 
and other mechanism not provided for in the Treaty of Peace.
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Chapter (4)
Mechanisms and Procedures available to Jordan for Pursuit of Claims
To and Against Israel
The Palestinian refugee problem and its solution had been viewed as a central objective 
for Jordan in the context of the Jordan-Israel Peace negotiations leading to the signing of
578the Jordan Israel Treaty of Peace. The Jordanian Government, in its campaign to 
mobilize support for the Peace Treaty, stated that the Peace Treaty accomplishes, among 
other things for Jordan, “ensuring the rights of refugees and displaced persons in 
determining their fate and giving them the right to return and compensation.”579
This chapter aims at examining the provisions of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty that 
provide for procedures and mechanisms for the pursuit of claims relating to Jordanian 
nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin and their right of return and compensation 
and Jordan right to present claims on their behalf to and against Israel and its right, as a 
host state to claim compensation from Israel. The Chapter will examine and analyze each 
of the provisions that could provide a mechanism and forum for presenting and bringing 
claims in the Peace Treaty. It will also examine and analyze mechanisms that, while are 
not contained in the Peace Treaty, were rendered possible and available as a result of its 
conclusion such as reference to the ICJ and mediation and conciliation.
578 Interview with Mulki, op.cit.
579 See, Jordan Media Group Publication Number 18, November 1994, titled ‘The Jordan-Israel Peace 
Treaty: What is It ”? this document was used by the Jordanian government as the main instrument for 
mobilizing support in Jordan for the Peace Treaty. Some Jordanian officials who were part o f  the Peace 
negotiations believe this statement to be fully true and accurate. Dr. Hani Mulki the Head o f the 
Negotiations Team with Israel at some point in the negotiations believes this statement to be accurate and 
stated it in an interview by the author with him on 6 February 2006 in Amman, Jordan.
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Certainly the approach and structure of this thesis and its endeavor to serve as a possible 
‘blueprint’ or ‘roadmap’ to Jordan for presenting and bringing claims to and against 
Israel would not be complete and maintain its utility and integrity without highlighting, 
scrutinizing and analyzing the mechanisms, procedures and avenues that are available to 
Jordan to present and bring claims to and against Israel.
The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, as explained previously in other chapters of this thesis, 
gave Jordan an additional standing and opposability in relation to claims that it may bring 
to or against Israel through the fact that Article 8 recognized such a standing for Jordan. 
Article 8580 in specific, it should be noted, did not only clearly indicate and stipulate that 
Jordan has a locus standi in relation to the refugees, it also provided for explicit and 
specific mechanisms and procedures in which issues pertaining to refugees are to be 
addressed and discussed. Such mechanisms and procedures are of a bilateral and 
. multilateral. character, namely bilateraL negotiations, a -quadripartite Jordan-Israel-. 
Egypt-Palestinian committee, the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees. Also Article
to | m
24 of The Peace Treaty contains reference to another procedure and mechanism, 
namely a claims commission. However, nothing in Articles 8 and 24 excludes other
582processes that are not treaty-based also from being used for the pursuit of claims.
Before examining the Peace Treaty-based mechanisms for the pursuit of possible claims
580 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 8.
581 Ibid.,
582 See, Opinion rendered by H.E Mr. Awn Al-Khasawneh, Advisor o f State for International Legal 
Affairs, contained in The Foreign Ministry of Jordan Classified Archive documents, Document number 
FMSC/281139, dated 25 December 1996.
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to and against Israel, it must be stressed that the signing of the Peace Treaty in itself and 
the termination of the state of war between the Jordan and Israel and the advent of the era 
of Peace would allow Jordan to also use other non Treaty based mechanisms. This option 
was impossible during the war era, owing to the fact that two states at war would never 
even appear before a dispute settlement mechanism in relation to issues such as the one 
discussed in this thesis.
Article 8 of the Peace Treaty does not exhaustively list the procedures which the parties 
might regard as appropriate for the settlement of their disputes concerning refugees and 
displaced persons. Certain other procedures through which claims might be pursued must 
therefore also be considered. These include: reference to the International Court of 
Justice, arbitration, mediation and conciliation, and participation in Israel-Palestinian 
claims arrangements agreed as part of the peace process. Different procedures may be
ro i
appropriate for different categories of claims.
Jordan’s procedural preferences are, of course, not decisive, since the final decision as to 
which procedure(s) to adopt will be a matter for agreement between Jordan and Israel. 
Nevertheless Jordan needs to be aware of what the various alternatives involve, both in 
deciding upon its own preferences and in resisting undesirable preferences expressed by 
Israel.
The first step for Jordan, upon presentation of claims to Israel, will be to invite Israel to 
enter into negotiations upon the matter. Unless this emerges as part of wider Middle East 
583 Ibid.,
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negotiations, this will require a formal Diplomatic Note. It will be necessary to allow 
Israel a reasonable time in which to study the Jordanian communication. But it will be 
important not to allow Israel to cause delay. It is as well to note that the negotiating 
process is not solely a matter of policy and diplomacy. It has a significant legal 
dimension of some significance.584
This includes, the fact that for the most part negotiation is voluntary; but in some 
circumstances States are under a legal obligation to negotiate with other States (e.g. when 
there is a treaty provision to that effect). Where parties are under an obligation to reach
• • c o can agreement, that implies that they are under an obligation to enter into negotiations.
Additionally, there may be a need to determine, from a legal point of view, what 
“negotiations” means (e.g. it may be a condition precedent to recourse to the pacific
r o r
settlement procedures set out in a treaty) . It is, however, a difficult concept to confine 
.within the terms.of a strict definition, because its most important.characteristic is its. 
flexibility, leaving to the parties much scope for adapting the process to suit their 
particular needs and circumstances.
Also, a State may not, by prolonging negotiations deprive an otherwise competent court 
of jurisdiction over a dispute. The active current pursuit of negotiations does not 
necessarily by itself prevent there being in existence a dispute capable of being referred
584 Many or the relevant considerations are set out more fully in an article entitled “Negotiation and 
International Law” by Sir Arthur Watts in Dimensao international Do Direilo (2000), pp. 519-536.
585 See, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. ICJ Reports 1969, pp. 3 ,47  (para. 85).
586 See, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), ICJ Reports 1988, pp. 69, 
94(para. 62)
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......................................................................................  * 587to a court, or prevent the court exercising jurisdiction over it.
However, an obligation to negotiate does not normally involve an obligation to reach an 
agreement. In this context it must be pointed to that if an obligation to negotiate exists, it 
cannot be ignored. A State refusing to negotiate in good faith would then be in breach of 
its international obligations.
The negotiating process must be characterized by good faith. This involves at least that 
each party must acknowledge the rights of the other party, the negotiations must be 
meaningful, and they must involve a genuine attempt to reach a positive result.
Also, reference has been made by an arbitral tribunal to “the general principles that ought 
to be observed in carrying out an obligation to negotiate - that is to say, good faith as 
properly to be understood; sustained upkeep of the negotiations over a period appropriate 
. to the . circumstances; awareness of the interests of the other party; and a persevering
588 *quest for an acceptable compromise.” The ICJ has similarly noted that where States are 
under an obligation to enter into negotiations in order to reach an agreement on maritime 
delimitation, the negotiations are to be “with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not 
merely to go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the 
automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement”. 
The Court added that “they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the 
negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon
587 See, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Reports 1978, pp. 3, 12-13; Military and Paramilitary 
Activities Case, ICJ Reports 1984, pp. 392,440.
588 See, Government o f Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil), ILR. Vol 66, pp. 519, 578.
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589its own position without contemplating any modification of it” .
Negotiations with Israel on the claims will either make some progress, or will get 
nowhere: they may indeed never get started, since Israel may simply refuse to negotiate. 
Failed negotiations, or a refusal to engage in negotiations, may have political 
implications. It will also have legal implications since it will serve to crystallize the 
existence of a legal “dispute”, which can be important in relation to the operation of other 
dispute settlement procedures. If negotiations do make progress, it may be in only limited 
areas, leaving other areas as ‘no progress’ areas. To the extent that no progress is made in 
negotiations, Jordan will then have to turn to other ways of reaching a settlement. Several 
options are available.
a. Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty Based Mechanisms and Procedures.
The first, set of options available to Jordan that will be considered are those provided for. 
in the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of 1994. There are two directly relevant provisions- 
Articles 8 and 24590- and one that is indirectly relevant, Article 29.591
At the outset it must be said that these provisions are, as will be explained in detail later 
in this chapter, neither as clear nor as helpful as they might appear. All three Articles, and 
particularly Articles 8 and 24, show signs of having been prepared in order to give the 
appearance of resolving issues of substance. However, in reality they do little more than
589 See, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. ICJ Reports 1969, pp. 3,47.
590 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Articles 8 and 24.
591 Ibid., Article 29.
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avoid prejudicing either Parties’ positions on matters of substance, which are left open for 
future negotiation and resolution. Nevertheless, Articles agreed between Jordan and Israel 
which far from offering a real procedural or substantive settlement of the matters dealt 
with in them, they represent at least an agreed framework. It is probably in Jordan’s 
interest to try to make as much use of them as possible. They therefore need careful 
scrutiny. It is necessary to look closely and carefully at the texts of these Articles since it 
may be assumed that Israel will seek to invoke any point which can be used to its 
advantage: to be forewarned of what those points might contain is to be forearmed in 
dealing with them.
Before considering each Article in turn, however, it is necessary to recall that they are 
part of a treaty. Their interpretation is therefore to be determined in accordance with 
those rules of international law which apply to the interpretation of treaties, and in
592particular Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
.Although, neither. Jordan nor Israel is to date a  party to the Vienna Convention, the 
International Court has held at least Articles 31 and 32 to reflect customary international
fQ^
law. They therefore embody the applicable rules even as between States which are not 
bound by the Vienna Convention itself.
Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention are as follows:
“Article 31: General rule o f  interpretation
592 See, The Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, op.cit
593 See, e.g. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) ICJ Reports 1994, pp. 6, 21-22; Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) ICJ 
Reports 1995, pp. 6, 18; Oil Platforms Iran v. USA (Preliminary Objections) ICJ Reports 1996, pp. 803, 
812; Case Concerning Kasivili/Sedudu Island ICJ Reports 1999, at para 18.
220
1 .A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meanings to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2.The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes:
(a)any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between 
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3.There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that 
the parties so intended.’’594
“Article 32: Supplementary means o f interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure;
(b)leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”595
594 See, the Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, op.cit, Article 31.
595 Ibid., Article 32.
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“Article 33: Interpretation o f treaties authenticated in two or more 
languages
1 .When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, 
the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty 
provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a 
particular text shall prevail.
2.A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in 
which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic 
text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.
3.The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning 
in each authentic text.
4.Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with 
paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a 
difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 
does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, 
having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be 
adopted.”
In the context of these Articles, a number of observations may be made. First; as regards 
Article 31.2, there has been no “agreement” or “instrument” between Jordan and israel of. 
the kind referred to in that provision; second, as regards Article 31.3, there has been no 
“subsequent agreement” or “subsequent practice” between Jordan and Israel of the kind 
referred to in that provision too;598third; as regards Article 31.4, it seems that Jordan and 
Israel have not agreed to any special meaning to be given to a term of the Peace Treaty 
(except perhaps, as noted later in relation to “refugees” and “displaced persons”). 599 As 
for Article 33.1, the relevant provision of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty stipulates that it
596 Ibid., Article 33.
597 Interview with Mulki. op.cit.
598 Ibid.,
599 Ibid.,
222
was concluded in Arabic, Hebrew and English, all texts being equally authentic; in case 
of divergence of interpretation, the English text prevails.600
An additional general point to be made at the outset is that both parties to the Peace 
Treaty are under a clear legal obligation to apply it in good faith. This is both a matter of 
general international treaty law, and a matter of specific provision in the Peace Treaty. 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention601 reads:
‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.’
Article 25.2 of the Peace Treaty602 begins with the statement that:
“the Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations 
under this Treaty...”
(i) Article 8 of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty.
This Article is the one dedicated in the Peace Treaty to the issue of refugees and as 
indicated in preceding parts of this thesis. This article is the one that gives Jordan a locus 
standi in relation to Israel and in connection with addressing refugees’ rights.
This long Article also outlines mechanisms and procedures through which the issues 
pertaining to refugees are to be addressed in the context of the Middle East Peace 
negotiations.
600 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 30.
601 See, Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, op.cit. Article 26.
602 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty.op.cit,
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It is therefore important to analyze this Article in Detail. The Article reads as follows:
“Recognizing the massive human problems caused to both Parties 
by the conflict in the Middle East, as well as the contribution made 
by them towards the alleviation of human suffering, the parties will 
seek to further alleviate those problems arising on a bilateral basis.
1. Recognizing that the above human problems caused by the 
conflict in the Middle East cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral 
level, the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate forums, 
in accordance with international law, including the following:
a.In the case of displaced persons, in a quadripartite committee 
together with Egypt and the Palestinians;
b.In the case of refugees,
(i)In the framework of the Multilateral Working Group;
(ii)In negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or 
otherwise in conjunction with and at the same time as the 
permanent status negotiations pertaining to the Territories referred 
to in Article 3 of this Treaty;
c.Through the implementation of agreed United Nations programs 
and other agreed international economic- programs concerning 
refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their 
settlement.”603
This Article is not free from problems of interpretation and application. It provides a 
series of procedures to be adopted in varying circumstances, and since those procedures 
are prescribed in a binding treaty there is probably value in invoking them if possible and 
if, on examination, the procedures are likely to meet Jordan’s requirements.
The background to Article 8 is relevant to its interpretation. What is now Article 8
603 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 8.
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evolved from section IV of the Jordan-Israel Common Agenda604 signed by them on 14 
September 1993. That Common Agenda did not stand alone. In the first place, its ‘Goal’ 
records at the outset that it flows from “the Madrid invitation” - a reference to the Madrid 
Conference on the Middle East Of 1991.605
In the second place, and again as indicated in the ‘Goal’, the Jordan-Israel Common 
Agenda formed part of the overall Middle East peace process, of which there was also a 
Palestinian-Israeli element, in particular the Palestinian-Israel Declaration of Principles 
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, of August 1993. These two aspects of the 
peace process came to be referred to as the Jordan-Israel track and the Palestinian-Israel 
track.606
In accepting the Jordan-Israel Common Agenda, the Head of the Jordanian Delegation 
noted recent developments on the Palestinian-Israel track and emphasized, in a formal 
statement, that “The announcement of-an agreed agenda on the Jordan-Israel track 
however does not prejudice the concept of comprehensiveness. It has been agreed among 
the Arab parties to the negotiations that the variation in the pace on different tracks does
f r y i
not nullify the principle of comprehensiveness.” He added that in the light of these 
developments “Jordan views that certain negotiation modalities and formats need to be
604 See, Jordan-Israel Common Agenda, (14 September 1993, Washington DC), in Jordan Media Group, 
publication number 18, November 1994, [hereinafter Common Agenda].
*05 Ibid,
606 See, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed between the 
Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Israel on 13 September 1993, 32 ILM (1993), p. 1525. 
[hereinafter Palestinian-Israeli DOP]
607 See, Statement by Dr. Abdulsalam Majali, Head o f the Joint Jordanian- Paletinian delegation to the 
Peace Process ( 1 5  September 1993), in MAJMUAT ALWATHAIK, op.cit (1994), p. 798. [hereinafter 
Majali Statement].
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608acknowledged and acted upon in future rounds.” He further noted that while the 
Palestinians would pursue their negotiations on a separate and independent track, “there 
will be a need to classify the issue among Jordanians, Palestinians and Israelis as those 
which require either a bilateral or a trilateral negotiation without prejudicing the integrity 
and independence of any of the three negotiating delegations.”609It was apparent that 
Jordan was, from the outset, aware of and made known the importance of not letting the 
Palestinians and Israel settle on a bilateral basis matters which were properly of trilateral 
concern.
The Jordan-Israel Common Agenda identified “Components of Jordan-Israel Peace 
Negotiations”.610 These were set out in eight numbered sections. The legal status of the 
Common Agenda is not clear. Although signed by both Jordan and Israel it does not 
constitute an international agreement, but is rather in the nature of a ‘heads of 
agreement’, i.e. a document setting out in broad terms the ground to be covered in a 
future agreement .which they will in due course negotiate, and sometimes also containing 
an indication of the substantive way in which that ground is to be covered.
The Common Agenda set out the elements of an eventual peace agreement, and included 
three Common Sub-Agendas.611 These covered Borders and Territorial Matters, Security, 
and Water, Energy, and the Environment: there was no separate Common Sub-Agenda on 
refugees and displaced persons. Section IV of the Common Agenda reads:
608 Ibid.,
609 Ibid.,
610 See, Common Agenda, op.cit, p. 1.
6,1 Ibid.,
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“Refugees and Displaced Persons
Achieving an agreed just solution to the bilateral aspects of the 
problem of refugees and displaced persons in accordance with 
international law.”612
Section IV thus established that the solution was to be “just” and “agreed”, that it 
was to cover “the bilateral aspects of the problem”, and that it was to be “in 
accordance with international law”.
The final provision in the Common Agenda stated that “It is anticipated that the above 
endeavor will ultimately, following the attainment of mutually satisfactory solutions to 
the elements of this agenda, culminate in a Peace Treaty”. The fact the a Peace Treaty 
was actually reached a year later between Jordan and Israel may suggest that the outcome 
on refugees and displaced persons was a “mutually satisfactory solution” to that element 
of the Agenda.
The Jordan-Israel Common Agenda needs to be seen in the light of the following parts of
* Allthe Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles of August 1993.
(a) In the Middle East Peace Conference (Madrid, 1991) there was a combined Jordanian- 
Palestinian delegation. The preamble to the Declaration of Principles refers to the 
Palestinian team in that delegation as “representing the Palestinian people”.614
612 Ibid., Section IV, p. 2.
613 See, Palestinian-Israeli DOP, op.cit.
614 Ibid., Preamble.
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(b)The Declaration provides for a transitional/interim period and a permanent settlement, 
and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of 
Security Resolutions 242 and 338.615;
(c)The permanent status negotiations “between the Government of Israel and the 
Palestinian people representatives” will cover, inter alia (“including”), “...refugees, 
settlements,... and other issues of common interest.”616
(d)Israel and the Palestinians are to invite Jordan and Egypt to join in establishing further 
liaison and cooperation arrangements between, on the one hand, Israel and the 
Palestinians and, on the other, Jordan and Egypt, to promote cooperation between them. 
These arrangements are to include a “Continuing Committee that will decide by 
agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in. 1967, -..Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this-
£ 17Committee.” It is not clear in this context whether "matters of common concern means 
matters of concern to the two parties to the Declaration of Principles (i.e. Israel and the 
Palestinians) or matters of concern to all four parties which will constitute the Continuing 
Committee.
Although Article 8 reflects the outcome on one of the elements included in the Common
6.5 Ibid., Article I.
6.6 Ibid., Article V.3.
6.7 Ibid., Article XII.
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Agenda of 14 September 1993 , it emerged late as a text for inclusion in the Peace
Treaty. This may have been because of the difficulty of the subject.
A draft Israeli text of 25 September 1994, presented just a month before the conclusion of 
the Treaty, contained only a brief text on refugees, as draft Article 24.619 Another revised 
draft presented by Israel the following day (26 September) contains that same brief text, 
but this time placed where it was eventually to be, as draft Article 7 A.620
A revised Jordanian draft of the Peace Treaty dated 28 September 1994 set out a fuller
S') 1
version of an Article 7A. A further Jordanian draft dated 28 September contains a
♦ * 622 similar (but not identical) version of Article 7A.
A further revised draft dated 29 September (Draft 3 of the Treaty) sets out the current 
Israeli draft (in roman type) and Jordanian draft (in italic type).
A further Jordanian revised draft dated 3 October and one that was prepared for Jordanian 
internal consideration, contains at Article 7A a brief note on this part of the negotiations, 
sets out in n.l on p.4 the current negotiating texts as in Draft 3 of the Treaty, and puts 
forward (for internal Jordanian consideration) a new form of words. It is notable that at 
this stage, 3 weeks before the Peace Treaty was concluded, Jordan was being advised that
618 See, Common Agenda, op.cit.
6,9 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty Documentary History, (1996) available at Jordanian Foreign Ministry 
Archives, p. 177.
620 Ibid., p. 179.
621 Ibid., p. 183.
622 Ibid., p. 190.
623 Ibid., p. 204.
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the refugee issue should be kept open while attention turns to other matters (boundaries 
and water).624 The last draft of Article 7 A is that set out in an internal Jordanian paper
625(prepared by Professor James Crawford) on 9 October.
It is apparent from this series of drafts that at least up to a couple of weeks before the 
conclusion of the Peace Treaty the two sides were a long way apart on the question of 
refugees and displaced persons. In general Jordan wanted a degree of precision as to the 
basis for settling these problems, while Israel was content with some very general 
undertaking to settle matters on a bilateral basis. The text finally agreed as Article 8 was 
the result of last-minute political compromise, without careful thought being given to the 
particular language used.626
627A preliminary question about Article 8 is whether it allows for the pursuit of claims at 
all. The procedures are set out in paragraph 1 of the Article which is numbered 1 (but it 
should be noted that there is no paragraph numbered 2, 3, etc.).628 Paragraph 1 identifies 
the issues and goes on to state that “the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate 
forums”. The word “them” refers back to “the above human problems caused by the 
conflict in the Middle East.” .This in turn refers back to the introductory sentence of 
Article 8 which notes “the massive human problems caused to both Parties by the conflict
624 Ibid., p.207.
625 Ibid., p.213. Also, all o f these drafts were presented to me by Dr. Hani Mulki the head of the Jordanian 
negotiating team in the interview with him in Amman, op.cit.
626 Interview with Mulki, op.cit. Dr. Mulki confirms this conclusion.
627 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit. Article 8.
628 Ibid., Mulki contends that Article 8 of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, as finally agreed, was a truncated 
version o f what had earlier been envisaged (at least on the Jordanian side) as a text with several numbered 
paprgraphs.
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in the Middle East”.629
The scope of that clause is wide. By virtue of paragraph 1(a) and (b) these “massive
630human problems” clearly include the problems associated with refugees and displaced 
persons; but it does not follow that they are limited to them. Any other matter which can 
be categorized as a “massive human problem” and which was caused by the Middle East 
conflict comes in principle within the scope of Article 8.
Limiting consideration to the clear case of the problem of refugees and displaced 
persons, the question which arises is what aspects of the problem are within the scope of 
Article 8. Is the Article only concerned with the socioeconomic-humanitarian aspects of 
the problem, or does it also concern the legal, and particularly the compensatory, aspects 
of the problem?
Taken by itself, -the text of Article 8 suggests that it- is primarily concerned with the
631 *former. It refers to the “human” problems which exist, and the “human suffering” 
involved. It also mentions the intention to “alleviate” those problems (which is not a term 
the normal meaning of which, in this kind of context, would refer to claims, as distinct 
from, say, humanitarian assistance). Also, The Article refers to others as equal parties in 
the resolution of the problem (which would not be usual if the Article were intended to 
deal with Jordan-Israel claims). Finally, it refers to UN and other economic programs 
concerning refugees and displaced persons, and assistance with their settlement.
629 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit. Article 8.
630 Ibid.,
631 Sec, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit. Article 8.
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On the other hand, Article 8 stipulates that the problems are to be resolved “in
632 •  *accordance with international law.” The significance of this reference in the present 
context is ambiguous. It is noteworthy that the reference to international law came late 
into the Peace Treaty, even though it was included in the Common Agenda it was not 
included in the Jordanian draft of 9 October, or in earlier drafts dated 29 September and 
28 September, or Israel’s drafts of 25 and 26 September.
The reference to international law could simply mean that the socioeconomic- 
humanitarian aspects of the problem are to be solved in accordance with international 
law. This in turn could mean either that the solution found must be consistent with 
international law, or that the solution must adopt whatever solution is required by 
international law. The former, in so far as it says little more than that the solution must 
not be unlawful, does not really advance matters much. The latter, which Jordan can 
interpret as providing that the solution must comply with Jordan’s right in international 
law to insist on Israel taking back the refugees and displaced persons whom it expelled, is 
of much more substantive significance.
Alternatively, the reference to international law could be taken as adding a legal 
dimension to the scope of Article 8 and of the task to be performed by the “appropriate 
forums” through which a resolution of the problems is to be sought: this legal dimension 
would embrace such matters as claims, compensation and reparation, so that those ‘legal’
632 Ibid.,
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aspects of the “massive human problems” fall within the scope of Article 8 . Indeed, it
is arguable that, given the origins of Article 8 in section IV of the Common Agenda, the 
legal dimension predominates over the socioeconomic-humanitarian dimension. Section 
IV would thus be seen as the primary statement of the parties’ intention, according to 
which a settlement in accordance with international law is one of the three settlement 
standards mentioned (the other two being that the solution must be “just” and 
“agreed”)634. Moreover, section IV is clear and specific that a solution in accordance with 
international law is to be sought not just in relation to the general human problems of the 
region but in relation to “the bilateral aspects of the problem o f refugees and displaced 
person”. To sustain such an argument it would be necessary to establish that the Common 
Agenda was more than just an ordinary piece of travaux preparatoires (whose relevance 
in interpreting Article 8 is limited), but this would be possible on the basis that a 
document in the nature of a ‘heads of agreement’ has a more substantial significance.
Against attributing to Article 8 a predominantly, or even partially, legal dimension, it
/ * i c
might be argued that claims are dealt with elsewhere (in Article 24) , and therefore
within the structure of the Peace Treaty would not have been intended to fall within 
Article 8. It may be replied that Article 8 is specifically about refugees and displaced 
persons and that therefore all aspects of those problems, including therefore the ‘legal’ 
aspects, are appropriate to be dealt with within the framework of that Article, while 
Article 24 is concerned solely with financial claims, without qualification, and so would
633 See, Opinion rendered by H.E Mr. Awn Al-Khasawneh, Advisor o f State for International Legal 
Affairs, contained in The Foreign Ministry of Jordan Classified Archive documents, Document number 
FMSC/281139, dated 25 December 1996. op.cit.
634 Ibid.,
635 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 24.
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include claims having their origins in other circumstances. To the extent that refugee and 
displaced person claims might fall within both Article 8 and Article 24, there is nothing 
wrong or unusual in providing alternative or complementary procedures for the 
settlement of claims (so long as no single claim is settled twice, or more, by recourse to 
each of the available procedures).
The language of Article 8 does not take this issue to a clear conclusion. It would seem 
that the two elements, the legal and the socio-economic humanitarian, ought to be 
mutually supportive, rather than contradictory. The language of Article 8, read with 
section IV of the Common Agenda, provides a firm peg on which to hang a “legal” view 
of the scope of the Article.
Apart from the particular terms of Article 8, there is a practical consideration. There is no 
doubt that Article 8 can indeed be used as the framework for the discussion of the general 
problem of refugees and displaced persons.. It. was specifically intended to be used .for 
that purpose. Once general discussions are started within the framework of the Article, 
there could well in practice be a natural progression from discussion of the general 
problem to a discussion of particular modalities of a settlement of substantive problems, 
including therefore questions of claims and compensation and a momentum may build 
which Jordan can steer so as to lead to discussion of related ‘legal* questions. If that was 
the way in which Jordan wished to play its negotiating hand, the burden would be on 
Israel to call ‘stop’ at some mid-way point in the discussion, and that might be politically 
difficult for Israel to do.
636 Interview with Mulki, op.cit. Mulki confirms this interpretation.
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Even so, such a practical momentum might be able to cover only certain parts of the 
‘legal’ issues, namely those directly related to the general problem of refugees and 
displaced persons and the ‘right to return’, but not, perhaps, claims for lost or damaged 
property. Much would depend on the way discussions developed.637
Assuming that, one way or the other, ‘legal’ matters can be discussed within the 
framework of Article 8, it then becomes necessary to look more closely at the procedures 
which Article 8 provides for those discussions, and to consider whether those procedures 
are likely to help Jordan’s cause.
In its first sentence, the Article states that Jordan and Israel “will seek to further alleviate
/*<! o
those [massive human] problems arising on a bilateral basis” . The words “further 
alleviate” refer to the earlier reference to the contribution already made by Jordan and 
Israel, to wards the alleviation, of human. suffering.. In. other respects .the clause.is.not free 
from ambiguity.
/<>Q #
Ambiguity arises regarding the phrase “arising on a bilateral basis.” Does it refer 
(implicitly) to the problems arising from the Middle East conflict which are to be further 
alleviated on a bilateral basis? Does it commit the parties to seek to further alleviate only 
those problems which arise on a bilateral basis (thus excluding problems of plurilateral,
637 Meaning that the focus in the context o f Article 8 may end up being on the issue of the right o f return, 
capacity to absorb and resettlement prospects.
638 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, Article 8.
639 Ibid.,
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or unilateral, concern) i.e. does the phrase “arising on a bilateral basis” qualify the 
process of further alleviation, or does it qualify the problems which are to be further 
alleviated? Both the natural meaning of the text, and the recognition in paragraph 1 that 
the problems “cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral level.”640 support the former 
meaning for the clause.
A further element of ambiguity is found in the words “those problems”641. On a 
straightforward reading of the text those words refer back to the only other “problems” 
previously referred to, namely the “massive human problems caused...by the conflict in 
the Middle East”642. But it is not beyond argument that the reference should have a more 
limited scope and be taken to be a reference to the problems arising out of the “human 
suffering” mentioned earlier.
Another element of ambiguity is whether the massive human problems “caused to both 
Parties”643 includes only those problems which are common to or shared by both Parties, 
or whether, they, cover problems caused to either .one of them, even if not shared by the 
other.
Despite such ambiguities, the natural meaning of the clause is probably that it calls for 
Jordan and Israel to work together to further alleviate the human problems arising for the 
Parties, separately or together, as a result of the conflict in the Middle East.
This opening provision is thus concerned less with questions of claims than 
with humanitarian questions which Jordan and Israel are to seek to [further] 
alleviate. Indirectly, however, questions of claims and the right to return can 
be legitimately considered as part of the solution to the ‘human’ problems 
which exist. Put bluntly, payment of compensation would undoubtedly help 
to alleviate the human problem and human suffering; as would agreement 
on settlement, re-settlement or return of the refugees and displaced persons.
Jordan need not, therefore, hesitate to use bilateral ‘alleviation’ discussions as a forum in 
which to raise those aspects of Jordan’s potential claims which can be fairly directly 
linked with ‘human [suffering] problems’.
There is a question about the extent of the commitment to embark upon these bilateral 
‘alleviation discussions’. The text states that the parties “will seek to further alleviate 
those problems”* In three respects this is less than a firm legal obligation to alleviate the 
problems referred to.
Firstly, the Parties are to “seek to” alleviate them further: i.e. they must try in good faith, 
but they are not obliged to succeed.644 Secondly, the Parties “will” seek, etc. “Will” is a 
slippery word. It may be intended to convey a legal obligation to do what is referred to 
(although in English usage the sense of obligation is more appropriately conveyed by
644 See, Opinion rendered by H.E Mr. Awn Al-Khasawneh, Advisor o f State for International Legal 
Affairs, contained in The Foreign Ministry of Jordan Classified Archive documents, Document number 
FMSC/281139, dated 25 December 1996. op.cit.
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“shall”, and its use in that sense is the regular treaty practice of many English-speaking 
States). Equally it may be intended to convey simply a statement of future conduct, as 
something which it is expected will in practice occur without there necessarily being any 
legal obligation that it should do so. Finally, the Parties will seek to “further” alleviate the 
problems; i.e. their commitment (such as it is) is to do more than they have already done. 
However, this does not commit them to going the whole way to solving the problems. 
Indeed, they recognize in the introductory words (the ‘chapeau’) to paragraph 1 that a full 
resolution of the human problems referred to cannot be achieved bilaterally.
This chapeau makes clear that Jordan and Israel accept that bilateral ‘alleviation 
discussions’, even if fruitful, are only at best going to contribute partially in resolving the 
human problems being referred to. They recognize that the human problems “cannot be 
fully resolved on the bilateral level”. For that reason paragraph I goes on to refer to the 
Parties seeking to resolve them in appropriate forums.
This raises the question whether resorting to these other forums is conditional upon 
Jordan and Israel having first started their ‘alleviation’ discussions. The language of 
Article 8 gives no clear answer. From one perspective the ‘alleviation’ discussions and 
resort to other ‘appropriate forums’ appear to be separate and self-contained processes, 
involving no particular chronological priority. On the other hand, there is some weight in 
the argument that recourse to the other ‘appropriate forums’ for a full resolution of the 
problems pre-supposes the achievement of at least some partial progress in the bilateral 
‘alleviation’ discussions, since otherwise the scope of what still remains for resolution by
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resort to the ‘appropriate forums’ would be unclear. It may be unnecessary to decide this 
issue, since at least the ‘other forums’ referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) (i.e. the 
quadripartite committee, and the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees) have in fact 
already been activated, and in any case there would seem to be no reason why Jordan 
should not initiate ‘alleviation’ discussions at the same time as it seeks to initiate talks in 
other ‘appropriate forums’. The two processes could be carried forward concurrently.645
The process involving the other ‘appropriate forums’ calls for several preliminary 
comments before detailed consideration is given to the particular forums identified in 
sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 ,M6 which are the following
For the reasons already given, there may be a question as to whether the Parties’ 
commitment that they “will” seek to resolve the problems referred to amounts to a legal 
obligation to do so. Similarly, the Parties’ commitment is only to “seek to” resolve those 
problems.
Also, the Parties’ endeavor goes further than the earlier endeavor to ‘alleviate’ the 
problems, and extends to resolving them: given the Parties’ intention that the problems 
cannot be “fully resolved” on the bilateral level, their endeavor to resolve them through 
the ‘appropriate forums’ could potentially extend to their complete resolution by those 
means;
646 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 8.
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Additionally, the resolution of the human problems in appropriate forums is to be sought 
“in accordance with international law”: the significance of this phrase has already been 
considered
The ‘appropriate forums’ identified in paragraph 1 are not exhaustive. They only 
“include” those subsequently identified.
It is not clear also from the text whether the parties must have recourse to the forums 
illustratively identified in Article 8.1. i.e. is their commitment simply to have recourse to 
‘appropriate forums’, it being entirely up to them to decide which forums are appropriate, 
although they have at least agreed that those mentioned are appropriate if  they wish to 
use them; or is their commitment to have recourse to ‘appropriate forums’, included 
among which are those identified to which they must have recourse, although they are 
free also to use other forums if they think them ‘appropriate’? The fact that Article 8.1(b) 
contains two distinct, forums, for refugee, problems, suggests that a ‘pick-and choose’, 
approach was intended.
Article 8.1(a) and (b), and arguably also (c) of the Peace Treaty draws an express 
distinction between “refugees” and “displaced persons”. This was intentional. “Refugees” 
being used to refer to those affected by the events of 1947-1949 which resulted in large 
numbers of people leaving Israel and crossing the frontier into Jordan, and “displaced 
persons” being used for those affected by the events of 1967 which resulted in large 
numbers of people moving from one part of Jordan (the West Bank) to another part of the 
same State (predominantly the East Bank). Such a specific interpretation of the terms
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would be in accord with Article 31.4 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties647, 
if both parties intended them to have those particular meanings.
The first ‘appropriate forum’ to be identified concerns only displaced persons. The 
relevant forum is a “quadripartite committee together with Egypt and the Palestinians.”649 
The reference in Article 8 to this Committee builds upon the provisions of section A .1 .e 
of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East (the Camp David Accords)650 of 17 
September 1978, and Article 12 of the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles of 
August 1993651. The former provided that “representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 
the self-governing authority” [i.e. the Palestinians] would constitute a continuing 
committee to deal with certain displaced persons’ problems. Although the subsequent 
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979 contained no elaboration of this commitment, the 
preamble did reaffirm the parties’ adherence to the Framework, and a side-letter 
envisaged Jordan being invited to join negotiations on certain matters and allowed for the 
Egyptian and Jordanian . delegations . to include. Palestinians. The . Declaration. of
647 See, the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, op.cit, Article 31.
648 See, Interview with Mulki, op cit. Mulki confirms that this is indeed the accepted usage of these terms, 
although there are occasional exceptions, as for example in the context of Camp David I. where the words 
“displaced persons” were intended also to refer to the 1948 refugees
649 This Committee finds its basis in Article XII o f  the Declaration o f Principles on Interim Self -  
Government Arrangements signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State o f Israel on 
13 September 1993, 32 ILM (1993), p. 1525. Article XII reads as follows: “ Liaison and Cooperation with 
Jordan and Egypt: The two Parties will invite the Government o f Jordan and Egypt to participate in 
establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the 
Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments o f Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, 
to promote, Cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution o f a Continuing 
Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities o f admission o f persons displaced from the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. 
Other matters o f concern will be dealt with by this Committee.”
650 See, Camp David Framework for Peace, signed by Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minster 
Begin and witnessed by US President Carter on 17 September 1978 [hereinafter the Camp David Accords], 
in Laquer, W. and Rubin, B. (eds.) The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History o f the Middle East 
Conflict, (1995), p. 404
651 See, Palestinian-Israeli DOP, op.cit, Article 12.
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Principles, as explained previously, referred to the two parties inviting Jordan and Egypt 
to participate in establishing cooperative arrangements, including the constitution of a 
continuing committee to deal with certain matters affecting displaced persons.
It is usual that before parties to a treaty involve other entities in procedures established 
by the treaty they seek the agreement of those other entities to participate in the manner 
envisaged. However, in the present situation, it appears to have been considered that the 
establishment of a quadripartite committee in both of those instruments was a sufficient 
manifestation of the consent of both Egypt and the Palestinians to participate in a similar 
committee established under the Peace Treaty, especially since it too was limited to the 
concerns of displaced persons. Therefore no specific request was made to either Egypt or 
the Palestinians to participate in the parallel committee established under the Peace 
Treaty.
The Committee, convened at ministerial level, on 7 March 1995652, and agreed that it 
would meet periodically at ministerial and technical levels. The Committee took as its 
terms of reference the Declaration of Principles, and the parallel clauses on displaced 
persons in the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty and the Camp David Accords. Although in 
theory there might be seen to be three separate Continuing (quadripartite) Committees, 
the Committee has met as a single Committee for displaced persons, combining its 
functions under the three separate instruments.
652 See, Takkenberg. Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 37; see, also official Archives o f the Jordanian 
Foreign Ministry. Document. A22/222NG. 30 December 2000. the Committee met at the Ministerial level 
three times in 1995 and one final time in January 2000 in Moscow. It has not met since then.
653 See, the Palestinian-Israeli DOP, the Jordan Israel Peace Treaty and the Camp David Accords, op. cit
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The first meeting of the Committee at the technical level was held on 7 June 1995.654 The 
four parties agreed on the agenda of the Committee as being: the definition of displaced 
persons, figures of displaced persons, agreed modalities and mechanisms of admission, 
necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder, and other matters of common 
concern and relevant confidence-building measures.655
The Committee has met several times since 1995, most recently, in April 2000.656 It has, 
however, achieved little if any substance, devoting most of its time (without success) to 
the first item of its agenda, the definition of displaced persons. Thus the fulfillment of the 
purpose for which the quadripartite Committee was set up by Article 8 of the Peace 
Treaty has been largely frustrated. It appears that this may be primarily the responsibility
t e nof Israel, which has continuously hindered the Committee’s work.
Jordan is not obligated nor would it be well advised to allow the prolonged recess of the
/•ro
Quadripartite Committee which has not even convened since February 2000. It is open 
to Jordan unilaterally to propose to the other three partners in the quadripartite committee 
that it must resume its work and get down to practical work in accordance with Jordan’s 
and Israel’s obligations in the Peace Treaty. Such a proposal ought to include some basic 
ideas about how this should be done, and could be coupled with a statement that if  the
654 See, official Archives of the Jordanian Foreign Ministry. Document. A22/222NG. 30 December 2000. 
op.cit, p. 67. The Committee has met at the technical level seven times in Amman, Beir Sheva, Cairo, 
Gaza, Amman, Haifa and Finally in Cairo in 2000. It has not convened since then.
655 Ibid., The second meeting of the Committee held in Beir Sheva in 1995.
656 7th Meeting o f The Committee, Cairo, February, 2000.
657 Interview with Mulki. op cit.
658 The last time the Committee met was in February, 2000.
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Committee cannot work in the way intended by the Peace Treaty, as interpreted and 
applied in good faith, then Jordan might consider resorting to dispute settlement 
procedures contained in the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. In taking such a step Jordan must 
do so in a way which protects Jordan from two separate risks. The first is to avoid Jordan 
being open to the charge that it is acting in violation of its treaty obligation (Jordan can 
do this by presenting its action as a response to Israeli breach of Israel’s obligation to 
implement Article 8 in good faith). The second is that Jordan’s political position must be 
defensible.
Multilateral initiatives could well not be successful. Even so, utilizing them would have a 
political dimension which could usefully serve (e.g. as regards the USA) to demonstrate 
Jordan’s readiness (and Israel’s unwillingness) to comply with commitments undertaken 
in the Treaty of Peace. It would also serve to establish a positive position for Jordan, and 
put Israel politically and legally on the defensive.
It would, of course, be necessary for Jordan, before moving in this direction to have a 
clear idea of the purpose(s) to be achieved by seeking to rejuvenate, reorganize and 
redirect this quadripartite committee. In the light of those Jordanian aims, there would 
also be a political judgment to be made as to whether a revived, reorganized and 
redirected Jordan-Israel-Egypt-Palestinian quadripartite committee would be likely, at the 
present time, to serve Jordan’s interests.
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The second ‘appropriate forum’ identified in Article 8.1 concerns only refugees.659 It 
involves action “in the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees.”660 
This relates to a body established by the Madrid Conference on the Middle East, 1991. 
Given the circumstances in which the Multilateral Working Group was established it can 
probably be assumed that its members were ready in principle to help in the search for a 
solution to the refugee problem. However, the Madrid Conference was held some three 
years before the conclusion of the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, and it would have 
been prudent, and normal practice, for the treaty parties to have sought confirmation from 
the Multilateral Working Group and/or its individual members that it was still willing to 
participate in the way envisaged in the Peace Treaty. At the very least the Multilateral 
Working Group should have been notified of its involvement in Article 8.1(b) of the 
Peace Treaty. Such notification did not occur.661
Assuming that the Multilateral Working Group was willing in 1994 to participate as 
envisaged in Article 8.1(b), there must .be. a question to what extent the members of the 
Group are, many years later, still willing to do so. Indeed, there is a question as to
f\(\)whether that Group can still be regarded as in effective existence. The Multilateral
659 As opposed to the other Category of Palestinian Refugees referred to in the Peace Process literature as 
Displaced Persons who are original inhabitants o f the West Bank and who fled as a result o f the 1967 war 
and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank.
660 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 8. The Multilateral Working Group is the product o f the 
design o f the Madrid Peace Process, the US-Soviet letter of invitation to the Peace Conference in Madrid 
which was sent to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinians (within the Jordanian Delegation) 
contained the following paragraph: “ ...Those Parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will 
convene two weeks after opening the conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe 
that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues such as arms control and regional security, 
water, refugees issues, environment, economic development and other subjects o f mutual interest”, cited in 
Tekkenberg. Palestinian Refugees, op.cit, p. 34.
661 Interview with Mulki, op.cit.
662 The Multilateral Working Group on Refugees which was shepherded by Canada has not met since early 
2000.
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Working Group has met periodically, but that, taken overall, its contribution to the 
resolution of Jordan’s refugee problems has been minimal. If not yet formally defunct,663 
the Group seems at least to be a broken reed in the task of constructing a refugee 
settlement.
The question is then whether Jordan should let the Group wither away, or try to revive 
and strengthen its role in resolving refugee problems. If the Group continues to exist and 
meet, there would seem no reason in principle why Jordan should not use it as a forum in 
which to pursue its claims, e .g, by tabling a paper setting out its claims in relation to 
refugees and request that it be discussed in the Group. The outcome, of course, would not 
be a matter solely in Jordan’s hands: the members of the Group would perhaps be the key 
players. It would certainly be open to them to revive it and make it more substantively 
relevant if they were inclined to do so - this is really a question of their present political 
will to get seriously involved once more in the Middle East refugee problem.
If Jordan was minded to seek to revive and strengthen the Multilateral Working Group, it 
would be as well for Jordan to take soundings (e.g. through diplomatic channels) to 
discover whether this would be likely to be acceptable to its members.
Whether Jordan would wish to work through the Multilateral Working Group in seeking 
to resolve the refugee problem is a matter for political judgment, and an assessment 
whether recourse to that particular forum would be likely to serve Jordan’s interests. One 
relevant consideration is clearly whether the membership of the Multilateral Working 
663 Ibid.,
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Group is likely to allow it to play a constructive role.
The two particular legal factors in any political judgment whether the Multilateral 
Working Group would be a desirable forum are the following. First, so long as the 
Multilateral Working Group continues to exist, however marginal its current contribution 
might be, Jordan (like Israel) has a commitment (which may or may not amount to a legal 
obligation) to seek to resolve the refugee problems in the framework of the Multilateral 
Working Group. Second, the commitment, such as it is, is to have recourse to “the 
framework o f’ the Multilateral Working Group. It is wholly unclear what this means in 
practice, e.g. as regards such matters as venue, chairmanship, composition, voting 
procedure and agenda. Without clarification of such matters the reference to the 
Multilateral Working Group in the Peace Treaty is pretty well empty of substance. Before 
this particular forum could be rendered really effective, there would almost certainly have 
to be preliminary discussion between Jordan, Israel and the chairman of the Multilateral 
Working Group in order .to. establish a basis, on which its work, would.in future.be 
conducted more effectively.
Of course, Israel or the general membership of the Multilateral Working Group might be 
unwilling to let the Group take on a more active role. Jordan would then be faced with the 
choice between continuing with a process which was serving no substantive purpose, and 
refusing to continue to participate in a process which was evidently not being allowed to 
fulfill the functions envisaged in the Peace Treaty. Considerations similar to those 
concerning a possible walk-out from the quadripartite committee apply here also.
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The third ‘appropriate forum’ identified in Article 8.1 and again only in respect of 
refugees - is negotiation in a very specific context. The terms of Article 8.1(b) (ii) are:
“In negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or 
otherwise in conjunction with and at the same time as the 
permanent status negotiations pertaining to the Territories referred 
to in Article 3 of this Treaty.”6
This provision is not entirely clear, since the significance of the cross-reference to Article 
3 of the Peace Treaty is uncertain. Article 3 does not refer directly to any “permanent 
status negotiations”. Article 3 has nine paragraphs, and the most likely to be relevant is 
paragraph 2 which is the only provision in Article 3 which refers to “status” and 
“territories” in a single context. After paragraph 1 delimited the Jordan-Israel boundary, 
paragraph 2 reads:
“The boundary, as set out in Annex 1(a). is the permanent, secure 
and recognized international boundary between Jordan and Israel, 
without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under 
Israeli military government control in 1967”.665
The qualification ‘without prejudice’ at the end of Article 3.2 has its origin in Section V 
of the Common Agenda of 1993.666 The territories in question include the West Bank. 
The implication is that the status of the West Bank territories was to be determined on a 
permanent basis in some future, unspecified negotiations. These future negotiations are 
“permanent status negotiations” referred to in Article 8 1 (b)(ii) In fact, the ‘permanent
664 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 8.
665 Ibid., Article 3.
666 See, Common Agenda, op.cit, p. 2.
A/%7status negotiations’ derived from the earlier Israel-Palestinian Oslo Agreement, and 
were simply picked up in the Peace Treaty as a timing ‘peg’ on which to hang certain 
Peace Treaty provisions.
That this was the parties’ intention is confirmed by the consideration that the Israel- 
Palestinian Declaration of Principles, which was adopted just 2 months before the 
conclusion of the Peace Treaty, referred in terms to “permanent status negotiations” (to 
follow negotiations on certain interim arrangements). This identification of the 
negotiations referred to in Article 8.1(b)(ii) still, however, leaves a number of questions 
open. In particular, and first, it is not clear who the parties in these ‘permanent status 
negotiations’ are to be. It is clear that the permanent status of the territories in question 
will involve other parties, particularly the Palestinians, and perhaps others. In fact, 
Israeli-Palestinian talks for a Middle East peace settlement (the ‘peace process’) have 
concerned themselves with the permanent status of those territories and may be regarded 
as constituting the, ‘permanent status negotiations’6?9 referred to in Article 8.1(b)(ii) of 
the Peace Treaty. This, however, involves excluding Jordan from the ‘permanent status 
negotiations’ referred to. Accordingly, Jordan must not allow any negotiations relating to 
refugees to proceed without its full engagement as an equal partner.
Against that background, Article 8.1 (b)(ii) establishes a commitment on Jordan and Israel
667 See, Palestinian-Israeli DOP, op.cit.
668 Ibid., see, Article I, para 2, and Article V. Although not expressly linked to “territories that came under 
Israeli military government control in 1967”, it is apparent that those negotiations were intended to cover 
the West Bank territories: it is also clear from Article V.3 that they were to include the question of 
refugees.
669 Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Ministers Ihud Barak had conducted marathon 
negotiations under the auspices of US President Bill Clinton in 2000 and thence Palestinian and Israeli 
officials held meetings in Taba, Egypt with the view of reaching a final settlement.
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to seek to resolve the human problems in question “in the case of refugees .... in 
negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or otherwise in conjunction with and 
at the same time as” those permanent status negotiations. This raises a number of 
questions.
The ‘refugee negotiations’ have to be held “in conjunction with and at the same time as” 
the “permanent status negotiations” (but not, it may be noted, as ‘part o f  those 
negotiations’). Apart from those required links with the permanent status negotiations the 
nature of the refugee negotiations is wholly unclear. In particular, their framework was 
still to be agreed, and no such agreement has yet been reached to date.670 Additionally, it 
is not even clear who the parties to the negotiations are to be, since the negotiations may 
be “bilateral or otherwise”: and while the normal reading of that phrase in a bilateral 
Jordan-Israel treaty is that the negotiations will either be bilateral between Jordan and 
Israel or ‘otherwise’ between Jordan, Israel and one or more other parties, it cannot be 
excluded that.“otherwise” might be construed (e.g. by Israel), to allow for negotiations 
between Israel and other parties not including Jordan.
The commitment is, in short, one which (were the concept known in international law) 
might be regarded as close to being void for uncertainty. In effect, it is left to Jordan and 
Israel to agree upon the basis for whatever negotiations there might be, including the 
closeness of the relationship between the refugee negotiations and the permanent status 
negotiations, and the parties to be involved in the refugee negotiations.
670 Interview with Mulki, op.cit.
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The uncertainties in this part of Article 8 are partly a consequence of the timing of the 
conclusion of the Peace Treaty in October 1994. At that time it was too early to be able to 
predict the outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli interim agreements (which stipulated inter 
alia that the final status negotiations would include the issue of refugees671). Article 8 
was therefore designed to keep Jordan’s and Israel’s options open in terms of the 
solutions to be adopted for the refugee problem. Thus the stipulation that the Jordan- 
Israel refugee negotiations were to be “in conjunction with and at the same time as the 
permanent status negotiations” reflected the parties’ wish to avoid legal and political 
complications which could arise if a Jordan-Israeli agreement on refugee problems 
preceded the permanent status settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.
In their joint Advice of 3 October 1994 Professors Crawford and Graefrath suggested, in 
their comment on this text (then draft Article 7A), that the words “in conjunction with 
and at the same time as the permanent status negotiations” were intended to guard against 
an Israel-Palestinian deal not to involve Jordan on the. refugee issue and were therefore
iyj'y
included so as to allow for the possibility of Jordanian participation. It was clearly 
understood at the time on the Jordanian side that ways needed to be developed in which 
Jordan would be involved in discussing issues affecting its citizens during the permanent
i'n*>
status negotiations.
Despite the uncertainties in Article 8, the provision is not without value, since by it
671 Interview with Mulki, op.cit; see, also Palestinian-Israeli DOP, op.cit, Article V 3 .
672 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty Documentary History, (1996) available at Jordanian Foreign Ministry 
Archives, op.cit, p. 183.
673 Interview with Mulki, op.cit.
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Jordan and Israel have both agreed that these refugee negotiations are to take place in a 
very close relationship with the permanent status negotiations. Article 8.1(b)(ii) thus 
offers a clear legal basis for Jordan to request that Israel should agree to establish a 
negotiating forum as agreed by Israel in that provision of the Peace Treaty.
In taking the initiative with such a proposal Jordan will need to have its own ideas as to 
how this negotiating forum should be composed, what it would do, and how it would 
work. It is presumably just such matters which were intentionally left undecided by the 
formula “in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or otherwise”.
It needs to be noted that, since the Peace Treaty expressly stipulates that an appropriate 
forum for refugee negotiations is bilateral or other negotiations in close relationship to 
the permanent status negotiations, there is a risk that if those permanent status 
negotiations continue without Jordan (or Israel) taking the initiative in invoking the Peace 
Treaty provisions of Article 8.1(b) (ii), then they might be taken to have lost (e.g. by 
implied waiver) their right to invoke that particular forum. This situation has not yet
arisen, but as time passes the risk increases. Clearly, once the permanent status
. . . .
negotiations have reached a successful conclusion and have terminated. Article 8.1(b) (ii) 
will no longer be capable of being applied since there will then no longer be any 
permanent status negotiations “in conjunction with and at the same time as” which the 
refugee negotiations can be held.
The fourth ‘appropriate forum’ to be identified in Article 8 is that referred to in Article
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8.1(c), involving action;
“[tjhrough the implementation of agreed United Nations programs 
and other agreed international economic programs concerning 
refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their 
settlement.”674
This forum applies to both refugees and displaced persons. There is, however, a question 
as to whether in this provision the terms “refugee” and “displaced persons” are to be 
given the somewhat special meaning attributed to them in the specific Jordan-Israel 
context, i.e. linked respectively to the events of 1948 and 1967, or whether they are to be 
given perhaps more general meanings which they might bear in United Nations and other 
similar international practice. There is room for argument about this, and it is not without 
substance since it affects the determination of which UN and other agreed international 
economic programmes are being referred to as providing the forum for the resolution of 
the human problems resulting from the conflict in the Middle East. Does Article 8.1(c) 
refer only to those UN (and other international) programmes which relate specifically to 
the refugees who fled in the aftermath of the 1948 events or the displaced persons who 
were the consequence of the 1967 events, or does it refer to any programmes relating 
generally to those who might be regarded as refugees or displaced persons? In that 
context, however, it may be noted there are no UN programmes specifically dealing with 
the 1967 displaced persons, unless they were also 1948 refugees.
Applying the rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
674 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 8.
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675Treaties, and noting in particular Article 31.4, the context of the Peace Treaty in 
general and of Article 8 in particular suggests that the terms should be given their special 
Jordan-Israel meaning. Against that is the fact that Article 8.1(c) places the matter 
squarely in a UN context, in which it would be appropriate to give terms whatever may 
be their normal UN meanings.
Whichever programs are within the scope of Article 8.1(c), it would seem that they have 
to be “economic” programs. This would seem implicit in the reference to UN and “other 
... economic programs”, thereby suggesting that the UN programmes themselves must be 
of an economic character.
The negotiating records of the Peace Treaty does not provide clarification as to which 
particular UN/intemational programmes were in mind as fitting the description in Art. 
8.1(c):
The ‘forum’ provided by these UN and other international programmes 
also appears to be of a different character from the other forums referred to in 
Article 8. Whereas the other forums are institutional in nature, these 
economic programmes are more functional. Although UN economic 
programmes can have an institutional base which could be used as a forum 
for negotiation, it may be that the parties were envisaging recourse to these economic 
programmes as a way of providing assistance in realising whatever arrangements they 
could agree upon, rather than as seeing them as offering an institutional framework
675 See, the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, op.cit, Article 31.
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within which those arrangements themselves could be agreed. This is borne out by the 
opening and closing words of Article 8.1(c) — “Through the implementation of agreed ... 
programs”, and “including assistance to their settlement.”
It is useful to note that in the phrase “assistance to their settlement”. “Settlement” 
suggests that the assistance being referred to relates to the settlement of the refugees in 
the places where they currently are, as distinct from their resettlement elsewhere or their 
return to Israel. While this suggestion in the text is unhelpful, it may not matter greatly 
since the implementation of the agreed programmes only “includes” the assistance 
referred to, and therefore does not exclude their implementation by e.g. assistance to the 
refugees’ or displaced persons’ resettlement or return.
The particular forums identified in Article 8.1 - the Quadripartite Committee, the 
Multilateral Working Group, and international economic programmes - are not an 
exhaustive identification of the forums , to. which the parties may have recourse. Article 
8.1 refers to the Parties seeking to resolve the problems in question “in appropriate 
forums, in accordance with international law, including the following..”. Thus it is open 
to the parties to agree upon other “appropriate forums” in which to resolve the refugee 
problems.
Several things about this possibility should be noted.
First, it will be necessary for Jordan and Israel to agree that some particular forum is
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“appropriate”. It would be open to Jordan to make a proposal, which Israel would have to 
consider.
Second, the other forums in which the parties might seek to resolve the problems would 
be forums which would act “in accordance with international law”. While the 
significance of that phrase is somewhat uncertain, it clearly leaves open the option of 
having recourse to legal dispute settlement mechanisms, such as judicial settlement, 
arbitration and mediation.
Third, the problems to be resolved are the human problems caused by the conflict in the 
Middle East. Since the particular forums illustratively identified in the subsequent 
provisions of Article 8.1 cover both refugees and displaced persons, it follows that the 
scope of the general introductory reference to “appropriate forums” covers both 
categories of persons.
Fourth, Article 8 says nothing about the composition of such other forums: they merely 
have to be “appropriate”. Thus while Jordan-Israel bilateral forums may perhaps 
primarily be intended, trilateral forums (e.g. involving the Palestinians) are not excluded.
(ii) Article 24 of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty.
The focus of Article 8 of the Peace Treaty is the resolution of the human problems arising 
from the conflict in the Middle East, including therefore the refugee problem and that of 
the displaced persons. In contrast, the focus of Article 24 is the settlement of financial
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claims. The Article is short and states that;
“The parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual
676settlement of all financial claims.”
Once again, this provision is ambiguous. The parties have agreed to establish a claims 
commission - but its actual establishment is left for the future,677 and raises numerous 
problems which will have to be solved in negotiation between Jordan and Israel.
Although Article 24 is brief and general, it should be noted that in the negotiation of the 
Peace Treaty, Jordan put forward a much fuller proposal, covering the kinds o f issues 
which are necessary if the obligation to establish a claims commission is to be workable
( S I Oin practice. The Israeli draft Peace Treaty of 26 September 1994 contained no 
provision for settlement of claims. The Jordanian draft of 28 September, however, 
contained a draft of Article 22B and its associated Annex XI which dealt with the matter 
in some detail. In what appears to be a Jordanian Commentary on that draft it is observed, 
in relation to Article 22B that
“It is established practice for a peace treaty to deal with 
outstanding claims between the parties. In the present case two 
categories of claim require to be taken into account: claims arising 
from the use, exploitation or occupation of lands returned under 
the Treaty and claims relating to the costs of dealing with the 
influx and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons. It is 
envisaged that global settlement o f these claims be reached by
676 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 24.
677 The Claims Commission envisaged in Article 24 was never formed.
678 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty Documentary History, (1996) available at Jordanian Foreign Ministry 
Archives, op.cit, p. 178.
679 Ibid., p. 180.
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negotiation, failing which a claims settlement procedure would
operate in accordance with [the Jordanian proposal for an] Annex 
«680
In the draft Peace Treaty (Draft 3) of 29 September 1994681 Article 22B appears as 
proposed by Jordan, with the annotation that Jordan was prepared to accept mutual 
renunciation of claims other than those referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 (which 
paragraphs needed to be seen in the context of the boundary and refugee issues 
respectively), and that Israel could not accept the Article and would prefer no claims 
clause but would be prepared to see a simple claims clause along the lines ‘The Parties 
agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims’. 
In their Advice on Unresolved Clauses, dated 3 October 1994, Professors Crawford and 
Graeffath noted, in relation to draft Article 22B that “The parties are far apart oh the issue 
of claims ... [T]he claims issue is one of Israel’s vulnerabilities.”682
Ultimately, nothing better than the formula preferred by Israel could be negotiated, 
notwithstanding its evident deficiency. Given that that language was exactly the same as 
the language previously adopted in the equivalent provision of the Israel-Egypt Peace 
Treaty of 26 March 1979 perhaps nothing better was to be expected.
Given the text of Article 24 as finally agreed, the first issue to be noted is that the parties’ 
agreement relates to “all financial claims”. This is not self-evident. It might, for example, 
mean those claims which arise out of financial matters (e.g. seized bank accounts), or it
681 Ibid., p. 180.
682 Ibid., p. 184.
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might mean any claim for redress expressed in financial terms (e.g. compensation for 
seized houses, or for unlawful expulsion). In the context of refugees and displaced 
persons, it is presumably in Jordan’s interest to give the term “financial claims” as broad 
a meaning as possible, i.e. the latter of the two examples just given. The meaning of 
“financial claims” is likely to be considerably influenced by the course of the 
negotiations leading to agreement upon Article 24.
It is possible that in the negotiations the parties presented various specific claims, and 
that it proved impossible to agree upon their settlement in the Peace Treaty itself, Article 
24 being agreed instead. In such circumstances, there would be a strong argument that the 
parties intended that Article 24 should take care of only those claims which had been 
discussed in the negotiations. It does in fact seem that Jordan was at least contemplating 
two specific categories of claims, along with a catch-all reference to all other claims. It is 
unclear in what if any detail these various categories of claims were presented or 
discussed.
An alternative possibility is that no particular claims were presented and discussed in the 
negotiations, but that both parties asserted that they had various (unspecified) claims 
which would have to be dealt with, and in the end they agreed to Article 24 for that 
purpose. In such circumstances, there would be a strong argument that Article 24 was 
intended to take care of all those unspecified claims, whatever they may be and whatever 
their basis, so long only as they can be regarded as “financial” claims.
However, the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used favours a broad view of
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“financial claims”, and that the party asserting that only certain claims were to be covered 
(e.g. those raised in negotiations) has the burden of producing evidence to that effect.
Another question which arises regarding the language of Article 24 is whether the claims 
commission can deal only with “financial” claims, or whether it has competence for 
claims which in addition to having a financial element also have some other element. In 
other words, is the claims commission limited to claims expressed solely as a request for 
financial redress, or can it also hear claims which seek financial redress in the alternative 
(e.g. the return of property or compensation instead of its return) or in combination with 
other redress (e.g. the return of property and compensation for loss of use for the past 60 
years)? It is again probably in Jordan’s interest to contend for the widest meaning of 
“financial”, so that all claims which include an element of financial redress are within the 
scope of the claims commission.
It may be noted that Article 24 in dealing with ‘‘all” financial claims, does not distinguish 
between those involving refugees, those involving displaced persons, and those others 
involving neither - e.g. Jordanian State claims.
A final point on the use in Article 24 of the words “all financial claims” is whether those 
claims are only inter-State claims, or whether they also include claims by individuals. It 
would seem that there is nothing in Article 24 to restrict its scope to inter-State claims. 
On the contrary, “all” financial claims suggests a broad meaning for the phrase, within 
the normal limits of international law regarding such matters as the nationality of claims.
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The claims commission is to be established “for the mutual settlement” of all financial 
claims. The word “mutual” suggests that the financial claims to be dealt with by the 
claims commission are claims by Jordan against Israel and claims by Israel against 
Jordan. Although it is probably in Jordan’s interest that Article 24 should be given a wide 
interpretation, much depends on the nature and size of the potential Israeli financial 
claims against Jordan if any.
Whatever the scope of the financial claims to be settled by reference to a claims 
commission, that commission has to be set up. Jordan and Israel have agreed “to establish 
a claims commission”. That is a clear treaty obligation on the two States.
The establishment of a claims commission requires agreement between Jordan and Israel, 
which in turn requires that the two States should enter into negotiations to that end. So 
far,, no such negotiations have taken place. Jordan has a clear right under the Peace Treaty 
to take the initiative in proposing the opening of negotiations for the establishment of a
z o - i
claims commission. Particularly given Article 25.2 of the Treaty, Israel cannot reject 
such an initiative without being in breach of its obligations under the Peace Treaty.
This is not to say that Israel is legally bound to agree with whatever proposals for a 
claims commission which Jordan may put forward, but simply that the principle of 
opening negotiations cannot be rejected by Israel. In fact, in proposing the opening of
683 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Aticle 2 5 .2  states that “ The parties undertake to fulfill in good 
faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction o f any other party and 
independently o f any instrument inconsistent with this Treaty....”
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negotiations on this subject it is not necessary for Jordan to put forward any detailed 
proposals for how the claims commission might work. A minimal proposal would be 
enough to start the process of negotiation.
Of course, if Jordan is to embark on this course, it ought first to have a reasonably clear 
idea of the sort of proposals it would eventually put forward for the establishment of the 
claims commission. Relevant matters to be covered in this context include the 
composition of the claims commission, whether there will be a single commission, or 
several (equal) chambers of a commission, the commission’s rules of procedure, the 
commission’s decision-making rule, the seat of the commission, the commission’s 
secretariat/registry, the commission’s financing and the commission’s jurisdiction (i.e. 
what claims it may deal with).684
The draft Annex XI which Jordan prepared for its draft Peace Treaty of 28 September 
1994 could be, a useful starting point..
(iii) Article 29 of the Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty.
Article 29 of the Peace Treaty reads as follows:
“Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this 
Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.
684 See, Opinion rendered by H.E Mr. Awn Al-Khasawneh, Advisor o f State for International Legal 
Affairs, contained in The Foreign Ministry o f Jordan Classified Archive documents, Document number 
FMSC/281139, dated 25 December 1996. op.cit.
685 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty Documentary History, (1996) available at Jordanian Foreign Ministry 
Archives, op.cit, p. 190.
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Any such dispute which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be 
resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.”686
This provision is clearly in a different category from Articles 8 and 24. It does 
not directly provide for the settlement of substantive problems affecting the 
refugees and displaced persons or the settlement of claims, as does Articles 8 and 
24, but instead provides for the resolution of disputes arising out of the 
application or interpretation of those Articles (as well as of other Articles of 
the Peace Treaty). As previous parts of this chapter have illustrated, there are a 
considerable number of potential difficulties which could arise out of the interpretation or 
application of Articles 8 and 24. Examples of such difficulties are, the meaning of 
‘displaced persons’, the non-fulfillment by Israel of the obligation to ‘negotiate’ in 
Articles 8 and 24, paragraph 1, the meaning of “financial claims”,
In addition to those differences arising out of Articles 8 and 24, there are others arising 
out of other Articles, of the Treaty, such, as Israel’s failure to fulfill its obligations to 
repeal adverse or discriminatory references m its own legislation, and Israel’s failure to 
accord “due process of law within [itsl legal systems and before [its] courts”.
Article 29 requires that there be a “dispute”. It may seem that this is a term the meaning 
of which is self-evident, but in fact it has been the occasion of much international 
litigation, particularly concerning when a dispute may be said to arise or exist, which in 
turn has required some analysis of what constitutes a dispute. The jurisprudence of the
686 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, op.cit, Article 29.
687 Ibid., Article 11.1(b).
688 Ibid., Article 11.1(d).
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ICJ may be summarized as requiring that for a dispute to exist for the purposes of the 
institution of proceedings before the Court, first, there must be “a disagreement on a point 
of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons,”689 second, 
the issue as to “whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective 
determination”690, third, consequently it is not enough to establish the existence of a 
dispute for one party to say that there is a dispute any more than it is enough to prevent 
the existence of a dispute for the other party to deny its existence.691 Fourth, “It must be 
shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other.”692 Fifth, there is no 
particular formal requirement for the expression of the opposing views of the parties , 
and finally, “where one party to a treaty protests against the behavior or decisions of 
another party, and claims that such behavior or decision constitutes a breach of the treaty, 
the mere fact that the party accused does not advance any argument to justify its conduct 
under international law does not prevent the opposing attitude of the parties from giving 
rise to a dispute concerning the application of the treaty”694. Undoubtedly, Jordan will be 
able to establish in a number of areas, the existence of.a dispute.to. which Article.29 
applies.
Under Article 29, such disputes must concern either the “interpretation” or the 
“application” of the Peace Treaty, and thus in particular in the present context o f Articles 
8 or 24. “Interpretation” refers essentially to the meaning to be given to a provision in the
689 See, Mavromatis Palestine Concession Case (1924), op.cit, PCIJ Ser. A, No.2, p.l 1.
690 See, Interpretation o f  Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, ICJ Reports 1950, at p.74.
691 See, South West Africa Cases, ICJ Reports 1962, at p.328.
692 Ibid.
693 See, Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf (Revision), ICJ Reports 1985, at p. 192.
694 See, Applicability o f  the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 o f  the United Nations Headquarters 
Agreement o f  26 June 1947, ICJ Reports 1988, at p. 28.
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Peace Treaty, and “application” refers to the way in which that provision, bearing 
whatever meaning it is held to bear, is to be applied, i.e. put into operation. Both aspects 
of Article 29 could be relevant in the present context.
Disputes of the nature covered by Article 29 are to be resolved by recourse to three 
possible procedures for dispute settlement, first negotiations, and if they cannot settle the 
dispute, then conciliation or arbitration. The difference is essentially between a procedure 
which involves only Jordan and Israel (negotiation) and a procedure which involves a 
third party or parties (conciliation or arbitration).
1- Negotiation
Apart from identifying the procedures to which recourse is to be had, Article 29 says 
nothing at all about the content which has to be given to them. In the case of negotiations 
this is. not a serious matter, since the concept of negotiation between the parties involved 
is well enough understood and is essentially a flexible bilateral process allowing the 
parties to construct their negotiations in whatever way best suits their purposes. Apart 
from observing that under Article 29 negotiations are a mandatory first step, there is little 
to be added.
2- Conciliation and arbitration
Third party involvement through conciliation or arbitration is, however, a different
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matter. There are three points to be noted; First, conciliation or arbitration are to be 
invoked only when a dispute “cannot” be settled by the mandatory first step of 
negotiations. There can obviously be much room for argument as to whether the stage has 
been reached when negotiations “cannot” settle the dispute. Second, Article 29 does not 
give either conciliation or arbitration preference over the other. They are equal 
alternatives. No weight is to be attached to the fact that conciliation is mentioned first: 
something has to be mentioned first, and traditionally conciliation is listed before 
arbitration, without thereby giving it any necessary priority. 695 Third, Article 29, in 
committing the parties to conciliation or arbitration should negotiations be unsuccessful, 
in no way completely disposes of the matter: all the important and difficult issues are still 
left to be settled by agreement between the parties.
As with Article 24, concerning financial claims, so too with Article 29 Jordan was 
prepared in the Peace Treaty negotiations to deal with this disputes settlement provision 
more fully than was agreed in the final text. Article 27 of the Israeli draft Treaty of 26 
September 1994696 provided only that disputes arising out of the interpretation or 
application of the Treaty “shall be settled by negotiations”. The Jordanian draft of 28 
September 1994 included a much fuller provision for Article 27.697 It added to the Israeli 
reference to settlement by negotiation the words “wherever possible”, and went on to 
provide that disputes which cannot be settled within three months by negotiation shall be 
referred to conciliation in accordance with Annex XII (which set out appropriate details
695 See, for example, Article 33 of the UN Charter, cited in Evans, Malcolm D. Blakstone”s International 
Law Documents, (1999) op. cit, p. 14,
696 See, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty Documentary History, (1996) available at Jordanian Foreign Ministry 
Archives, op.cit, p. 178.
697 Ibid., p. 180.
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for this procedure), and that if a dispute cannot be settled by conciliation within six 
months (or longer if agreed) either party may refer it to arbitration in accordance with 
Annex XIII (again, setting out the necessary details). As a last resort, either party might 
refer a dispute unsettled by other means to the ICJ.
In the draft Peace Treaty (Draft 3) of 29 September 1994698 Article 27 appears as 
proposed by Jordan, with the annotation that Israel does not want to see any form of 
dispute settlement other than negotiation, but would be prepared to accept a clause to the 
effect that disputes not settled by negotiation may be referred to mediation or arbitration; 
and that Jordan is not wedded to particular procedures or courts but has a very strong 
preference for a third party mechanism which would be available after every effort at a 
negotiated settlement had been made and exhausted. In the revised draft suggested by 
Professor Crawford with his paper of 9 October 1994,699 he proposed a simplified version 
of the Jordanian draft, consisting of a shortened draft Article 27 plus a single draft Annex 
X setting put. at least the .essential elements of the propedures. envisaged (which still 
involved negotiation, conciliation, arbitration and ultimately the ICJ).
This was of no avail. In the event the final text of Article 29 followed the simple form set 
out previously. It follows exactly the equivalent provision of the Israel-Egypt Peace 
Treaty of 1979. To some extent it involved a compromise since it provided for 
conciliation and arbitration and made them obligatory (“shall”) if negotiation was 
unsuccessful (neither of which Israel wanted) but omitted the kind of detailed procedural
698 Ibid., p. 204.
699 ibid., p 213
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prescriptions which Jordan had wanted. Its net effect was to leave all the crucial details 
still to be negotiated as and when occasion arises, in the light of general international 
practice regarding procedures for conciliation and arbitration.
Conciliation has been defined as “the process of settling a dispute by referring it to a 
commission of persons whose task it is to elucidate the facts and ... to make a report 
containing proposals for a settlement, but not having the binding character of an award or 
judgment”.700
Another definition refers to conciliation as “A method for the settlement of international 
disputes of any nature according to which a Commission set up by the Parties, either on a 
permanent basis or an ad hoc basis to deal with a dispute, proceeds to the impartial 
examination of the dispute and attempts to define the terms of a settlement susceptible of 
being accepted by them or of affording the Parties, with a view to its settlement, such aid 
as they may have requested”701
Although the first of these definitions makes it a requirement of conciliation that there be 
a “commission of persons” to undertake the task, this is not essential if the parties are 
ready to agree to a single person acting as conciliator.
Whether involving a commission or a single person, the task of the conciliator(s) is to
700 Brierly, The Law o f  Nations (4th ed.), p. 271, quoting in turn Oppenheim, International Law (5th ed), 
vol. ii, p. 12.
701 Regulations on the Procedure of International Conciliation, Art. 1, adopted by the Institute de droit 
international in 1961 (annuaire, 49 (1961) ii, pp. 385-391)
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clarify the facts of the dispute, and then to make nonbinding proposals for a settlement. It 
is the non-binding quality of conciliation proposals which distinguishes them from an 
arbitral or judicial award, both of which involve binding awards.
Under Article 29 conciliation is an equal alternative to arbitration, either of which may be 
resorted to once it is established that negotiations cannot settle the dispute. The first task 
for Jordan will be to determine whether, in the circumstances of the particular dispute 
which has arisen, conciliation is to be preferred to arbitration. Jordan’s preference is not, 
however, dispositive: the choice between conciliation and arbitration will require 
agreement between Jordan and Israel. If conciliation is to be the chosen procedure, the 
second task is to determine the identity(ies) of the conciliators). This, too, is not a matter 
solely within Jordan’s power to decide since it will require agreement with Israel. Jordan 
will have to establish its preferences as regards both the number of conciliators, and how 
they are to be appointed. The third task is to determine - again in agreement with Israel - 
the terms of reference, for the conciliation body.. The fourth task is to determine - again in 
agreement with Israel - the manner in which the conciliation body will perform its 
functions, and its timetable for doing so.
Arbitration amounts in effect to an ad hoc judicial process. It involves the appointment of 
an arbitral tribunal comprising one or more persons, which has the task of determining 
the facts and applying the law which the parties agree should be applied to the matter in 
dispute, resulting in an award which is binding upon the parties.
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As with conciliation, the first task for Jordan will be to determine whether, in the 
circumstances of the particular dispute which has arisen, arbitration is to be preferred to 
conciliation. The second task for Jordan is to seek agreement with Israel upon that 
preferred choice. As with conciliation, if  arbitration is the preferred option it will be 
necessary - in agreement with Israel - to determine the number of arbitrators, and how 
they are to be appointed. The third task is to determine - again in agreement with Israel - 
the terms of reference for the arbitration tribunal, involving both the question(s) which it 
is to be asked to decide and the law to be applied in reaching its decision. The fourth task 
is to determine - also in agreement with Israel- the manner in which the arbitration 
tribunal will perform its functions, and its timetable for doing so. For both arbitration and 
conciliation there are numerous precedents which can be drawn on as a basis for an 
agreement to be reached with Israel.
b. Other non Peace-Treaty based Mechanisms and Procedures.
In addition to the various mechanisms and procedures within the framework of the Jordan 
Israel Peace Treaty previously identified, there are a number of other international 
possibilities for reaching a settlement, either in whole or in part of the refugee problems 
addressed in this thesis.
It is important to stress the significance of the phrase “in whole or in part”: a settlement 
does not have to be reached within the framework of a single process, and it is entirely 
possible that parts of it may be settled by recourse to one procedure while others may be
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settled by recourse to others. A settlement may in practice only be achieved by way of a 
package of processes, each mutually supporting and reinforcing the others. The way in 
which the various elements in the package are put together will be largely dependent 
upon the strategy adopted by Jordan; in the final analysis the elements will probably have 
to be agreed with Israel, but at least at the outset there are some elements which might be 
invoked unilaterally by Jordan, as a means of demonstrating Jordan’s determination to 
achieve a settlement and as a way of exerting pressure on Israel.
(i) The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
It is in that light that it may be possible for Jordan to consider the possibility of referring 
at least some of the issues which arise to the International Court of Justice. The ICJ can 
only deal with legal questions to which it is appropriate to apply rules of international 
law. However, the Court has made it clear that a legal question is still a legal question 
even though if mayhave strong political overtones,
Proceedings before the ICJ can either be contentious (i.e. a dispute between two or more 
States) or advisory (i.e. advice by the Court on a legal question put to the Court by an 
international organization). These two kinds of proceedings involve different 
considerations.
If a case is referred to the ICJ, it will normally be heard by the full Court, composed of
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702fifteen Judges (one of whom is at present Jordanian). Israel, not having a Judge on the
703Court, would be entitled to appoint an ad hoc Judge, so making a Court of 16 Judges. It 
is however possible for the parties to request that a case be heard by a Chamber of three 
or more Judges (in practice usually five).704 This does not noticeably speed up or simplify 
the Court’s procedures, but it does in practice provide a means whereby parties can avoid 
their dispute being heard before some of the Judges whose likely attitudes they might 
believe not to be sympathetic. This is a consideration which on balance might be more 
likely to be relevant for Israel than for Jordan.
1- Contentious Proceedings.
The principal difficulty in referring a case to the ICJ is that its jurisdiction in any
H ( \ C
particular matter depends upon the consent of the parties. Both Israel and Jordan would 
have to agree to refer the matter in question to the Court. Such an agreement can be 
manifested in various ways. It can be given ad hoc in relation to a particular matter* 
through the conclusion of a special agreement between the parties to that effect or a party 
can give its consent by participating in a case already commenced by the other party 
(forum prorogatum) or consent can be given in advance in relation to certain general 
categories of matters - most usually by way of declarations submitted under Article 
36.2706 of the Statute (the so-called ‘optional clause’). Finally, consent can be given in
702 Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh is currently the Vice President of the ICJ. He was elected in 2000.
703 See, Statute of the International Court of Justice, cited in cited in Evans, Malcolm D. Blakstone”s 
International Law Documents, (1999) op. cit, p. 26, Article 31.2, p. 30.[Hereinafter, ICJ Statute] .
704 Ibid., Article 26.2.
705 Ibid., Article 36, p32.
706 Ibid.,
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advance by way of agreement given in a treaty on a particular topic that disputes about 
the interpretation or application of that treaty will be referred to the Court.
If Jordan considers instituting proceedings against Israel before the ICJ, it must act within 
the framework of Article 40707 of the Statute of the Court. This provides that cases are 
brought before the Court either by the notification of a special agreement or by a written 
application. In practical terms, since neither Jordan nor Israel has made a declaration 
under the so-called “optional clause” accepting the Court’s jurisdiction, this means that 
Jordan must either conclude a special agreement with Israel for the submission of an 
identified dispute or disputes to the Court, or file with the Court an Application in 
reliance on a treaty providing that disputes arising out of the interpretation or application 
of the treaty may be referred to the Court, or file with the Court an Application which 
leaves it to Israel to decide whether or not to consent to the Application forming the basis 
for the Court’s jurisdiction.
The possibility of concluding a special agreement with Israel to refer a particular matter 
to the ICJ is dependent upon Jordan and Israel being willing to reach such an agreement. 
It is probably unlikely that Israel will agree to refer to the ICJ any of the central and 
politically-charged refugee-related issues in dispute. However, the option may become 
more realistic at a later stage in negotiations with Israel, when there may be sufficient 
political pressure to lead Israel to agree to conclude a special agreement in relation at 
least to a specified part of the matters in dispute between Jordan and Israel, particularly as 
a way of resolving some otherwise intractable legal problems which may be left over at
707 Ibid., p. 33.
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the conclusion of an otherwise successful negotiation.
A more likely possibility is the institution of proceedings before the ICJ by way of 
Application. This would be the way forward either on the basis of submitting an 
Application and waiting for Israel to accept the Court’s jurisdiction on that basis (the 
forum prorogatum option), or on the basis of invoking a relevant treaty obligation which 
commits Israel and Jordan to accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction in disputes arising out of the 
interpretation or application of the treaty.
The first option involves Jordan submitting to the ICJ an Application commencing 
proceedings against Jordan on a stated legal matter. The scope of the Application can be 
as wide as Jordan wishes to make it (so long as it concerns a dispute to which it is 
appropriate to apply international law). The onus is upon Israel either to respond to the 
Application and participate in the ensuing proceedings before the Court or (which is more 
probable) decline to do so, .in which case the matter \yilj npt prqceed,
This course is not unknown, but its value is primarily tactical and political. For example 
the United States lodged a unilateral Application against the USSR and Hungary in 1954 
in respect of the Treatment o f US Aircraft and Crews in Hungary, while the United 
Kingdom lodged a unilateral Application against Argentina in 1956 in relation to the 
dispute between those two States over certain territories in Antarctica.
This course is unlikely to lead to substantive proceedings before the Court and a
274
judgment by the Court. However, it does have certain non-legal advantages, including 
raising the international profile of the dispute, demonstrating the determination of the 
applicant to pursue it and its confidence in its legal position. It also puts the other party 
on the defensive and may create a useful bargaining chip in future negotiations.
If Jordan pursues this option, the necessary procedural steps are laid down in the
*7AO 7 0 0
Statute and Rules of the Court. In practice, the Application needs to be sufficiently 
detailed to give the Court, and the intended respondent State, a clear idea of what the case 
is about. The Application is an important document in the case, since it establishes the 
basic legal limits of the case, and once submitted the essential character of the case 
cannot be changed, although details can be and usually will be developed as the case 
proceeds.
Currently, Jordan has a Judge of its nationality on the Court, and therefore would appear 
in principle to have no scope for appointing an ad hoc Judge. However, the Jordanian 
Judge had been, prior to his election to the ICJ, closely associated with advising Jordan
71fton a wide range of Palestinian/Israeli/refugee matters. It may be, therefore, that the 
Jordanian Judge would be excluded by Article 17.2 of the Court’s Statute from 
participating in the decision of a case referred to the Court: that provision applies to any 
member of the Court who:
“has previously taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of
708 See, ICJ Statute cited in cited in Evans, Malcolm D. Blakstone’s International Law Documents, (1999) 
op. cit, p. 26.
709 See, International Court of Justice, Rules of the Court, adopted on 14 April 1978 and entered into force
on 1 July 1978, available on ICJ website http:// www.ici-cii.org. [ hereinafter ICJ Rules]
7,0 Judge Al-Khasawneh had been Jordan’s Senior Legal Advisor during the Peace Negotiations.
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the parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or 
of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity.”711
The last four words are very wide. Whether or not Article 17.2 would apply to the 
Jordanian Judge could only be determined when the particular case to be put to the Court 
is known. If he considers that the Article does apply so as to exclude his participation, or 
if any doubt on the point is settled against him by decision of the Court,712 he will have to 
stand down for the particular case, and Jordan will then be able to appoint a Judge ad hoc 
under Article 31.3713 of the Statute. Subject to the conditions prescribed by Article 31.6714 
Jordan has a fairly free hand in appointing an ad hoc Judge. Two noteworthy points are 
that the Judge would not have to be a Jordanian national, and that Jordan’s appointment 
would not require Israel’s consent. Israel would be able to avail itself of the right to 
appoint an ad hoc Judge, since Israel has no Judge of its nationality on the Court.715
Once the Application is submitted, the Court will take further action on it as provided for 
in the Statute and Rules of the Court. In particular where the Application depends on the 
yet-to-be-given consent of Israel, the Court will transmit it to Israel, but will otherwise
71 f%take no action on it until Israel’s consent is forthcoming.
Once (if) that consent has been given, the President of the Court will as soon as possible 
invite the Parties’ Agents to a meeting at which questions of procedure will be
7.1 See, ICJ Statute, op.cit, Article 17.2, p. 29.
7.2 Ibid.,
7.3 Ibid., Article 31.1.
7.4 Ibid., Article 31.6.
715 It must be noted that the issue of Jordan having a Judge o f its Nationality at the Court would become a 
relevant matter only if  Jordan were to institute proceedings before the ICJ while the Jordanian Judge is still 
a member o f the Court.
716 See, ICJ Rules, op.cit, Article 38.5
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717discussed. In practice, this meeting will constitute the basis on which the Court will 
make orders fixing the time-limits for the first round of written pleadings in the case.718 
Depending on the nature of the case before the Court, it is likely that the Court would 
require Jordan, as the Applicant, to file a Memorial in about 9-12 months, and would 
require Israel to file a Counter-Memorial within a similar time limit thereafter. These 
time-limits can be extended. The timings for subsequent written pleadings (Reply, 
Rejoinder) would be left until later.
Israel would be entitled to present counter-claims which are “directly connected with the 
subject-matter of [Jordan’s] claim”, provided that they fall within the Court’s 
jurisdiction.719Any such counter-claims must be made in Israel’s Counter-Memorial.
The final method of taking a contentious case to the ICJ is on the basis of a provision in a 
treaty in which the parties have agreed that disputes about its interpretation or application 
should be referred to the ICJ. Many multilateral treaties contain such provisions, but most 
are not directly relevant to the present problems.
The scope of a treaty-based Application will be limited to the scope of the treaty 
provisions whose interpretation or application is in dispute. An Application based on 
some treaty provision relating to disputes about the interpretation or application of the 
treaty will need to cover the same ground as in the more general Application discussed 
above, with the addition of a reference to the treaty provision on the basis o f which
7.7 Ibid., Article 31.
7.8 Ibid., Article 41.1.
7.9 Ibid., Article 80.
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Jordan contends that the Court has jurisdiction. The scope of the Application will 
inevitably be less wide-ranging, being limited by the permitted scope of the treaty 
provision in question, and since the treaty will have established the Court’s jurisdiction 
the Application will be less for political/diplomatic effect and will be more a realistic first 
step in litigation.720
Where the Application is based on a treaty provision, the Court will notify the Secretary- 
General of the UN, Members of the UN, and other States entitled to appear before the 
Court.721
With a treaty-based Application it would be open to Israel to file preliminary objections 
to the Court’s jurisdiction or to the admissibility of the Application.722 Indeed, Israel can 
be expected to do so. Thus, for example, Israel might argue that the application before the 
Court related to a dispute which fell outside the dispute-resolution provision in the treaty. 
A preliminary objection would have to be made within three months after the delivery of 
Jordan’s Memorial.723 If Israel were to raise preliminary objections, the effect in practice 
would be to delay the proceedings for a considerable time, and of course, in so far as the 
objections might be upheld by the Court, Jordan’s case would be correspondingly 
diminished.
It would be open to Jordan, after (or contemporaneously with) submitting a treaty-
720 This scenario is for illustrative purposes as no such agreement to which both Israel and Jordan are both 
parties thereto exists.
721 See, ICJ Rules, op.cit, Article 42.
722 Ibid., Article 79.
723 Ibid., Article 79.1 as amended.
278
based724Application to request the Court to “indicate ... any provisional measures which
* 79  ^ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party” Jordan’s request 
would need to specify the reasons for which it is made, the possible consequences if it is
726not granted, and the measures requested. A request for provisional measures has 
priority over all other cases.727 The protection is “interim” since it is granted only 
pending the final outcome of the merits of the case, and is without prejudice to what that 
outcome might be.
According to the Court’s decisions on requests for provisional measures, a Jordanian 
request to protect Jordan’s rights would have to be limited to the preservation and 
protection of rights which would otherwise be irremediably damaged if they were not 
granted such protection. This would clearly cover such acts as the killing of people, or 
bulldozing of settlements, provided of course that the prohibition of such killing and 
destruction could be brought within the legitimate scope of a Jordanian Application. A 
well-constructedrand ,successful,-Jqrdaniaq request fo* interim measures .of, protectiorj 
would be a valuable weapon in Jordan’s hands.
2- Advisory Proceedings.
Proceedings for obtaining an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ are quite different from
724 In practice, a request for provisional measures submitted on the basis o f a general Application 
dependent on Israel’s consent would be ineffective unless Israel's consent were to be forthcoming, although 
as part o f the political/diplomatic game the making o f such a request would underline the urgency of doing 
something to put a stop to Israel's unlawful actions.
725 See, ICJ Statute, op.cit, Article 41, p. 33, See, also, ICJ Rules, op.cit, Articles 73-78.
726 See, ICJ Rules, ibid., Article 73.2.
727 Ibid., Article 74.1.
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those relating to contentious proceedings brought by one State against another. 
Essentially, instead of Jordan deciding to institute proceedings against Israel, an Advisory 
Opinion involves an appropriate international organ or organization requesting such an 
Opinion from the Court. Advisory Opinions can only be sought by certain UN organs and 
international organizations (generally speaking, the specialized agencies).
The UN General Assembly and Security Council can request Advisory Opinions “on any 
legal questions”. Other UN organs may also do so if so authorized, as may authorized 
specialized agencies. However, in these cases they may only request Advisory Opinions 
“on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.”728 While it is perhaps 
natural to think first of Advisory Opinions being requested by the General Assembly and 
Security Council, it is important not to neglect the possibility of using specialized 
agencies for such requests if there are particular difficulties in the way of using the UN 
organs and if some particular aspect of the refugee problem falls within the scope of an 
agency’s activities.
In practice the distinction between the two formulae governing the scope of the legal 
questions on which an Advisory Opinion may be sought is minimal in the present 
context, since, given the involvement of the General Assembly and Security Council with 
Middle East refugee issues, any such question posed by those two organs would almost 
inevitably arise within the scope of their activities. The language does, however, serve to 
underline the need for any request by a specialized agency for an Advisory Opinion to 
arise within the scope of that agency’s activities, a point emphasized by the ICJ in
728 See, UN Charter, op.cit, Article 96, p. 24.
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rejecting the request for an Advisory Opinion presented by the World Health 
Organization on The Legality o f the Use by a State o f Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict?19
What is required is a decision of the organ or organization in question, usually in the 
form of a resolution adopted by the majority provided for in the organization’s 
constitution. In practice, the most relevant bodies authorized to see, k Advisory Opinions 
are the General Assembly and Security Council of the UN. What follows concentrates on 
the position in respect of those two bodies.
The task for Jordan would thus be to persuade the Security Council or the General 
Assembly to request an Advisory Opinion, i.e. to adopt a resolution in which such a 
request is formulated. Two questions would immediately arise. First, on what specific 
question should an Advisory Opinion be requested? Second, what are the chances of 
success of such a resolution resultine in the adoption of a reauest?
With regard to the latter issue, the situation in the Security Council and the General 
Assembly calls for separate consideration. In the Security Council the first concern is that 
Jordan, not being a member of the Security Council, would in practice have to find a 
friendly State which is a member of the Council and which would table the necessary 
draft resolution, and would need to work with that State to build up support for and co­
sponsorship of the draft. Assuming that this can be done, it may then prove difficult to get
729 See, The Legality o f the Use by a State o f Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 66.
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a resolution requesting an Advisory Opinion adopted by the Security Council. Such a 
resolution on refugee-related issues could scarcely be regarded as a merely procedural
7^0matter, and would therefore almost certainly require an affirmative vote of nine
i
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members. In light of past 
practice it is possible that a request initiated by or on behalf of Jordan would be defeated 
by a veto: however, this may not be inevitable.
The most obvious organ to request an Advisory Opinion on refugee-related issues is 
probably the UN General Assembly, since it has the widest general competence and has 
over the years dealt with virtually all aspects of the refugee problem. It would be easy to 
frame a request for an Advisory Opinion in such a way as to raise a legal question which 
was directly relevant to the exercise of the Assembly’s functions, (for although this may 
not be a strictly necessary requirement, it would in practice be highly desirable, if only as 
a basis for attracting enough votes in support of a request).
The problems are more likely to be political than legal. The Member States of the UN do 
not lightly see, k Advisory Opinions, and it would be necessary to persuade a substantial 
majority that a request should be made. Article 18732 of the Charter does not specify 
requests for Advisory Opinions among those “important” questions which require a two- 
thirds majority, which therefore suggests (perhaps surprisingly) that it would be an
730 A different view has been expressed, to the effect that co-operation between organs o f the N (and thus 
the giving o f an advisory opinion by the ICJ to the Security Council) is inherently procedural in nature: De 
Arechaga J., Voting and Handling o f Disputes in the Security Council, p. 8. In the present context such a 
view would be unlikely to prevail.
731 See, UN Charter, op.cit, Article 27.3, p. 13. it should be mentioned that the one Security Council request 
so far made for an Advisory opinion (concerning Namibia) was adopted by 12-0-3, the 3 abstaining states 
being, Poland, USSR and the UK.
732 Ibid., Article 18, p. 11.
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“other” question for which a simple majority would be sufficient Requests by the 
General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion have usually734 been adopted by substantially 
more than a two-thirds majority, and that is obviously the sort of majority for which, for 
political reasons, it would be as well to aim even if it may not be strictly necessary. 
Whether such a majority is attainable is a matter for political judgment: in principle, 
however, there see, ms no reason why it should not be.
It is worth recalling two previous attempts to obtain Advisory Opinions on questions 
relevant in the present context. In 1952 Syria proposed to refer a series of questions on 
the refugee issue to the Court for an Advisory Opinion, but this proposal was rejected 21 
(for)-13 (against) - 24 (abstaining) in the ad hoc Political Committee.735 The Syrian 
proposal would have referred to the ICJ the questions as to whether Palestinian Arab 
refugees were entitled as of right to be repatriated to their former homes and to exercise 
their rights to their properties and interests, the Syrian proposal would have secondly 
asked whether Israel was entitled to deny refugees these rights. Thirdly, it would have 
asked whether these rights should be observed by themselves or required to be negotiated 
by States, the refugees not being nationals thereof. Finally, it would have asked whether 
Member States were entitled in law to enter into any agreement in relation to these rights.
In 1991 the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities suggested that the Commission on Human Rights should recommend to
733 Ibid.,
734 Notably, however, Resolution 49/75K requesting an Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f the Threat or 
Use o f Nuclear Weapons was only adopted by a simple majority o f States present and voting: 78-43, with 
38 abstentions.
735See, UNYB, 1952, pp. 251-2.
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ECOSOC that it request an Advisory Opinion on the question of the legal consequences 
for States arising from the building by Israel of settlements in the territories occupied 
since 1967, notwithstanding various Security Council resolutions.736 The Commission 
postponed consideration of the suggestion, since it appeared that there was a consensus 
that the Commission should not decide on this question.
The question to be referred to the International Court for an Advisory Opinion will need 
careful drafting. It will need to be phrased in terms which can plausibly be presented as 
posing a question the answer to which will assist the General Assembly to carry out its 
functions. A straight question as to whether Israel’s actions are a violation of Israel’s 
international obligations towards Jordan would almost certainly not be appropriate. A 
more generally phrased question is called for: for example (and in substance, rather than 
precise legal drafting), “is Israel’s conduct in relation to displaced persons in breach of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention?”, “what are Israel’s international legal obligations in 
relation to refugees and displaced persons?”, “what are the legal consequences for other 
States of Israel’s conduct in relation to the occupied territories?”.
It will not be difficult to prepare a resolution putting forward a question on which an 
Advisory Opinion could appropriately be sought. The draft resolution could be prepared 
and tabled by Jordan, which could undertake the task of gathering support for the draft 
and attracting co-sponsors. Jordan could thus expect to keep general control of the 
initiative, although the process of attracting support and co-sponsors would inevitably 
lead to some compromises on points of textual detail. Deciding upon the terms of the
736See, UNYB, 1991,p.612.
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question will thus in the first place be a matter for Jordan, in the light of legal advice and 
relevant political considerations; thereafter it will be a matter for discussion with Jordan’s 
supporters.
If a resolution is adopted by the General Assembly, the subsequent procedure is relatively 
simple.737 The Court may treat the request as a matter requiring urgent treatment and as 
therefore calling for an accelerated procedure (and can be expected to do so if the 
Assembly itself asks for its request to be treated as a matter of urgency).738 States are 
entitled to submit written statements to the Court on the question put in the request for an 
Advisory Opinion, and usually to comment on statements made by others; and there will 
usually be an oral hearing at which oral statements may also be made.739 The Court 
prescribes the time-limits for these various statements: they are usually considerably 
shorter than those applicable to the various stages of contentious proceedings.
Given that the initiative for requesting an Advisory Opinion will have come from Jordan, 
which will have been able to begin to prepare any statement which it might wish to 
present to the Court well before the request is formally put to the Court, there will be 
adequate time for Jordan to put together a full statement of its views for consideration by 
the Court.
737 In particular, and compared with contentious proceedings discussed above, there is in advisory 
proceedings no room for a formal Application, appointment o f ad hoc Judges, preliminary objections, 
counter-claims or provisional measures o f protection. The Statute o f the court, however, provides generally 
for the Court to be guided by the Statute’s provisions which apply in contentious proceedings “to the extent 
to which it recognizes them to be applicable” (Article 68).
738 See, ICJ Rules, op.cit, Article 103.
739 Ibid., Article 105; see, also ICJ Statute, op.cit, Article 66, p. 35.
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Although technically only “advisory”, an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ would carry a 
lot of weight. For the purposes of the organization which has sought it the Court’s 
Opinion is for most practical purposes equivalent to a binding decision. As a basis for 
further action against Israel it could be extremely significant (comparison may be made 
with the influence upon South Africa of the several Advisory Opinions relating to South 
West Africa/ Namibia). An Advisory Opinion would be quicker to get from the Court 
than a Judgment in contentious proceedings, and would be vastly less expensive for 
Jordan. Against those considerations, it would only answer the particular legal question 
put to the Court, it would not be able to provide remedies for action found to be unlawful 
(although it might be able to indicate what the consequences should be), and the whole 
process of seeking and acting on the Advisory Opinion would not be solely in Jordan’s 
hands.
In short, it is a possible option to be considered, but is probably more relevant as part of a 
wider strategy for dealing with the refugee problems .than being in itself a solution to 
them.
(ii) Arbitration
Arbitration as a possible method of resolving disputes has already been referred 
previously in this part, in the limited context o f disputes arising out of the application or 
interpretation of the Peace Treaty. In the present context, however, the scope for 
arbitration is much wider, and comprises virtually any dispute which the parties might
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agree to submit to arbitration. Primarily these are disputes which are best resolved by the 
application of law, and in particular international law, but they may also include disputes 
which would be more appropriately settled on some other basis.
Determining what some such “other basis” might be, however, is not easy. In practice it 
would be likely to amount to leaving the arbitrator(s) to settle the dispute in whatever 
way makes most sense to the arbitrator. This leaves much discretion to the arbitrator, and 
makes the outcome difficult to predict, which in turn makes it difficult to come to an 
informed conclusion whether to opt for such a non-legal arbitration. It is largely for this 
reason that arbitrations are usually based on international law, which limits the arbitration 
tribunal's discretion and makes the outcome more susceptible to rational prediction.
Arbitration based on international law is in effect a form of ad hoc judicial process. Its 
advantages and disadvantages are usually stated in comparison with recourse to the ICJ. 
Thev include the following: first, in terms of the tribunal’s iurisdiction. there is little 
difference between them. They both require consent of the two parties, and if consent is 
forthcoming to arbitration it might just as easily be forthcoming for a reference to the ICJ. 
Second, there is little difference between the two as regards the formulation of the 
question to be submitted to arbitration. Third, Arbitration is, however, more flexible, 
since the parties can agree upon whatever they wish. Fourth, whereas the ICJ is an 
established and functioning institution, with arbitration the parties must create everything 
for themselves (although there are many precedents which can be drawn on). Finally, 
where States are willing to refer a dispute to judicial settlement but prefer arbitration to
287
the ICJ, it is usually because, either they have political objections to the ICJ as an 
institution, or they prefer to select the members of the tribunal rather than take the 15- 
Judge ICJ as it stands, or they can give an arbitral tribunal specific directions as to the 
law to be applied, whereas the ICJ is bound by Article 38 of the Statute to apply 
international law as there set out. Also, they may believe that they can exercise greater 
control over the timetable of their own arbitral tribunal than over the schedule to be 
adopted by the ICJ. They also may believe that an arbitral tribunal can be more flexible in 
the decisions it reaches than is the case with the more strictly judicial ICJ.
If Jordan is to seek to refer any outstanding disputes to arbitration, the first and 
unavoidable requirement is to obtain Israel’s agreement. This will be essentially a 
political matter. It is necessary to bear in mind that arbitration does not have to cover all 
outstanding issues about which there is dispute: it would be entirely appropriate for only 
some issues to be referred to arbitration, while others are settled in some other way, e.g. 
by direct agreement.
Assuming, therefore, that both States agree to refer one or more issues to arbitration, 
there will need to be an agreement to that effect, usually taking the form of a bilateral 
arbitration treaty. The content of such a treaty is primarily a matter for the parties: as a 
matter of international law they have considerable flexibility as to how to organize the 
process of arbitration.
However, certain elements are essential to a practically effective arbitration treaty. These
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are; the question(s) to be submitted to arbitration, the basis on which the question is to be 
decided (e.g. by the application of international law; or international law, and equity; 
and/or taking into account certain specified legal and practical considerations), the 
composition of the tribunal, both as regards the number of arbitrators and as regards the 
manner of their appointment, the number, order and timing of written pleadings, the need 
for oral proceedings, the applicable procedural provisions (or at least a stipulation that the 
Tribunal can decide its own rules of procedure), and the majority needed for the 
Tribunal’s Award, and its binding quality.
There is no need for arbitration to be initiated by the submission of an Application. The 
conclusion of the arbitration agreement is enough to begin the process. Also, there is 
usually no scope for preliminary objections since the parties will have agreed ad hoc to 
the arbitration. Whether or not counter-claims are permitted will depend upon the agreed 
terms of the reference of the dispute to arbitration, and the provision made as regards the 
tribunal’s rules of procedure. Whether provisional, measures of. protection maybe sought 
will depend also upon the arbitration agreement and the rules of procedure adopted by the 
tribunal.
(iii) Mediation and Conciliation: non-binding third party assistance
Conciliation has already been referred to in relation to disputes as to the interpretation 
and application of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. It is here convenient to consider 
conciliation at the same time as mediation, since there is no sharp dividing line between
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them - or indeed between them and other forms of non-binding third party assistance.
Conciliation, as already noted, involves a process where the conciliator makes a report 
containing proposals for a settlement. Mediation, on the other hand, involves the 
mediator helping the parties to negotiate between themselves but himself taking part in 
the negotiations. Good offices, which is classically another such form of third party 
assistance, involves the third party helping the disputing parties to negotiate a settlement 
between themselves, but without the third party itself getting involved in the
740negotiations.
However, none of these definitions is definitive. These modes of settlement are very 
flexible, both as to what each mode may involve, and as to the dividing lines between 
them. The classification is inherently one of convenience rather than one of real 
substance; labels rather than content. The forms of non-binding third party assistance 
may take other forms than mediation and conciliation, and virtually the only limit to 
those forms is that imposed by limits upon the ingenuity of the States concerned. The 
essential elements are simply that the results are not binding, that they involve assistance 
by third parties, and that “the intervention of the third party aims, not at deciding the 
quarrel for  the disputing parties, but at inducing them to decide it for themselves”.741
As already noted in relation to conciliation within the framework of Article 29 of the
740 See, Brierly, Law o f Nations (4th ed.), p. 269. And see generally, Merrills, International Dispute 
Settlement ( 3rd ed., 1998), pp.27-43, 62-87); Collier and Lowe. The Settlement o f  Disputes in International 
Law (1999). pp. 27-31.
741 Ibid., pp. 269-271.
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Peace Treaty, the first task is to determine whether one of these nonbinding third party 
forms of settlement is desirable from Jordan’s point of view. Jordan cannot impose such a 
form of settlement on Israel, since Israel’s agreement would be needed: but at least 
Jordan needs however to decide whether such a procedure would serve Jordan’s interest 
and therefore whether it would be appropriate to propose it to Israel.
The second task would be to choose the identity of the third party to exercise the task. 
This may be either a State (leaving that State to identify a particular individual to perform 
the task) or an individual (e.g. Senator George Mitchell of the USA, who helped in this 
way in relation to problems in Northern Ireland, as well as more recently in relation to the 
Middle East). Choosing an individual is probably safer, although the support of the State 
to which the individual belongs would be very desirable. However, even if a State is 
chosen, it is almost certain that the State would not appoint an individual unless it knew 
in advance that that person would be acceptable to the parties. The choice would need to 
be agreed with Israel, but Jordan would be best served if  it had a clem: idea in advance of 
a short list of people to whom it would be ready to entrust the task.
The identity of the mediator will be closely linked to the scope of the mediation. 
Depending on what aspect of the Jordan-Israel dispute is the subject of the mediation the 
kind of person it will be necessary to look for may be, e.g. an international political 
figure, an internationally distinguished lawyer or economist, an expert in humanitarian 
affairs, an experienced diplomat, and so on.
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The third task would be to settle the terms of reference for the third party assistance. 
Again, Israel’s agreement would be needed, but Jordan must have a clear idea of what it 
would want before embarking on the necessary negotiation with Israel.
The mediator’s terms of reference will need to clearly set out the matter on which he is 
expected to help, and the end-result to be aimed for (e.g. an agreement between Jordan 
and Israel on the matter in question; or simply some formula for narrowing the gap 
between the parties’ positions so as to make an agreement more attainable). If  some 
measure of initial agreement with Israel on those lines can be achieved, it will be 
necessary to discuss then the proposed terms of reference with the person who has been 
identified as a possible mediator he or she may well have other elements to add.
The fourth task would be decide how the third party should perform its functions, and 
within what timetable. As before, Israel’s agreement would be necessary, but Jordan 
should from the outset have a clear idea of what its preferences would be.
With regard to the mediator’s modus operandi, Jordan and Israel will have to reach a 
preliminary agreement and then discuss it with the mediator-designate. Matters which 
will need to be settled include such matters as the location of meetings, whether meetings 
are always to be with both parties or whether the mediator can see the parties separately, 
the frequency of meetings, the submission of papers to the mediator, confidentiality, 
physical security, administrative/secretarial support for the mediator, and payment of the 
mediator’s fees and expenses.
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Once a mediation process has been established, the internal Jordanian preparation for 
participation in the mediation will depend upon the subject of the mediation. Generally 
speaking, the burden on Jordan will be much less than a case before the ICJ or an 
arbitration tribunal. Nevertheless, well-prepared presentations of Jordan’s position 
presented to the mediator will be essential if the mediation is to be able to take full 
account of Jordan’s requirements.
(iv) Participation in Israel-Palestinian mechanisms
It may be that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will, if and when they 
resume, eventually result in some agreement which could provide a mechanism through 
which refugee problems, or certain of them, would be resolved. That mechanism could in 
terms envisage eventual participation by Jordan (and perhaps others with an interest in 
the refugee problems); or, if  not, Jordan could nevertheless seek to join in what would be 
a purely Israeli-Palestiman procedure.
In these circumstances Jordan will have a difficult political choice to make. On the one 
hand, it will presumably not want to undermine a potential Israeli-Palestinian agreement; 
on the other hand, there are obvious dangers in participating in a mechanism in the 
negotiation of which Jordan has played no part.
One possibility which might be considered is for Jordan, if it learns on good authority
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that Israel and the Palestinians are making real progress towards a settlement on refugee 
issues which impinges on Jordan’s rights and interests, is to request the parties to be 
allowed to participate in the Israeli-Palestinian discussions, in substance to the extent that 
they directly affect Jordan’s position. From the point of view of Israel and the 
Palestinians, such a request could be regarded as adding a possible complication to what 
would already be delicate negotiations. A Jordanian participation might be seen as a way 
of minimizing Jordanian objections once an agreement is reached.
Israel and the Palestinians might find it difficult to refuse such a request given that refusal 
would almost certainly provoke an eventual Jordanian objection to the final settlement.
From Jordan’s perspective, the request would in itself demonstrate Jordan’s real interest 
in the refugee question and Jordan’s determination to stand up for its rights. Also, 
participation would give Jordan up-to-date and first-hand information about what was 
being discussed. Jordan’s participation could also give Jordan an, opportunity .to. explain 
its views and a degree of influence over the outcome. It would also have the potential 
disadvantage of politically tying Jordan into whatever the final settlement might be and 
make it more difficult for Jordan to stand aside from it.
Refusal of a request to participate would, however, pave the way for Jordan subsequently 
to reject any involvement with the settlement arrived at between Israel and the 
Palestinians.
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A variant of this kind of arrangement which might be worth considering by Jordan would 
be one whereby Jordan and the Palestinians cooperate over certain aspects of the refugee 
and displaced persons problem, with the Palestinians taking the lead in negotiating with 
Israel, but with it being agreed between Jordan and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization that any gains which it may achieve will be shared proportionately between 
the it and Jordan. Thus, the right of return for all Palestinians (even Jordanian nationals) 
might be left for negotiation by the Palestinian Authority, and to the extent that return 
could be agreed then Jordanian nationals would share in that benefit, while to the extent 
that all that could be agreed was compensation in place of actual return then that 
compensation should be shared between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Such an 
approach need not apply to all aspects of the refugee/displaced persons problem. For 
example, it need not apply to the right of such persons to compensation for loss or 
damage to their property that would, in the case of Jordanian nationals), remain a matter 
for Jordan to negotiate directly with Israel, as would any question of redress for any loss, 
or damage suffered directly by Jordan. As with the first-mentioned possibility of 
Jordanian involvement in Palestinian-Israel negotiations, there are various pros and cons 
to be considered, and Jordanian involvement in such negotiations, at least as an observer 
but preferably (since Jordanian interests would be in issue) as a substantive participant, 
would be highly desirable and probably essential.
Subject to those possibilities of seeking to participate in the Israel-Palestinian 
negotiations, Jordan’s best strategy, from a legal point of view, would seem to be to take
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the position that Jordan has its own specific national interest in the way in which the 
refugee problem is resolved, that no other State or entity has the right to negotiate on 
Jordan’s behalf, and that Jordan’s acquiescence in any settlement affecting Jordan’s 
claims which others might arrive at between themselves cannot be taken for granted. 
Such a stand would be firmly based on unassailable principles that were highlighted 
previously in this thesis, and should commend itself to all other States.
The fact that such is Jordan’s position should be made known at the highest level in all 
relevant quarters before any Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are concluded, and indeed 
before they get too far advanced. Moreover, if all relevant quarters are put on early notice 
that that is going to be Jordan’s position, it would be important to keep repeating Jordan’s 
position at periodic intervals during the continuation of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, 
so that those parties are not under any illusion that Jordan does not really mean what it 
says. A firm statement, and repetition, of such a Jordanian position would have a greatly 
enhanced effect if at the same time Jordan, were to take positive action to. pursue .its own. 
refugee claims against Israel, of the kind discussed elsewhere in this chapter.
That said, however, it cannot be ruled out that Israel and the Palestinians might establish 
arrangements which could in practice, and at least in part, have some attractions for 
Jordan. It would therefore be unwise for Jordan to reject any such Israeli-Palestinian 
arrangements in advance and in principle, without further consideration. Jordan might 
find something of advantage in Israeli-Palestinian arrangements, especially if they are 
being backed by substantial internationally-funded resources. The option should be kept
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open, until the details of any such arrangements are known.
It should be added that the author of this thesis has been shown some papers which 
indicate how the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on this issue were, in June 2001, 
progressing. On a quick reading of those papers, and bearing in mind that they reflect 
only an incomplete set of ideas under discussion, it can be said that a settlement along the 
lines set out in those papers would not be fully acceptable to Jordan. There are elements 
in them which could be attractive to Jordan as a settlement of part of the refugee problem, 
but there would still remain a number of issues on which Jordan would continue to have 
rights as against Israel.
It must be stressed that, regardless of the scope of the claims to be pursued and 
irrespective of whether they are to be pursued through negotiation or instead through one 
of the other processes and dispute settlement mechanisms described above, the claims 
will require investigation and preparation for presentation in accordance with 
international norms. Inevitably, the Jordanian Government must play a role in this 
process. While the precise nature and scope of the Government’s role in the claims 
preparation process will be influenced, although not necessarily determined, by the types 
of claims to be pursued and the process through which they are to be pursued, the most 
basic claims development process must in fact take place even before any such decisions 
are made.
To reduce the matter to its simplest form, how can the Government even know how much
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it should be seeking, and on behalf of whom, if it has not first taken an inventory of 
possible claims and thereby determined, insofar as practicable as a preliminary matter, 
the existence, nature and amount of all of the claims its nationals, as well as the 
Government itself, may wish to assert against Israel. Absent such a review the 
Government would assume a potentially very high risk of negotiating with Israel for 
either too much or too little. In addition, without such basic data, it could wind up 
expending efforts to establish a forum for the resolution of claims that in light of the 
number and character of the actual claims would be far less suitable than feasible 
alternatives.
It is for these reasons that the United States, for example, by a regulation of its 
Department of the Treasury required all United States nationals during the Iranian 
hostage crisis that commenced 4 November 1979 to register with it within a stated time 
basic details of any claims they might wish to assert against the Islamic Republic of Iran 
by virtue, of the successful Islamic Revolution. Based, in part.on the data thus assembled,, 
the United States then negotiated with Iran and ultimately concluded the Algiers Accords 
establishing (in The Hague) the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which for over 20 
years has been adjudicating claims of those two states and their nationals arising from 
those events.
Thus the first step that the Government must take in this entire process of preparing for 
the assertion of claims against Israel must be to acquire sufficient knowledge of all 
potential claims. The manner by which this is best accomplished depends upon a number
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of points that must be discussed within the Government. Clearly the process of inventory- 
taking as regards the Government’s own claims must be distinguished from what may be 
involved in acquiring the necessary knowledge regarding claims of individual Jordanian 
nationals. In both situations one must proceed in consciousness of the fact that the very 
process of collecting claims information necessarily will have two effects. On the one 
hand, it can raise initial expectations, potentially not fully justified, regarding future 
Government action in respect of claims and amounts that might eventually be paid (or 
otherwise realized). On the other hand, the very fact that the Government is collecting 
claims information will, to the extent it becomes known to Israel, become an element in 
any bilateral negotiating process that touches on claims matters, however tangentially. 
Moreover, other states and the Palestinian Authority may have their own reactions to 
knowledge of such a process.
For these reasons, Jordan will need to consider carefully the degree of confidentiality 
with which, it will proceed, in gathering.necessary, claims, data, which, in turn.raises the. 
issue of how much control it will exercise over the process. Clearly the degree of control 
it can bring to bear, and the level of confidentiality consequent thereon, will be greatest 
insofar as the Government is preparing its own claims against Israel, and hence involves 
in that process only Government employees subject to Government discipline. As soon 
as, and to the extent that, nationals are brought into the process, however, e.g., by 
requesting through a public notice that all potential said claimants come forward with 
details of their claims, Government control becomes less, both over internal expectations, 
and hence over such actions as may be driven thereby, and over Israeli reactions
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generated, or at least influenced, by knowledge of such process. Hence, the Government 
may wish, to the greatest extent possible in light of relevant political imperatives, and 
consistent with effective claims preparation, to minimize reliance on participation of 
prospectively claiming nationals themselves in the process of taking inventory of possible 
claims.
As decisions eventually are made regarding the scope of the claims to be asserted and the 
process by which they are to be pursued - i.e., by negotiation, or under the provisions of 
Articles 8 or 24 of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of 1994, or before an existing 
international court or tribunal, or by establishing a new tribunal or commission, the shape 
of the process for preparing the claims will begin to emerge. The information and 
evidence required to support bilateral diplomatic negotiations for a lump sum settlement 
is likely to be considerably less, in volume, detail and refinement, than that needed to 
support a scheme whereby the Government itself would present claims both of itself and 
of individual nationals to an international tribunal or claims commission that hears them 
one at a time and requires a high standard of proof. The following paragraphs will deal 
first with state-to-state claims and then with claims of nationals.
The history of international claims indicates that specific claims of one state against 
another for a breach of international law, if they are to be adjudged favorably to the 
claiming state, invariably must meet a certain standard of proof. They must take into 
consideration, however, the age of the claims and the circumstances in which they arose, 
either (or both) of which can affect the quality and availability of evidence. Currently
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valid statements of such standard include those of the United Nations Compensation 
Commission (“UNCC”) (handling all claims against Iraq for “any direct loss, damage... 
or injury.., as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait [starting 2 
August 1990]742, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”):
UNCC Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, Article 35 states that:
“1) Each claimant is responsible for submitting documents and 
other evidence which demonstrate satisfactorily that a particular 
claim.., is eligible for compensation...
3) With respect to claims [of, inter alia, “Governments and 
International Organizations” ]..., such claims must be supported by 
documentary and other appropriate evidence sufficient to 
demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the claimed loss.” 743
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 
Article 24(l)states that;
“Each party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to 
support his claim or defence.” 744
742 See, UNSC Resolution 687 (1991), para. 16, available at www.unog.ch
743 See, Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, Annex to UNCC Governing Council Decision No. 10, UN 
doc. S/ AC.26/1992/10 (26 June 1992), available at http:/ /  www.unog.ch/uncc, at Art. 35.
744 See, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., Final Tribunal Rules o f Procedure (3 May 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S. 
C.T.R. 405. It should be noted that this is identical to the same Article of the Arbitration Rules o f the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL Rules”), promulgated by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1976 (UNGA Resolution 31/98), and authorized for use in numerous 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties around the world. See, for example, Treaty Between the 
Government o f the United States o f America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom o f  Jordan 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection o f  Investment, 2 July 1997, available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/bit-jordan.pdf. Article IX 3.(a)iii. Other international claims 
institutions are likely to follow the Tribunal’s example.
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As to the ICJ, its practice is described as follows:745
“Generally, in application of the principle actori incumbit probatio 
the Court will formally require the party putting forward a claim to 
establish the elements of facts and of law on which the decision in 
its favour might be given. If in the final submissions both parties 
lay claim to the same object, for instance disputed territory, each 
will have to establish its case. As the Court has said: “Ultimately... 
it is the litigant seeking to establish a fact who bears the burden of 
proving it; and in cases where evidence may not be forthcoming, a 
submission may in the judgment be rejected as unproved (Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility) case, [1986] 387 (para. 65)).”
While these statements of the mle give no direct guidance as to precise level or standard 
of proof that may be deemed “sufficient,” experience indicates that international courts, 
tribunals and commissions in fact almost invariably require convincingly “high,” levels 
of actual proof before sustaining a claim against a sovereign (whether or not the claim is 
that of another sovereign). This point is difficult to discern from the texts of actual 
decisions, and is not easily apparent even from the writings of learned publicists. 
Nonetheless it is a fact commonly accepted among experienced practitioners in the field. 
The level of proof actually required is likely to be in direct proportion to the political 
sensitivity of the claim. Hence it may be anticipated that as a practical matter the burden 
of proof against which Jordanian claims against Israel, especially those of a particularly 
controversial character, will be tested will not be a relaxed one.
There are, as previously indicated, however, two qualifications to this principle. The age 
of claims (in the present case well over half a century as to a number of potential claims) 
generally is understood to affect the availability and quality of proof, i.e., witnesses have
745 Rosenne, S. The Law and Practice o f the International Court, 1920-1996, (1997). p. 1083
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died and documents have been lost or destroyed. Further, it often is inherent in the 
circumstances in which claims have arisen, e.g., revolution, political upheaval or war (as 
in the present case), that the availability and quality of proof will be similarly affected. In 
other words, international adjudicators tend to evaluate evidence against the background 
of what they believe is or should be available to the claimant. As was noted by Professor 
Michel Virally, sitting as Chairman of Chamber Three of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, in a memorandum excerpted in the Buckamier award:
“The Tribunal has, in the past, adopted a pragmatic and moderate 
approach... by deciding, on a case by case basis, whether the 
burden of proof has been properly sustained by each contending 
party, taking into consideration [the parties’] declarations together 
with all other evidence submitted in the case, the particulars of the 
case and the attitude of both parties in the proceedings.
[I]t must be recognized that in many claims filed with the Tribunal, 
claimants face specific difficulties in the matter of evidence, for 
which they are not responsible. Such is particularly the case when 
U.S. claimants were forced by revolutionary events and the chaotic 
situation prevailing in Iran at the time, to rush out of Iran without 
haying the opportunity or the. time tq take with them their .files* 
including documents which normally should be submitted as 
evidence in support of their claims. In many instances, the situation 
in Iran between the establishment of the Revolutionary Islamic 
Government on 11 February 1979 and the taking of the American 
Embassy on 4 November 1979 was not sufficiently settled to 
permit a return in Iran or, in case of return, ... to recover the files 
left behind. After 4 November 1979, and up to the critical dates of 
19 January 1981 [the date of the Algiers Accords establishing the 
Tribunal] and 19 January 1982 [the deadline for filing claims], 
collection of documents in Iran by U.S. nationals was almost 
impossible. Obviously, these facts made it very difficult for the 
claimants who did not keep copies of their files outside Iran to 
sustain their burden of proof in the ways which would be expected 
in normal circumstances. In view of these facts, the Tribunal could 
not apply a rigorous standard of evidence to the claimants without 
injustice. In adopting a flexible approach to this issue, however, it 
must not lose sight of its duty to protect the respondents against
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claims not properly evidenced. At any rate, it must be satisfied that 
the facts on which its awards rely are well established and fully 
comply with the provisions of... its Rules of procedure.
In order to keep an equitable and reasonable balance between those 
contradictory requisites, the Tribunal must take into consideration 
the specific circumstances of each case, as well as all the elements 
which can confirm or contradict the declarations submitted by the 
Claimants. The list of such elements is practically unlimited and 
varies from case to case. The absence or existence of internal 
contradictions within these declarations, or between them and 
events or facts which are known by other means, is obviously one 
of them. Explicit or implied admission by the other party is 
another, as well as the lack of contest or the failure to adduce 
contrary evidence, when such evidence is apparently available or 
easily accessible. In relation to this last element, however, the 
Tribunal must not disregard the fact that destruction due to 
revolutionary events or to the war, the departure from Iran of 
persons responsible for the conduct of the business at the time of 
the facts referred to in the claim, changes in the direction or the 
management of the undertakings concerned, can also impair the 
Respondents’ ability to produce evidence. It is often a delicate task 
to determine if and to what extent respondents would be 
responsible for such a difficulty.”746
Thus a comparatively modest showing from a party having to contend with “old facts” 
that, in addition, became such in an environment of fast-moving violence may succeed in 
securing an award or a judgment where the same showing might well be deemed 
insufficient to justify a very fresh claim for an asserted loss occurring in a peaceful, if not 
altogether normal, political context.
In summary, then, on this point, Jordan’s own claims (for the losses of the state,
746 See, W Jack Buckamier and The Islamic Republic o f  Iran, et al.. Award No. 528-941-3 (6 Mar. 1992), 
reprinted in 28 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 53. 74-76; see also Sola Tiles, Inc. and The Government o f  the Islamic 
Republic o f  Iran, Award No. 298-317-1 (22 Apr. 1987), reprinted in 14 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 223, 238.
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excluding any losses of its nationals), must be prepared so as to provide a high level of 
proof. While the “upward” effect on the level required that is caused by the presumably 
highly contentious nature of Jordan’s claims is likely to be ameliorated to the extent those 
claims are rooted in the events of 1948, the net result, it should be anticipated, is likely to 
be still that a high level of proof must be adduced if success is to be achieved. In any 
event, it must always be kept in mind that there is no such thing as proving one’s case too 
strongly, too well. Of course a point hypothetically can be reached beyond which further 
proof is simply so cumulative of an already convincing case as not to be even remotely 
worth the effort of collecting and submitting it. Short of such an obvious situation, 
however, in matters of proof it almost invariably is true that “more is better.” A judge, 
arbitrator or negotiator naturally is more easily prone to accept a contested proposition 
that he sees is proven credibly three different ways than he is to endorse one of two 
contending theories pitted against each other.
The approach to large masses of claims of individuals pioneered by the UNCC has been 
emulated by the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland and 
others. It may well recommend itself to Jordan, whether in the context of a negotiated 
claims commission or tribunal, or as part of the process of negotiating and distributing an 
eventual lump sum settlement. Such a scheme may be particularly suited to the 
processing of claims of Jordanian nationals against Israel, given the fact, as is shown 
previously, that there appear to be natural categories of claimants (e.g., 1948 and 1967 
departees), some of whom appropriately might be compensated on a UNCC-style basis, 
particularly given the numbers involved and the length of time that has passed since the
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events giving rise to such claims. It is clear that to the extent such “mass claims” 
treatment appears to be a possibility, the claims preparation process may be pursued, 
correspondingly, in less depth. On this basis, too, it might be justified for the inventory- 
taking process discussed previously to be conducted with little (or possibly no) direct 
participation of prospectively claiming nationals. Without judging the issue on this point, 
it should be considered, having regard for the facts and sources set forth before in this 
chapter, whether information already available to the Government of Jordan may be 
sufficient for present purposes.
The Treaty of Peace between Jordan and Israel contains provisions that provide for 
mechanisms, forums and procedures which could serve as avenues in which claims can 
be brought by Jordan on behalf of its nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin 
relating to their right of return and compensation. The Treaty also contains, as explained 
provisions that could provide a forum for Jordan to bring and present compensation 
claims to and against Israel as a host state.
Those provisions are not however watertight and problem free. Article 8 of the Treaty 
provides, as explained in detail, for forums and procedures that have in reality been 
dormant for many years now and involve other parties. This is especially the case in 
relation to the quadripartite committee and the Multilateral working Group on refugees. 
Additionally, this Article, while not excluding the possibility of resorting to other 
procedural mechanisms and forums as stipulated in its chapeau, links the inception of 
aspects of the discussion aimed at resolving the Problem of refugees and their rights to
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return and compensation to the inception of permanent status negotiations between Israel 
and the Palestinians. Such negotiations, in spite of the fact that they were envisioned to 
begin in 1998, did not begin to date.
Additionally, the claims commission whose establishment is stipulated in Article 24 and 
who is entrusted, in accordance with the article, with “the mutual settlement of all 
financial claims” has not even been set up after 12 years of signing the Peace Treaty 
between Jordan and Israel. There has been no discussion on its establishment, 
composition, mandate, terms of reference or the nature of claims that fall within its 
jurisdiction.
Jordan could be well advised to initiate formal diplomatic contacts with Israel requesting 
to initiate the bilateral talks pertaining to refugees as envisioned in Article 8. Equally, it 
would be advisable that the Jordanian government begin discussion without any further 
delay on.setting up.the claims commission provided.for in Article 24 and developing, in 
agreement with Israel, it composition, competence, jurisdiction and identify with 
precision the types of claims that fall within its mandate.
It would not be practical, feasible or advisable for Jordan to attempt to invoke article 29 
relating to dispute settlement before it takes diplomatic steps to activate articles 8 and 24. 
it is the activation of the those two articles and discussions conducted in their context that 
could give rise to a “ dispute” in the context of the “application and interpretation” of the 
Peace Treaty that would in turn allow for dispute settlement mechanisms contained in
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Article 29 to come into operation.
This very same rationale would apply to non Peace Treaty based mechanisms. Jordan 
would be well advised to first engage Israel formally in the context of bilateral talks 
referred to in Article 8 relating to refugees. It will also have to engage in talks to set up 
the claims commission provided for in Article 24 and test the waters and scope of 
satisfaction that is provided in the context of those two provisions before it seeks to resort 
to non treaty based mechanisms such as contentious or advisory proceedings before the 
ICJ or non Peace Treaty based dispute settlement, although possible, procedures such as 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration.
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CONCLUSION
Palestinian refugees have a right to return to their homes of origin in Israel and to the 
West Bank. They also have a right to compensation. The two rights, as indicated 
throughout this thesis are complementary and not mutually exclusive. The right of return 
and right to compensation naturally apply to Jordanian nationals who are of Palestinian 
refugee origin from the period of 1947-1949 and its aftermath or the 1967 war and its 
aftermath and their descendants. This right of return is clearly established in the context 
United Nations Resolutions, the law of nationality, human rights law and humanitarian 
law. It is also implied in certain provisions of the Jordan-Israel Treaty of Peace. The right 
of compensation for Palestinian refugees, including ones who are Jordanian nationals, is 
also well established in international law. Naturally, Jews who fled certain Arab countries 
and who were nationals of such countries in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict have 
the right to return to their homes of origin in such countries and have a right to 
compensation, especially when the circumstances ot their night are similar to the ones in 
which Palestinian refugees were forced to leave predominantly under coercion.
Jordan is rather unique in the manner by which it has treated Palestinian refugees. It has 
conferred upon them its nationality as early as 1954 unlike all other host countries. 
Palestinians who were original inhabitants of the West Bank also became Jordanian 
nationals when Jordan incorporated the West Bank in 1950. They continued to be 
Jordanian nationals after the occupation of the West Bank by Israel in 1967. Those
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original inhabitants of the West Bank who left and came to Jordan as a result of and after 
Israel’s occupation in 1967 continue to be Jordanian Nationals to date. The only 
exception to this is that Jordanian nationality was revoked from inhabitants of the West 
Bank who were still physically residents there and not in Jordan when it enacted its legal 
and administrative disengagement with the West Bank in 1988.
Jordan is also unique in terms of it being the host country of almost two thirds of the 
entire Palestinian refugee population. Almost half of the population of Jordan today is of 
Palestinian refugee origin.
Jordanian nationals of Palestinian refugee origin, unlike Palestinian refugees elsewhere, 
have the advantage of possessing the nationality of a state almost from the date of their 
expulsion or forced departure. While there are procedural and legal hurdles for 
Palestinian refugees to bring and present claims to and against Israel in relation to return 
to their homes and to compensation, owing to the fact that as individuals they do not have 
available forums to bring claims against a state with the exception of Israeli courts who in 
turn have not been providing any effective remedies. Palestinian refugees who are 
Jordanian nationals have the benefit of being nationals of a state that can bring claims on 
their behalf to and against Israel in the context of diplomatic protection. Their nationality 
link to Jordan is well established, genuine and effective and most certainly not one that is 
acquired for purposes of exercising diplomatic protection. They have been nationals of 
Jordan for decades.
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Jordan undoubtedly has the right to present and bring claims to and against Israel on 
behalf of its nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin in the context of extending 
Diplomatic Protection to them. This is particularly possible and legitimate owing to the 
fact that Israeli legislation either does not provide for any effective remedies for those 
individuals neither in relation to compensating them or allowing them to return nor does 
it allow, in the majority of cases, for any form of recourse to a satisfactory procedure 
altogether.
Indeed, while Jordan can extend Diplomatic Protection to its nationals who are of 
Palestinian refugee origin, obstacles pertaining to ‘nationality at the time of injury’ could 
arise. This is particularly the case in relation to Jordanian nationals of Palestinian refugee 
origin from the period of 1947-1949 owing to the fact that they only became Jordanian 
nationals after passing the Jordanian Nationality law in 1954. Having said this, it must be 
noted that the issue pertaining to ‘nationality at the time of injury’ may not be fully 
relevant in the context of the particular circumstances surrounding the 1947-1949 events. 
Additionally, there are, as illustrated and explained in this thesis erga omnes aspects that 
would be of utility to Jordan in relation to bringing claims on behalf of its nationals who 
are of Palestinian refugee origin of the 1947-1949 period and their descendants in the 
event that problems arise in certain cases where the issue of ‘nationality at the time of 
injury’ may prove problematic.
Obstacles of the nature described in the preceding paragraph do not arise in the context of 
Jordanian nationals of Palestinian refugee origin who were original inhabitants of the
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West Bank and fled to Jordan and continue to reside therein after Israel occupied the 
West Bank in 1967. Those have been Jordanian nationals from the date Jordan 
incorporated the West Bank in 1950.
This right that Jordan has to present claims on behalf of its nationals who are of 
Palestinian refugee origin is exclusive in nature. No other party, including the PLO, can 
claim to have such a right in relation to Jordanians of Palestinian refugee origin without 
Jordan’s explicit consent. The exclusive nature of this right emanates from the fact that 
Jordan has clearly indicated, as explained in chapter 1 of this thesis, that the decision of 
the Arab League Rabat Summit of 1974, recognizing the PLO as the sole and legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian People is ‘without prejudice to the full and exclusive 
right of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in relation to all nationals thereof.’747
Jordan’s right and locus standi in relation to its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin is 
reinforced by Article 8 of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. The Article recognizes, 
throughout it various paragraphs,, Jordan’s standing in relation to Palestinian refugees.
Jordan also stands in a unique position in an adverse sense. It hosts, as explained 
previously, the largest number of Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. It extends to the 
overwhelming majority of them its nationality with its full benefits. The number of 
Palestinian refugees in other Arab countries and elsewhere is at the most in the range of 
three hundred thousand refugees in each of such countries and pales when compared to
747 See for the text o f  the the Resolution o f the Arab League Rabat Summit Meeting and the text o f Jordan’s 
reservation in the authentic Arabic text ‘ MAJMUATALWATHAIK", (1975), op.cit, p. 243-245.
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their number in Jordan which is in excess of two and a half million. Therefore, Jordan as 
a result of the huge number of Palestinian refugees who were forced to leave their homes 
by Israel to Jordan and have been residing therein and whose majority are nationals, have 
incurred immense financial losses directly associated with absorbing, catering and 
providing for Palestinian refugees in terms of services, subsidies, infrastructure and 
pressures on the natural and already scarce water resources. Jordan was forced to incur 
such immense financial costs not by choice but as a direct result of unlawful Israeli 
actions leading to the generation of refugees and their flight to Jordan predominantly and 
to other countries. Accordingly, Jordan being the host state of large numbers of 
Palestinian refugees is entitled to seek compensation from Israel, being the country 
whose unlawful actions led to the generation of Palestinian refugees. Such a right is 
premised on Israel’s state responsibility for wrongful acts.
Israel’s international responsibility provides a basis for Jordan’s right to bring claims on 
behalf of its nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin to and against Israel 
regarding their.right of return and right to compensation. It also provides a basis for 
Jordan’s right to seek compensation as a host state from Israel being the state whose 
wrongful actions created the refugee generation. The wrongful actions and measures, as 
highlighted in the thesis, are of a nature that is clearly attributable to the State of Israel.
Jordan has a number of well founded claims that it can consider bringing to and Against 
Israel on behalf of its nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin relating to their right 
of return and right to compensation and to bring compensation claims, as a host state, for
313
financial losses that it has been incurring as a host state. Such claims indeed require that 
availability of mechanisms and forums for their pursuit.
The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty contains certain provisions that provide for mechanisms 
and procedures which could serve as appropriate avenues for bringing such claims. 
Article 8 of the Treaty, as explained in the thesis in detail, provides for bilateral 
discussions, a Quadripartite Committee, a Multilateral Working Group and UN 
Programmes. Article 24 provides for the establishment of a claims commission that deals 
with all financial claims. Regrettably, the mechanisms provided for in both Articles have 
not achieved any meaningful progress. No bilateral talks of any substance have taken 
place between Jordan and Israel relating to solving the problem of Jordanian Nationals 
who are of Palestinian refugee origin in terms of return and compensation. The 
Quadripartite Committee and Multilateral Working Group have not convened for the past 
eight years as a result of the overall stagnant status of the Peace Process and no 
permanent status negotiations have began between Israel and the Palestinians which 
would allow Jordan, as stipulated in Article 8 of the Peace Treatv to hold talks with Israel 
relating to refugees “in conjunction with and at the same time as”. The financial claims 
commission that was provided for in Article 24 has not come to life either.
Additionally, assuming that mechanisms and procedures provided for in Article 8 had 
been functioning, and as noted in preceding chapters, the language of the Article is not 
watertight and does not give clear and explicit guidelines or terms of reference for 
solving the problem. This Article and other Articles that may have relevance to the issue
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of Palestinian Refugees in the Peace Treaty do not appear to substantiate or serve the 
contention of Jordan that the Peace Treaty, among other accomplishments, “ensures the 
rights of refugees and displaced persons in determining their fate and giving them the 
right of return and compensation.”
The financial claims commission whose establishment is provided for in Article 24, was 
not established either. Its establishment, composition, competence, Jurisdiction and scope 
of activity are not clarified in the Article and are left for the two parties to agree upon in 
later talks. Such talks have not occurred and when they do, the process of setting up such 
a commission and agreeing on its composition, competence, Jurisdiction and scope of 
activity is not likely going to be an easy process or one with clear outcomes.
Nevertheless, the provisions of the Peace Treaty are not devoid of any meaning or utility. 
They still provide for broad and general mechanisms and procedures for the presentation 
of potential claims and could prove useful if forums such as the quadripartite committee 
and Multilateral Working Group resume their work or in the case of Article.24, if a 
claims committee is set up. Article 8, although very generic, still stipulates that human 
problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East are to be resolved ‘in accordance with 
international law.’ Furthermore it does not preclude the possibility of resorting to other 
procedures and mechanisms for the presentation of claims that are not provided for in the 
Article or the Treaty. Such procedures and mechanisms could conceivably be in the form
748 See, Jordan Media Group Publication Number 18, November 1994, titled “The Jordan-Israel Peace 
Treaty: What is It?,” op.cit.
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conciliation, mediation, arbitration or recourse to advisory or contentious proceedings at 
the ICJ. They will also require agreement of both parties to resort to them.
The Peace Treaty reiterated, reinforced and confirmed Jordan’s standing vis-a-vis the 
issue of Jordanian Nationals who are of Palestinian refugee origin. This in itself is an 
accomplishment. Also, it did not exclude the possibility of, and may have paved the way 
for a possible and imaginable potential recourse to other procedures not provided for in 
the Treaty itself. Such procedures would not have been even conceivable had there not 
been a Treaty of Peace signed between the two countries. It would not have been 
imaginable or realistic to ponder the possibility of two states at war resorting to 
conciliation, mediation, negotiation, arbitration or International Judicial Proceedings. 
Such possibilities were only rendered possible and available to Jordan as a result of the 
Peace Treaty.
Jordan would be well advised to initiate without any further delay formal diplomatic 
contacts, with Israel requesting to launch formal bilateral .negotiations, ip the. context of 
Articles 8 and 24. The aim of such negotiations would be to agree on a detailed bilateral 
framework in which the issue of claims on behalf of Jordanian Nationals of Palestinian 
refugees in relating to their right of return and compensation can be brought by Jordan 
and the issue of its compensation claims as a host state. Also, Jordan ought to request 
setting up the claims commission provided for in Article 24 and insist that it should be 
established. Jordan must seek to bring all the major claims that it has under the 
jurisdiction and competence of this commission. All of this requires Israel’s consent.
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If Jordan is not satisfied by Israel’s reaction to its formal diplomatic communications or 
if Israel’s engagement does not lead to an agreement that is satisfactory to Jordan and a 
‘dispute’ arises then in the context of ‘application’ or ‘interpretation’ of the Peace Treaty, 
Jordan then can formally request from Israel to enter into negotiations aiming at resolving 
such a ‘dispute’ within the context of Article 29 of the Peace Treaty and if such 
negotiations fail recourse then can be made to conciliation or submitted to arbitration as 
stipulated in Article 29. Israel and Jordan will again have to both agree to the conciliation 
and arbitration details.
Alternatively, Jordan could seek agreement with Israel to resort to non Peace Treaty 
based mechanisms and set up mediation, conciliation, arbitration, special claims tribunal 
or institute international Judicial Proceedings to deal with claims enumerated in this 
thesis specifically. It is unlikely that Israel would consent to participate in an international 
Judicial settlement procedure in any event regarding issues pertaining to the right of 
return of Refugees.
While the right of return of Palestinian refugees, including those who are Jordanian 
nationals, is solidly established in international law, it is not likely that all or even the 
majority of Palestinian refugees would be allowed to return to what is today recognized 
Israeli territories. This is ascribed to the fact that there is general recognition that massive 
scale return of Palestinian refugees to Israel would in fact endanger and dilute the Jewish 
character of the State of Israel. It is unlikely, that any international tribunal would
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actually give effect to the right of return on a massive scale to Palestinian refugees to 
what is today recognized as Israeli territory.
Ultimately, the solution of the Palestinian refugee problem will predominantly be one 
that would allow the exercise of the right of return to a Palestinian State that emerges 
from the Peace Process when resumed subject to absorption capacity. Some refugees, in 
limited numbers, may be allowed to return to Israel. The solution of the Problem of the 
overwhelming majority of Palestinian refugees who do not return to such a Palestinian 
state will most likely be through their settlement in countries in which they currently live 
or to third countries that are willing to resettle them. This would be coupled with paying 
compensation to those returning and non returning refugees.
Therefore, for realistic and practical purposes, Jordan would be advised to focus its 
claims to matters of compensation of its nationals of Palestinian refugee origin and 
compensation as a host country predominantly.
Jordan should not wait until the Peace Process resumes before it initiates a process of 
negotiations with Israel and would indeed be better advised to delve into such a process 
without any further delay.
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